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INTRODUCTION
The general purpose of my dissertation is to
investigate how we come to understand ourselves once the
conception of subjectivity has been displaced from its
foundational position in metaphysics. I call this problem
the displacement of subjectivity, and I examine the problem
of the displacement of subjectivity by enacting a reading of
Heidegger's readings of Kant. I choose this approach to the
problem because Heidegger was one of the first thinkers to
investigate the problem of displacement.

1

Further, Heidegger

enacted his investigation into the issue of the self through
a critical retrieval of Kant, who was one of the first
thinkers to institute radically the conception of
subjectivity as the ground of metaphysics. Thus an
investigation of Heidegger's readings of Kant will show how
the conception of subjectivity is displaced, and how the

1

Heidegger does not use the term displacement.
However, Heidegger brings the idea of the metaphysics of
subjectivity into question and raises the issue of selfunderstanding within his own thought. Displacement is a term
I use to encapsulate the problem of the transposed
understanding of the self, once that self-understanding lies
outside the framework of the metaphysics of subjectivity.
1

2
displacement results in a different understanding of the
self.
I develop my approach to the problem of the
displacement of subjectivity in four parts. In the first
chapter, I reintroduce and clarify the problem of
displacement in the following way: first I specify the
problem; second I situate my dissertation within my
understanding of contemporary thought; third I describe the
phenomenon of displacement through the phenomenon of
decentering; and fourth I discuss three modes of reading the
history of philosophy and justify why I choose certain ways
of reading over other ways of reading the history of
philosophy.
In the second chapter I begin my examination of Kant.
In order to understand how the displacement of subjectivity
takes place within the Kantian project, we must first
understand Kant's new conception of metaphysics. Once we
understand the Kantian project, we can begin to gain an
understanding of the Kantian conception of the imagination.
I concentrate on the imagination because, as we come to see,
the imagination is the factor that displaces subjectivity.
In order to come to the point where we can understand the
displacing effect of the imagination within subjectivity, we
must first understand the role of the imagination. The
examination of the imagination in this chapter focuses on
its empirical and anthropological function, as the

3

imagination appears in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point
of View.
In the third chapter I examine Kant's conception of
the imagination within the Critique of Pure Reason. I
concentrate on the Kantian conception of the imagination
because I am examining Heidegger's retrieval of the
imagination in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. My
particular focus is on Kant's presentation of the epistemic
and ontological functions of the imagination.
The investigation of the Kantian conception of the
imagination in the second and third chapters has three
purposes. First I examine Kant's understanding of the
empirical employment of the imagination. This investigation
takes place at the end of chapter two. The study of the
imagination in the APP serves to establish a contrast
between the empirical and transcendental employment of the
imagination. Further, the examination of the imagination in
the APP serves as a clue to Kant's consistency regarding the
imagination in the CPR. Second I investigate the imagination
in the first edition deduction of the CPR. This
investigation occurs in the first part of chapter three. I
must point out that the two deductions written by Kant share
the same metaphysical deduction, and thus Kant changes only
the transcendental deductions. In this section, the
examination of the metaphysical deduction of the categories
applies to the two transcendental deductions. After
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examining the metaphysical deduction, I give the argument of
1

the A Deduction." Third I examine the place of the
imagination in the second edition deduction. I have two
purposes for examining the imagination in the B edition of
the CPR. On the one hand, I want to see the differences
between the two deductions.

On the other hand, I want to

show how the imagination does not lose its place of priority
in Kant's ontology. On this point I am in disagreement with
Heidegger's reading of the B edition. The two deductions are
different, but I do not see a recoil in the Kantian
conception of the imagination. The deductions are different
for other reasons. Specifically, I argue that the deductions
are different in terms of their directionality. I understand
the A Deduction as phenomenological description of the
validity of the categories, while I understand the B
Deduction as a strict transcendental deduction with no
empirical admixture. This will become clear when I address
the issue in the third chapter.
At this point I must make a disclaimer. I am not going
to investigate the entire corpus of Kant's examination of
the imagination in the CPR, because I am going to omit a
discussion of Kant's conception of "The Schematism of the
Pure Concepts of Understanding.'' I omit a discussion of the
schematism for three reasons. The first reason involves my

2

I will refer to the first edition of the CPR as the A
edition and the second edition of the CPR as the B edition.
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approach to the solution of the differences between the
deductions. Kant did not change his idea of schematism in
either edition of the CPR. This fact alone proves nothing
about the role of the imagination in the two deductions. At
best, the fact that the schematism remains unchanged
provides a challenge to Heidegger's claim in KPM regarding
the Kantian recoil from the imagination. However, the
analysis of the schematism reveals nothing about the role of
the imagination in the deductions themselves. The second
reason I omit a discussion of the schematism arises from
Heidegger's analysis of the imagination in KPM. Heidegger's
study of the schematism occurs in the second section of KPM.
In this section, Heidegger shows how Kant carries out the
laying of the foundations of metaphysics. The second section
of KPM precedes Heidegger's understanding of the imagination
in its primordiality. Heidegger presents the primordial
character of the imagination in the third section of KPM. My
concern is with Heidegger's understanding of the imagination
in its primordial character and with Heidegger's retrieval
of the imagination in its temporal character. The third
reason I omit a discussion of the schematism concerns the
direction I take in my dissertation. If my paper were on an
understanding of Temporalitat, Kant's and Heidegger's
conception of schemata as transcendental time determinations
and horizonal, temporal interpretations would be important
factors. A discussion of the schemata would take us in the

6

direction of Heidegger's discussion of metontology, but the
topic of metontology lies outside the boundaries of my
dissertation.
In the fourth chapter I examine Kant's understanding
of the imagination through two double readings. A double
reading of a text is either a reading that exposes unthought
of possibilities within a text and/or a reading that sees
how the text disrupts the intentions within the text. I
examine the first type of double reading in KPM, and I
perform the second type of double reading upon the Kantian
analysis of the imagination. In accordance with my
dissertation, I investigate the effect these readings have
upon the conception of subjectivity.
Heidegger carries out the first type of double reading
upon Kant in his examination and retrieval of the
imagination. Explicitly we see Heidegger's double reading in
two places in KPM. The first occurs in Heidegger's
examination of the primordial character of imagination, and
the second occurs in his retrieval of the imagination in
terms of the conception of fundamental ontology. These two
readings take place in sections three and four of KPM, and I
concentrate on these two sections. We will see how the
retrieval of the imagination moves us from the conception of
ourselves as subjects to a conception of ourselves as
Dasein.

7

I perform the second double reading. Where Heidegger
pulls the imagination into his own project, I want to see
how the Kantian conception of the imagination is disruptive
to the Kantian project. In other words, if Kant's purpose is
to establish subjectivity as the ground of the emergence of
entities, i.e., as being, and if we understand being as
presence, then I want to show how another reading of Kant
defers the desire for presence in the metaphysical project.
I show that the imagination resists incorporation into the
framework of the metaphysics of presence, and that presence
has within it an irretrievable absence. At this point, I
discuss the disruptive effect of the imagination upon
subjectivity and how the disruption affects our thinking of
the self.

CHAPTER I
THE CLOSURE OF THE METAPHYSICS OF SUBJECTIVITY
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of my dissertation is to show how
Heidegger's reading of Kant brings to a close the
metaphysics of subjectivity, while at the same time to call
forth the need to rethink the meaning of who we are. I have
given the name displacement to this play of closing and
rethinking. This assertion requires some preliminary
explanation. If we understand ourselves as human entities,
then this mode of understanding must have within it both a
sense of what an entity is and a sense of how this entity
differentiates him/herself from other non-human entities. I
call this type of understanding an understanding of the
being of entities. We name the type of thinking that thinks
the being of entities metaphysical thinking, and we call the
discipline that investigates the being of entities
metaphysics. An understanding of being allows us to
understand what, that and how an entity is. In other words,
an understanding of being is an understanding that allows
8
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entities to come to be recognized as entities. In this
sense, being has an a priori character, since being is
always already there in any understanding of entities. Thus
being is earlier than, or prior to, entities for us and
allows us to understand entities as entities. We can
designate being as presence, since the understanding of
being allows us to understand how entities come to be
present as entities. As an understanding of the being of
entities, metaphysics can also be called ontology.
Metaphysics has the peculiar character of thinking the
being of entities in terms of a particular entity, viz., the
highest and most complete entity. Ordinarily, metaphysicians
have conceived of this entity in terms of an unique and allpowerful god. However, within the metaphysics of
subjectivity we understand the being of entities from the
perspective of subjectivity. In other words, the metaphysics
of subjectivity takes the subject as the phenomenon that
lets entities show themselves, or lets entities come to
presence, i.e., subjectivity is being and the self-conscious
subject is the highest entity. As an understanding of being
in terms of the highest entity, metaphysics can also be
called theology. When we gather the two parts of metaphysics
into a whole, we can designate metaphysics as onto-theology,
i.e., as an understanding of the totality of entities in
terms of the highest entity.

10

The designation of metaphysics as onto-theology is not
a neutral description of metaphysics. Instead, the
designation of metaphysics as onto-theology names a problem,
and the problem lies in the reduction of being to an entity,
albeit the highest entity. Metaphysical thought accounts for
its understanding of being always in terms of an entity.
However, an understanding of an entity presupposes an
understanding of being. Thus the being of the entity that
comes to represent being is never questioned, i.e., being
itself is never investigated. Instead, we come to understand
both entities as a whole and being in terms of the highest
entity. However, the being of the foundational entity, i.e.,
the being of the ground, remains unthought. Metaphysical
thought forgets the difference between being and entities
and leaves the difference unthought, which presents a
problem for metaphysics. The possibility of onto-theology
lies in the forgetfulness of being. 3
The metaphysics of subjectivity is onto-theological.
Unlike the metaphysics prior to Descartes, the metaphysics
of subjectivity has a peculiar character. Within the
3 In the essay "The Principle of Identity," Heidegger
shows that metaphysical thought accounts for itself in a
circular manner. He says that metaphysics is "thee-logic
because it is onto-logic" and "onto-logic because it is
thee-logic." As such, metaphysics can never account for its
ground, since it remains within this circle. If metaphysics
could explain the circle of onto-theology, then metaphysics
would transgress its own boundaries and cease to be
metaphysics. Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference,
trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969),
p.60.
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metaphysics of subjectivity, the understanding of being and
the essential understanding of ourselves as selfconsciousness go hand in hand. Within the metaphysics of
subjectivity, we come to understand ourselves as being
instead of understanding ourselves in relationship to being.
The result of understanding being in terms of selfconsciousness raises the following problem: if an
understanding of being gives us an understanding of entities
as entities, and if the subject is an entity, then we come
to understand being in terms of an entity. Thus the selfconscious subject shows itself to be the foundational
entity, or ground, within the metaphysics of subjectivity.
However, the understanding of being in terms of an entity
conflates the difference between being and entities and
leaves the difference unthought. Thus the metaphysics of
subjectivity remains entrenched within the problem of ontotheology. Being remains concealed within the metaphysics of
subjectivity, and the ontological difference is not
investigated. If the ontological difference remains
unthought within the metaphysics of subjectivity, then the
self-conscious subject does not show itself to be a
primordial phenomenon, i.e., does not show itself to be the
ground of metaphysics, because the ground has something
unthought within it. In other words, the notion of ground
comes into question.

12

The loss of the ground has at least two consequences.
First, the loss of the ground results in the recognition
that we do not understand being. Second, the loss of the
ground as the loss of the understanding of being means that
we lack the understanding of who we are. Now I can raise the
problem. If we understand the basic structures of
metaphysics in terms of self-consciousness, and if this
understanding of being comes radically into question, i.e.,
undergoes displacement, then how do we understand the
conception of human being when the foundation is undermined?
I contend that Heidegger performed this act of
displacement. Heidegger brought the conception of
subjectivity as a self-grounding and self-constituting
phenomenon into question, and thus Heidegger undermined the
metaphysics of subjectivity. In order to see how Heidegger
undermined the metaphysics of subjectivity, I am going to
examine Heidegger's own analyses of the place where
subjectivity received the first expression of its full
force, viz., within Kantian metaphysics. Particularly, I am
investigating the places where Kant shows subjectivity to be
the ground of metaphysics and the places where Heidegger
exposes the abyss within Kant's

~hinking

of the ground.

Where Kant's thinking attempts to reinstitute the activity
of metaphysics, Heidegger's thinking decenters the very
basis of metaphysics. But then the question arises: how do

13

we understand ourselves when the ground for that
understanding has been removed?
Within the brief introduction of the problem of
displacement just given, I have raised the following issues:
the current situation cf contemporary thought, the
phenomenon of decentering, and the problem of interpreting
the history philosophy. I will now expand on these issues
and set the stage for the dissertation more explicitly than
I have done up to this point.
B. THE LOCUS OP CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT:
THE CLOSURE OF METAPHYSICS
Philosophy is not conducted in a void. Every
philosophical undertaking has its own locus that arises out
of a current situation, and the task of the philosopher is
to respond to the given situation. For the response to be
possible, the philosopher must have an understanding of the
current state of affairs. Thus the question arises: how do I
assess the current philosophical situation?
I introduce my assessment of the philosophical
situation through Nietzsche. In the Twilight of the Idols,
Nietzsche discusses what he calls the "history of an
error. 114 This Nietzschean outline of the history of an error
traces the various interpretations of the concept of the
4

Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The
Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking
Press, 1968), pp. 485-486.
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"true world" from Greek philosophy up to the present day. In
this historical outline, Nietzsche reveals that the
conception of the "true world" has changed six times.
One possible explanation for the changing conception
of truth is that we possess more knowledge than the previous
generations possessed. This explanation would be rooted in
the idea that humankind progresses from primitive to
civilized conditions, and thus humankind sees matters more
clearly as we progress out of our ignorant condition.
However, another explanation is possible. I can
understand and explain the changes in the true world as
displacements. If we linger a moment on Nietzsche's
reflection, we can see a different idea at work than the
idea of progress. If we give thought to the idea of the true
world changing, then we must realize that we are confronted
with a contradiction. The contradiction arises from the fact
that according to the definition of the word "truth," what
is true should not change. Truth should abide. However, what
the history reveals is that truth does not abide, i.e. truth
changes. As a matter of fact, the very conception of the
true world undergoes changes or displacements. Within
Nietzsche's interpretation, the conception of the true
world, synonymously called being, has been degenerating,
i.e., losing power. If we consider being as presence, and if
being is equated with truth, then Nietzsche presents being
as becoming absent. Being is not there. The true is not

15

true. What should be constant changes. Thus the concept of
the true world is a myth, meaning in Nietzsche's sense, an
error. According to Nietzsche, the current stage of this
history is the recognition of the abolition of the true
world.
If the true world shows itself as an untruth, then
the question arises: "What world has remained? 115 The
quickest and the most thoughtless answer to the question is
that the world of mere appearance remains once the true
world is abolished. In the Republic, Plato called the world
of mere appearance the world of shadows. However, Nietzsche
discards this answer, because he recognizes that the true
world and the apparent world are correlates of each other.
The true and the apparent are not simply oppositional
concepts; they are also appositional concepts: one concept
explains the other concept. Thus without the true world, the
world of appearance must fall away as well. For Nietzsche,
the recognition of the dissolution of the true/apparent
world is characterized as "mid-day," the time of the least
shadows, and as an "end of the longest error."

6

With the

advent of midday, Nietzsche announces the end, or closure,
of metaphysical thought. The end of metaphysical thinking
calls forth a thinking that no longer accepts the

S Twilight, p.486.
6

Twilight, p.486.
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appositional oppositions as constituting philosophical
thought.

7

If each conception of the true world, or being,
operates as an interpretive model for entities within the
world, then the conception of the human entity must change
in each of those errors/eras, and the conception of the
human entity does change in each error/era. Nietzsche
structures the history of an error in terms of the different
conceptions of the human entity that arise in these
errors/eras. These different conceptions of the human entity
unfold within the six interpretations of the true world as
the "virtuous man," the "sinner," the subject, the
positivist, the "free spirit" and finally "Zarathustra."

8

As

we can see, Nietzsche refers to the subject as one of the
interpretations of the human entity, and thus the subject is
only one interpretation among many interpretations of the
human entity, depending upon how we conceive of truth and
being. Hence the understanding of what it means to be human
There is an element of Nietzschean irony present
within the history of an error. On the one hand, Nietzsche
shows that metaphysical thought cannot be consistent
according to its own standard of truth. In other words, if
truth is an error, then truth ends up being contradictory,
i.e., truth ends up being its opposite. On the other hand,
the error is what characterizes metaphysics. Thus
metaphysics cannot become consistent simply by revising its
idea of truth again. After all, the historical revision of
truth is precisely the problem Nietzsche is addressing. In
essence, the 'correction' of truth entails the abolition of
truth and, along with this, the abolition of the philosophy
of truth, i.e, metaphysics.
8

Twilight, pp. 485-486.
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has a history and changes along with the conceptions of
being. Thus, in opposition to the metaphysical understanding
of the self that tries to understand the self in terms of a
fixed essence, Nietzsche shows that our own selfunderstanding undergoes change, depending upon what
interpretation of the true world is operative during a
particular error/era. The conception of the self-conscious
subject is an error, since it is part of the history of an
error.
I understand the contemporary setting of philosophical
thought as being at the end of the history of an error. In
other words, I understand the current philosophical
situation as being within a history that has run its course
and come into question. I call the current philosophical
situation the closure, or the end, of metaphysics, and I am
placing my project within the advent of the closure.
I understand closure as the bringing into question of
what has not been questioned previously. In this sense, the
closure of metaphysics means neither the eradication of
metaphysical thought, the

~erfection

of thought, nor the

cessation of thinking. Instead the closure of metaphysical
thought is an opening into what has not been thought within
the text of metaphysics itself. The thinking of what has not
been thought in metaphysics is only possible if metaphysics
has reached a place where its appositional oppositions come
into question.

18
In "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,"
Heidegger defines "end'' in the following way:
The old meaning of the word "end" means the same
a~ place: from one end to the other means from one
place to another. The end of philosophy is the
place, that place in which the whole of
philosophy's history is gathered in its most
extreme pofsibility. End as completion means this
gathering.
The end as a gathering into completion is the closure of
metaphysical thought, where the foundational concepts of
philosophy come into question. What is given us to think is
the closure and the corresponding space the closure opens
up.
I want to examine the closure cf the metaphysics cf
subjectivity. This closure does not eradicate the conception
cf subjectivity and its corresponding conceptions of mind
and objectivity. Empirically speaking, we see that the
discourse of the metaphysics cf subjectivity operates in
philosophy today. Nonetheless, the closure heralded by
Nietzsche does bring the conception of subjectivity into
question. If we take Heidegger's sense of closure as end,
then we can see that the closure of something is a
redirecting of thought, where what is to be thought achieves
its utmost possibility.
Given our historical situation, certain possibilities
are given to us to think. I use the passive voice

9

Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell
Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 375.

19

construction quite consciously in this statement. While we
can respond to our historical situation, we are not the
authors of our historical situation. I cannot create the
space where questioning takes place, since I am always
already within the space. The way I have chosen to question
the metaphysics of subjectivity lies in the fact that the
metaphysics of subjectivity has fulfilled itself, and the
fulfillment allows for the very basis of the metaphysics of
subjectivity to be questioned. Philosophical thought has
undergone a displacement. For example, the closure and
reopening of the sensible/intelligible opposition in Kant's
thought, Marx's inversion of Hegelian thought and
Nietzsche's inversion of Platonism are facts given to us to
think in our contemporary milieu. Furthermore, we can think
beyond these possibilities. For example, we are at the point
of thinking the meaning of being and of thinking differance.
We can think these latter possibilities as well as the
former possibilities because a certain decentering occurs in
the focus of any text of metaphysics that brings certain
elements of the text into question. Inroads can be made into
this thought, but only if we recognize what is there to be
thought.
C. DECENTERING
The discussion of the setting of my dissertation has
brought me to the issue of decentering. Decentering is a way

20
to understand the play of displacement. First, I describe
decentering in general, and second I specify instances of
decentering in order to concretize the general conception.
The description of decentering leads me to a discussion of
the way I read the history of philosophy.
In a general sense, I understand decentering as a
force operative within any text that does not allow the text
to be self-contained. Since an understanding of decentering
depends on the phenomenon of the text, I must explain the
phenomenon of text. Then I can explain the way decentering
works within a text. A text is a network of differential
effects and forces held together by a unifying thread that
interweaves itself throughout this network.

10

The

differential play of forces within a text gives rise to
meaning. A text can be a book, but a text is not simply a
book. A text can also be a political institution, a
political issue, the field of metaphysics, the nuclear
issue, the conception of the university, a poem, a
photograph, a map, or any other place meaning could possibly
arise.

11

If I may be allowed a comparison, a text is both

similar and dissimilar to Heidegger's concept of the world
as a referential totality of our involvement with entities,
10

Jacques Derrida, "Critical Response: II: But
beyond ... ," trans. Peggy Kamuf, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, Autumn, 1986), 13, p. 168.
11

James Kern and James Newton, nAn Interview with .Jacques
Derrida," The Literary Review, (Edinburgh: Sunlight Press
Ltd., 1980), p. 21.
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ourselves and other people. On the one hand, a text is
similar to the phenomenon of world because a text is a
referential totality. The forces operative within the text
allow the different elements within the text to refer to
each other. On the other hand, a text is dissimilar to the
phenomenon of world because a text does not end and begin
with Dasein. In other words, a text is not simply the Worin
of Dasein's assignments but is the place where we find
ourselves assigned.
Generally, a text presents us with an interweaving of
forces that are connected by a guiding thread, i.e., the
oppositions within any text are not sporadic. On the one
hand, when we interpret or read a text we can see the
reasons why a text is ordered in a particular way, the
reasons one thing is granted priority over another thing,
the intentions of an author or participant within a text,
the historical period of the text, as well as other factors
too numerous to mention in this context. On the other hand,
there are elements within the text that disrupt the
intentions of the text. A text is like a Koch curve. A Koch
curve represents the paradox of infinite length with a
finite space, where the possibilities of the length are
dependent upon the initial shape of the figure. A text is a
finite space with a multitude of interpretations or
readings, where the readings are dependent upon the initial
text. Where a text represents a center, ground or guiding
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force within its confines, there is a play among these
forces that gives rise to possibilities not part of the
intentions at work in the text. This is what I call
decentering, viz., the play of forces that disrupt the text
and give rise to other possibilities of thought. A
decentering reading shows how the text does not retain its
homogeneity. In this context, homogeneity does not refer to
logical consistency. I will state overtly that any
philosophical text should be free of explicit contradiction,
otherwise we would be dealing with nonsense. In a text that
is homogeneous, there are forces at play that order and
>tructure the text according to a guiding principle.
Decentering, as a force of heterogeneity, disrupts the
intentional homogeneity of a text and brings the original
project of the text into question.
Since we have the general sense of decentering in
view, I can begin to specify how the force of decentering is
operative within a text. Decentering can occur in two ways.
On the one hand, decentering can result in a recentering of
the basic oppositions of

t~e

text. This type of decentering

occurs in metaphysics, where the decentered principle
becomes replaced by a new principle that restructures and
recenters the textual oppositions in a different way. On the
other hand, decentering can leave the text without a new
center, and what is left for us to think becomes something
other than what is given to us to think in the metaphysical
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project. In fact, a sense of otherness itself that is no
longer understood in reference to sameness is given us to
think. In order to explain the two different modes of
decentering, I will use two examples that relate to the
metaphysics of subjectivity. I exemplify the metaphysical
sense of decentering by briefly examining Descartes' move
from god to the subject as the ground of metaphysics, and I
exemplify a non-metaphysical sense of decentering by
reexamining Nietzsche's history of an error. My examples
must be brief at this juncture and are only inserted for
explanatory purposes. Since I consider my own project to be
a project of decentering, the full comprehension of how to
understand the play of decentering can only be seen as we
proceed through my text.
I place the beginning of the metaphysics of
subjectivity within Cartesian thought. To see the beginning
of modern thought in Descartes is not new, and I see no
reason to change this beginning. My reasoning is that
Descartes was the first to view the phenomenon of the
subject, i.e., the cogito, as the foundation for the
understanding of all entities. Only through a

clear and

distinct representation of the self as a thinking entity can
we come to any certainty about entities outside of us.
Through understanding the cogito ergo sum as the first
principle and ground of certainty, the subject becomes the
highest being and makes possible the presence of other
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entities. The subject becomes the center of metaphysics,
i ,e •

I

the subject stands as the hub of onto-theology.
Within the metaphysics of subjectivity, we define the

subject as self-consciousness. Through self-consciousness,
the subject becomes the ground for the understanding of
entities. As self-conscious, I am not simply aware of
entities confronting me. Instead, I am aware that I am aware
of entities. In other words, I come to an understanding of
objects as being objects through self-consciousness.
With Descartes and the advent of the centrality of
subjectivity, a decentering move occurred. Where a
conception of god as the moving principle or creator of all
entities occupied a central position in the thought of
metaphysics, now the subject began to occupy a central
position. With the displacement of god and the replacement
. of the subject as the highest entity, both a decentering and
a recentering occurred within metaphysical thought itself.
Playing with the metaphor of closure, let me say that
Descartes began to close, or call to an end, to the
foundation of Medieval thought by decentering the concept of
god and putting in god 1 s place the conception of the
subject. Descartes 1 decentering move does not eradicate the
concept of god. The subject is not creative of entities ex
nihilo. However the subject does become creative of
foundational representations, or thoughts, that allow for
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entities to show themselves.

12

Thus the displacement of one

ground gives rise to a replacement with another ground. The
displacement/replacement effects a transference from one
entity to another entity as the highest entity, while at the
same time giving rise to a new sense of being.
What I have just described is the metaphysical meaning
of decentering and closure. Within metaphysics, when one
ground is displaced, another arises to take its place. Thus
a decentering becomes a recentering, and metaphysical
thought has a new ground to think. This process of
decentering/recentering does not eradicate the previous
concepts. However the decentered concepts lose the power
they possessed under the previous interpretation, and the
recentered concepts are thought along the lines of the newly
established ground. For example, Descartes does not
eradicate the sensible/intelligible opposition, which is one
of the basic oppositions of metaphysical thinking. Instead
he rethinks the opposition within a new ground. In this way,
Descartes recenters the sensible/intelligible opposition
within metaphysics and redirects the opposition according to

12

I must point out that Descartes uses the coaito to
come to the knowledge of a god, because the cogito is not
primordial enough to assure itself of its own existence
outside of the present moment. In Descartes, the mode of
access to certainty through the cogito is in need of more
stable ground than the cogito can establish. Kant is the
first thinker to see the cogito in its primordial, grounding
character.
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the new ground. We will reopen this topic when we examine
Kant's philosophy and his conception of critique.
Allow me to introduce the force of decentering into
the metaphysics of subjectivity through a question: what
happens if a force reveals itself within a text of the
metaphysics of subjectivity, such that this force brings the
very conception of ground itself into question? In other
words, what happens if a force removes not only the subject
from its function as a ground, but also radically disrupts
the conception of ground itself? If this type of decentering
could be found,

then there could be no recentering. Within

the context of decentering that I am adopting, some other
entity does not come to take the subject's place. Instead
the whole conception of subjectivity, as a foundational
entity, comes into question. Along with the conception of
subjectivity coming into question, the conception of ground
comes into question. Again, decentering does not eradicate
phenomena, but decentering does displace the priority of the
phenomena. In this instance, the priority of the subject
would be displaced. Only nothing arises to takes the
subject's place. At this point, the project of metaphysics,
understood as onto-theology comes into question.
We see this sense of decentering depicted in
Nietzsche's ''History of an Error." I have already discussed
this example, but now I will present the example in terms of
decentering. At the sixth stage of the history, Nietzsche
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shOWS that the true world is at an end. The closure of the
true world has taken place, or has at least announced
itself. As we saw previously, the closure of the true world
carries along with it the closure of the apparent world. In
other words, the end of the true world displaces the
true/apparent opposition and thus displaces any opposition
that comes under the interpretation of the true world. Thus,
the opposition between the intelligible/sensible worlds
undergoes displacement, since the intelligible/sensible
opposition is an interpretation that arises within the
Nietzschean History of an Error. In this case, the closure
of the opposition does not result in a recentering of the
opposition. What is left to think? Nietzsche directs us to
the thought that opens at the closure of the real world by
saying

11

INC IP IT ZARATHUSTRA. 1113 Nietzsche presents us with

Zarathustra as the matter of thought, which is a thinking of
the overcoming of the "last man" and the passage beyond to
the overman.

14

Nietzsche offers to us to rethink who we are,

once the metaphysical oppositions lose their power and are
put out of play.
I draw the following conclusion from my previous
remarks: if the conception of subjectivity involves a
specific understanding of selfhood, and if the conception of
13

Twilight, p. 41.

14 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra; in The
Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking
Press 1968), p.129f.
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subjectivity undergoes displacement, then the conception of
selfhood must change in the decentered movement.
Furthermore, if the metaphysical oppositions undergo a
decentering that displaces the oppositions and does not
recenter the metaphysical oppositions, then we must see how
selfhood can be understood in a way that does not think in
terms of the oppositions.
D. READING THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
The issue of decentering leads me to the issue of
reading the history of philosophy. Since I am placing my
dissertation within the closure of the metaphysics of
subjectivity, I need to discuss how I am going to confront
the history of philosophy in general, and particularly how I
am going to confront Kant's thought. There are a multitude
of ways to confront the history of philosophy. I will
examine three modes of reading the history of. philosophy. I
call these three modes of historical confrontation the
polemical, destructive and deconstructive readings of the
history of philosophy.

I will briefly examine each mode of

confrontation, and then state why I choose the destructive
and deconstructive readings as my modes of interpretation.
The polemical confrontation with a thinker's thought
is primarily the act of defending or disputing the claims of
the thinker. In other words, a polemic is an argumentative
style of confrontation. When philosopher's engage each other
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polemically, they choose sides and debate an issue. The
focus of the polemical style is to engage in a commentary
with the thinker's wrttings, while at the same time arguing
for or against the thinker's position. In other words, a
polemical reading is not merely a commentary that duplicates
the thinker's thought, rather a polemical reading presents a
problem that is in need of a solution.

15

Some representative

Kant scholars who engage in the polemical style are D.
Henrich, H. Allison, J. Bennett, N. K. Smith, H. J. Paton,
and P. Guyer.
A paradigmatic example of the polemical style of Kant
scholarship is P. Guyer's text, Kant and the Claims of
Knowledge. Guyer is a Kant scholar who believes in the
patchwork theory first put forward by Hans Vahinger and
introduced into American philosophy by Norman Kemp Smith.

16

.Guyer's claim is that Kant must base his transcendental
idealism on an ontological realism. Guyer reads Kant as an
epistemolgist, who is trying to establish the conditions of
15

I contend there is no such thing as objective
commentary. A reading of a philosophical text that merely
tries to repeat the author's intention already changes the
meaning of the text. As I showed earlier in the paper,
philosophical thought arises out of a situation. This
situation creates a backdrop for any reading and should not
be ignored, even though the backdrop is ignored for the most
part.
16

The patchwork theory involves a way of reading Kant.
Its main tenet is that Kant wrote the sections of the CPR
over consecutive years, and the sections are not homogeneous
with each other. In other words, patchwork theorists claim
the CPR is not coherent. I do not abide by this reading. My
reading of the CPR shows the work to be totally coherent.
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hOW we come to know objects. According to Guyer, Kant

analyzes the capacities of the hum.an subject that allow the
subject to give rise to knowledge claims. However, Guyer
says that Kant had to prove the existence of the external
world of objects, so that we could come to know objects and
to avoid the pitfalls of a Berkeleyan idealism. So our
knowledge of objects depends on the reality, or existence,
of those objects external to us. Kant gives this proof, not
well according to Guyer, in the section of the CPR entitled
"The Refutation of Idealism." Basically, Guyer sees Kant as
vacillating between an idealistic and realistic approach to
our knowledge of objects, while Guyer maintains that Kant
was a

'closet' realist.
Given certain parameters, Guyer's reading is

plausible, but disputable. One problematic claim in Guyer's
reading concerns his equation of a study of the subject's
faculties with epistemology and a study of objects with
ontology. This equation makes Guyer miss the fact that Kant
is doing ontology in the CPR. Thus Guyer thinks that Kant's
real concern is to prove the existence of the external world
and not to establish the objectivity of the· object.
However, my real problem with Guyer is not with his
scholarship, but with the presuppositions he accepts
uncritically in order to read Kant the way he does. To
defend either the claim of realism or idealism, he must
presuppose the basic opposition between the subject and the
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object. Further, the presupposition involves the need of an
isolated subject who must find a way to get outside of
itself. Moreover, both the object, as an external thing, and
the subject, as an isolated interior thing, are conceived of
in terms of being Vorhanden, i.e., present-at-hand.

17

However, the question of being of the subject and the object
is lacking. Guyer does not broach the question of existence,
and he accepts merely the sense of existence as present-athand. The issue of being is not a part of Guyer's reading of
Kant, and his work suffers from that lack.
In what I have just said, I have briefly engaged
myself in Guyer's issue. To engage myself in Guyer's issue
means to accept the parameters he sets forth for the debate.
His parameters require the acceptance of the opposition
between idealism and realism, as well as the foundational
opposition between the subject and the object.· However, what
Guyer leaves unexamined is the basis of the oppositions. If
I raise the issue of the presuppositions and infrastructures
of Guyer's debate, I become excluded from the debate. I
would be excluded from the debate because the seeking of the
presuppositions of a text and the investigation into the
oppositional forces that make up the text require a
different discourse than the polemical style. The polemical
style remains within the metaphysical oppositions, even if
17

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans., John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row,
1962), p. 248.
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the polemicist refuses to acknowledge the metaphysical
parameters. The polemical style of decentering involves a
constant recentering of the oppositions.
The second reading I discuss is the destructive
reading of the history of philosophy. This was Heidegger's
strategy. Heidegger called his destructive reading a
Wiederholung, and I understand Wiederholung as the retrieval
of the unthought in a thinker's work. Heidegger saw the
unthought as the meaning of being, which he conceived of as
the temporal projection, or understanding, of an entity, or
the totality of entities, upon their being. I want to
discuss the sense of retrieval pertinent to my project,
which arises out of Heidegger's reading of Kant in KPM.

18

Heidegger discusses his notion of retrieval in Being
and Time. In BT, Heidegger sets the groundwork for the
possibility of a retrieval in terms of the Seinsfrage, the
question of being. Specifically, Heidegger predicates the
possibility of a retrieval upon the oblivion of being, i.e.,
upon the oblivion of the difference between being and
entities. In BT, Heidegger wanted to show how time is the
meaning of being and how time had underlain implicitly the
history of metaphysics. In other .words, since the history of
metaphysics had always interpreted being in terms of
18

I am focusing on Heidegger's reading of Kant in KPM.
However, Heidegger has other interpretations of Kant that come
after KPM that show a change in both his understanding of Kant
and his understanding of retrieval. This change lies beyond
the scope of my dissertation.
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presence, the history of metaphysics presented being in
terms of time. However, the interpretation of being in terms
of time had not been explicitly addressed. Heidegger sought
to retrieve this possibility by destroying the history of
metaphysics. How are we to understand destruction in light
of the oblivion of being?
Destruction is not equal to eradication. In his
investigation of the history of metaphysics, Heidegger
wanted neither to obliterate nor deny the history of
metaphysics. Heidegger's reading of the history of
metaphysics took place in terms of an Auseinanderstezung,
confrontation with the thought of the thinker. In a
metaphoric sense, Heidegger's reading was an act of
violence. In his reading, Heidegger attempted to wrest from
the thinker's thought the concealed sense of being operative
within the text. In other words, Heidegger tried to divulge
the temporal interpretation of being implicitly operative
within a text.
19

19

In Cassirer's issue with Heidegger's reading of
Kant, Cassirer is concerned that Heidegger does not see
Kant's explicit intention in the critical project. According
to Cassirer, Kant's explicit intention is "to deny knowledge
in order to make room for faith" (Bxxx). In other words,
Kant wanted to define the limits of knowledge, i.e., what we
can know of entities, and to establish the bounds of
morality, since Kant saw morality as the proper destination
of human being, defined in terms of personhood.
To think that Heidegger did not see the importance of
morality in the Kantian corpus would be a grave mistake. In
KPM and BP, Heidegger sees that the true essence of the
human being for Kant does not lie within the limits of selfconsciousness. Heidegger states that the true sense of
(continued ... )
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Heidegger develops his sense of retrieval further in
his discussion of the phenomenological method in the Basic
problems of Phenomenology. Both BT and BP are
contemporaneous, so the one helps to explain the other.
Heidegger breaks the method down into three components:
reduction, construction, and destruction. Unlike Husserlian
reduction which suspends the natural world and attempts to
get to the essential, noetic structures of consciousness and
the meaning structures of things, called noema, Heideggerean
reduction involves a redirection of sight away from entities
within the world to our understanding of the being of
entities within the world. Through the reduction, we focus
upon an entity's mode of disclosure. This shift of attention
also involves a self-understanding, since we are entities
who recognize through the reduction that we are entities who
ask the question of the meaning of being. Through the act of
19

( ••• continued)
selfhood in Kant lies within the conception of moral
personhood (KPM, p.163, and BP, p.131). However, Heidegger
is also aware that Kant first had to delimit the realm of
the.sensible in order to get to the realm of the
supersensible. Furthermore, the sensible and the
supersensible are both understood through temporal
determinations, i.e, the changing and the eternal. Thus a
temporal understanding of the realms lies at the basis of
the separation of the sensible and the supersensible.
Heidegger saw that this temporal understanding had to be
uncovered prior to an investigation of Kant's work, since it
was what remained unsaid in the Kantian project.
Cassirer does not go deeply enough in his own
understanding of Kant, and only projects his reading of Kant
upon a metaphysical horizon. On the other hand, Heidegger
reads Kant from a horizon that cannot simply be given within
the confines of metaphysics, since Heidegger's horizon
brings into question the metaphysical horizon itself.
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the question, we see that we gain access to the
understanding of being through ourselves.
However the reduction is in need of a construction.
since our access to being is different from our access to an
entity, and since our access to being is primarily concealed
from us in our everydayness, Heidegger says that being "must
be brought to view in a free projection. 1120

By the term

projection, Heidegger means an understanding of being. In
the phenomenological construction, we attempt to understand
an entity in terms of its being. In other words, since being
is always the being of entities, the reductive view of being
must always be directed back toward our projective
understanding of entities. There is no such thing as being,
since being is not a thing. Heidegger's attempt to construct
an understanding of being must be entity-related, either
directed toward a particular entity (Dasein), directed
towards a type of entity {equipment, objects), or directed
toward das Seiende im Ganzen. While the reduction refocuses
our attention upon being, the construction attempts to come
to an understanding of being.
The third part of the method involves· the task of
destruction. Reduction and construction are in need of
destruction for the following reason: any understanding of
being arises out of the particular situation we find
20

Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology,
trans. Albert Hofstadter {Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1982), p. 22.
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ourselves in at the given moment. The way we describe our
understanding of being is determined by that situation. The
situation is historical, i.e., the situation has arisen out
of a history that has comprehended being in many ways.
However, the traditional modes of Seinsverstandnis have
obscured our understanding of being, especially if the
traditional reading of being has not recognized the
ontological difference. Thus the traditional conceptions of
being must undergo a destruction "down to the sources from
~1

which they are drawn."·

However, the destruction of the

traditional concepts of being is not an eradication of the
concepts, but rather a retrieval of the possibility of the
formation of the concepts themselves. The destruction is a
retrieval of the meaning of being out of the oblivion of
being perpetrated by the history of metaphysics. Heidegger
refers to the phenomenological method as a dismantling,
i.e., a retrieval of the meaning of being out of the
oblivion of being along with the attempt to make thematic
the understanding of being.

22

To make this more concrete,

Heidegger reads the history of metaphysics in light of the
temporal understanding of being. We will see this reading
when we look at KPM.
21
22

BP, p.23.

I am translating the word "Abbau" as dismantling,
while Albert Hofstadter translates Abbau as "deconstructing. 11 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der
Phanomenologie, in Gesamtausgabe Bd.24 (Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, 1975}, p.31, and BP, p.23.

37

The third reading of the history of philosophy is a
oerridean reading, which has come to be called
deconstruction. When reading a text deconstructively, a
double reading occurs. On the one hand, the reader must be
able to produce the structures of the text. As Derrida says,
the structures of signification present within a text serve
as an

11

indispensable guardrail" for any critical reading,

i.e., the text prevents a critical reading from
indiscriminately rambling into any 'unauthorized' areas. 23
On the other hand, the reader must also produce the forces
operative within the text that the text itself cannot
incorporate. These forces make the structure of the text
possible and open the text to something other than what the
thinker "would mean. 1124 As Derrida says, there is a play of
differance within a text. This play of differance is "an
operation of differing which at the same time both fissures
and retards presence, submitting simultaneously to a
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Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatari
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1976), p.158.
24

On Grammatology, p.158. In this section of On
Grammatology, Derrida discusses the place of the writer
within his/her own text. He says,, the writer "writes in a
language and in a logic whose proper system, laws, and life
his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely." The
same statement can be said about the reader. The writer and
the reader stand within a text and possess no standpoint
outside the text that gives them an absolute vantage point
either on the text being read or on the text being written.
In other words, "there is nothing outside of the text, 11 and
an idealism that could possibly supply its own ground is not
possible. (Ibid.)
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primordial division and delay."

25

This reading shows how

being, presence, cannot maintain itself, and thus undermines
metaphysical thought. Since I am dealing with the issue of
temporality in Kant and Heidegger, my deconstructive reading
bas to show how the movement of temporality decenters and
disrupts being, and hence decenters our self-understanding.
I direct my deconstructive reading at the role Kant
assigns to the imagination in the CPR. Here I show how the
imagination is disruptive of presence, such that presence
cannot maintain itself within the text. In other words, I
examine whether objectivity, which is the being or presence
of the object, and its ground in the subject attains the
unity demanded by the concept of being as presence, or
whether a force disrupts the metaphysical desire for
presence. In this reading, the issue of decentering comes to
the forefront, and I must show how the deconstructive
decentering affects our self-understanding.
All of the above is only introductory and is in need
of further clarification. What we need to do is see if the
force of decentering is operative within the metaphysics of
subjectivity. Thus we must turn our attention to Kant.
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Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. David
Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973},
p.88.

CHAPTER II
KANT'S COPERNICAN REVOLUTION
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to bring us to the
point where we can come to understand the role of the
imagination in Kantian metaphysics. We cannot understand the
place of the imagination in Kant's metaphysics without first
having an overall view of the project in the CPR. Once we
have a sense of the project, then we can begin to
investigate the imagination.
This chapter has two sections. First I explain Kant's
critical project. I do this by interpreting Kant's
Copernican revolution within the context of
decentering/recentering. Kant sees himself as placing
metaphysics upon a newly secured foundation. The re-laying
of the metaphysical foundations requires the razing of the
old foundations of dogmatic metaphysics, so that the
foundations can be rebuilt. The disruption of the ground is
only a reinstitution of the ground. Second I begin to
investigate the imagination. I introduce the imagination
39
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through an analysis of its empirical employment. Kant
presents the empirical sense of the imagination in APP. I
concentrate on the areas of the APP pertinent to the Kantian
metaphysical project. I also explain why the APP can provide
a clue to the understanding of the locus of the imagination
in the first and second editions of the transcendental
deduction.
B. THE DECENTERING/RECENTERING OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
SUBJECTIVITY: THE KANTIAN COPERNICAN REVOLUTION
Kant begins the first and second editions of the CPR
with a metaphor. This metaphor both sets the tone of the
entire Kantian critical project and portrays the
metaphysical play of decentering and recentering. The image
that pervades Kant's thought is the image of war,
specifically the image of the "battle-field"

26

Kant views

the current state of metaphysics as a field of confrontation
being waged on two fronts. I designate the two fronts in
terms of cause and effect. The cause of the war lies in our
natural tendency for metaphysics. As entities endowed with
reason, Kant says we are weighed down with questions that we
can neither ignore nor answer. These unanswerable questions
26

The metaphor of the battlefield appears in both the
first and the second edition prefaces of the CPR. The
difference between the two appearances of the metaphor is only
in terms of the place each occurs in the prefaces. In the A
edition, Kant begins the preface with the metaphor and uses
the metaphor to explain his project. In the B edition, the
metaphor occurs after Kant has begun to discuss his project.
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involve our raison d'etre and are concerned with the
concepts of the existence of god, freedom and immortality.
Yet the answers to these questions lie beyond our finite,
rational powers of comprehension. Nonetheless we cannot
ignore the questions. Our natural metaphysical tendency
compels us to respond to these questions.
The need to respond to these metaphysical questions
produces an effect, i.e., our natural metaphysical tendency
gives rise to a thematic investigation of the metaphysical
questions. However, the thematization of the questions has
resulted in war because of the groundlessness and
discrepancy of answers to the questions. Thus the war is not
something extrinsic to human reason, rather the war arises
within human reason.
The war receives the paradigm of its battlefield in
ancient philosophy, particularly in the philosophy of Plato.
Given a particular reading of Platonic philosophy, Plato
provided the scene upon which the war would be waged for the
next two thousand years. We call this paradigmatic scene the
divided line.
In the Republic, Plato presented the image of the
divided line to show Glaucon the difference between what is
opinable and what is knowable (509c - 5lld). The basic
division on the divided line is between the sensible and
intelligible realms. The sensible world of shadows and
things keeps us mired in the world of imagination and
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opinion, while the intelligible world of mathematical
objects and ideas provides us with the true locus of our
knowledge. The intelligible world is the place of truth and
knowledge because mathematical objects and ideas are
unchanging. Hence we can fix our minds upon these unchanging
intelligible entities. Regardless of the fact that Plato
presents the divided line in an image, the paradigm of the
sensible/intelligible worlds becomes one of the basic
paradigms of philosophical thought, and subsequent thinkers
recast the paradigm in various ways.

21

Kant recasts the sensible/intelligible opposition
within his own thought. On the one hand, Kant sees the
sensible/intelligible opposition as the battlefield where
the war is being waged. On the other hand, Kant wants to
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A matter worthy of thought is the fact that the
divided line is itself an image. Thus the depiction of the
intelligible world depends upon an image. In other words, we
do not know the intelligible world except in terms of an
image. This would lead us to think that Plato placed the
divided line on the lowest rung of the ladder, viz., in
images. However this is not correct. Plato places neither
artistic nor pedagogical images on the divided line. So
Plato has depicted an image of the sensible/intelligible
worlds, but this type of image is not accounted for on the
divided line. Further, the divided line is an image that is
not generated from an original thing, since the divided line
is the only way we see the sensible/original opposition.
Thus we cannot account for the image of the divided line in
terms of the opposition between original and copy. This
produces a dual undermining of the sensible/intelligible
opposition. On the one hand, the opposition is only seen in
an image and hence is not intelligible. On the other hand,
the divided line cannot account for itself in terms of the
oppositions created by the divided line. Plato is already
involved in an undermining of the sensible/intelligible
opposition presented in the Republic.
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reinstate the opposition within metaphysics in a new way.
one Kant commentator, Norman Kemp Smith, believes the war is
being waged between rationalism and empiricism.
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Smith

reads Kant as equating scepticism and empiricism, and Smith
derives from this that scepticism is empirical and
irrational. This is not what Kant says. Kant understands the
struggle as a war being waged between dogmatism and
scepticism (Aix}. On the one side, dogmatism represents a
"despotic" rule, where the dogmatist governs without
providing a guideline by which to rule (Aix}. Without the
guidelines, a capriciousness arises within dogmatism, since
the dogmatist cannot necessarily ground his/her right to
rule. Without the ground, this capriciousness gives rise to
a conflict within dogmatism itself. Different parties arise
that wish to rule, and numerous ungrounded principles arise.
The ungrounded play of dogmatism gives rise to
28

Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to 'Kant's Critique
of Pure Reason', 3rd ed., (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities
Press, 1984), p. 14. Smith has Hume in mind when he
describes scepticism, but he is wrong to call scepticism
irrational. Scepticism exercises its rational capacity in
order to show that judgment must be deferred in all cases
where a ground cannot be substantiated. Unlike Smith, Kant
sees scepticism as an ongoing force within metaphysics, and
scepticism has been present since the inception of
metaphysics. For Kant, Hume is only one instance of
scepticism, but he is an important instance.
For Smith to be consistent with his own equation of
empiricism and scepticism, he would have to include Locke
under scepticism. However, Kant does not regard Locke as a
sceptic, but as a physiologist who tries to put an end to
the war. In reference to Kant's discussion, Locke could be
viewed as a dogmatist, who, having failed to provide the
necessary ground for his solution to metaphysics, came under
the scepticism of Hume.
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scepticism. Kant understands the sceptic as a nomadic
anarchist, who uses his/her logic against the ungrounded
claims of the dogmatist in order to disrupt the pseudoorder of the dogmatist (Aix). If the dogmatist is a creator
of the state, the sceptic tries to open the city to the
wilderness.

29

Kant views the dogmatists as having the upper

hand, and yet Kant recognizes that the dogmatists can only
maintain their rule through either self-imposed tyranny or
sceptical apathy.
Kant wants to end the war and institute peace into
metaphysics by creating a constitutional monarchy. Kant
wants to reestablish philosophy as the "Queen of all the
sciences," but the reinstated queen cannot be dogmatic or
the conflict continues (Aviii). Thus Kant must provide a
ground for the queen's rule. In order to establish this
,ground, Kant sets up a "tribunal" that establishes a
29

One way the opposition between the outside and the
inside arises within Kant's thought ls in terms of the city
and the wilderness. Kant views philosophy as primarily being
conducted inside the city, while the outside, the
wilderness, is foreign to philosophy and needs to be
incorporated into the city. For Kant, the wilderness needs
to be domesticated or gentrified, and perhaps the Critique
of Judgement provides the way the gentrification is to take
place.
Kant has a less ambivalent relationship to the city
and country, or the inside and the outside, than Plato has.
Plato has Socrates stand in different relationships to the
city and the country in the dialogues. In the Phaedrus,
Socrates gives speeches on beauty outside the city; in the
Republic, Socrates philosophizes at the Piraeus, which is
both outside and inside Athens; in the Apology, Socrates
defends philosophy and is condemned to death within the
city. Thus Plato sees the city as a problem to philosophy,
even though Plato philosophizes inside and outside the city.
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constitution and limits the queen's power (Axii). In this
way, the queen becomes law-directed and loses her capricious
character. Through the tribunal, Kant establishes an order
of justice for the order of truth and puts an end to the war
of metaphysics.

30

The war has resulted in a decentering of the ground of
philosophy. The foundation has been exposed and shown to be
in need of repair. By repairing the foundation, Kant

recenters the basic paradigm of philosophy. If I reinsert
Kant's references in place of the metaphors, then we can see
that the queen is reason, the tribunal is a critique that
repairs the foundation, and the critique is of pure reason.
In other words, the critique investigates the application
and limits of reason.
In effect, Kant rethinks the paradigm of the
opposition between the sensible and the intelligible worlds.
In the CPR, Kant analyzes the limits of what is knowable and
redefines the boundaries of the two spheres. As Kant shows
in the results of the CPR, the subject matter of the

intelligible world is not accessible to human knowledge,
since the intelligible world transcends the limits of human

reason. However, the sensible world remains open to our
scrutiny and becomes the place of knowledge.

30

The metaphor of war that Kant uses in his text is
not innocent. Instead an interesting problem arises from
Kant's use of the metaphor of war, viz., the idea of justice
interceding for truth and of ethics preceding metaphysics.
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If we view this analysis within the interpretative
horizon of decentering/recentering, then we can see that
Kant closes off the possibility of knowing what lies beyond
the limits of experience. Where previous philosophers had
interpreted the intelligible world as the most knowable
sphere, Kant decenters the intelligible world by showing
that the intelligible world is unknowable. Kant removes the
intelligible world from its place of prominence in
metaphysics, by showing that the subject does not have the
ability to know anything about god, immortality and the
world as a whole. In other words, Kant decenters the
intelligible/sensible opposition as the opposition was
handed down to him.

So there is a closure of the

intelligible realm in terms of knowledge, and the proper
object of metaphysics becomes the sensible world.
However, Kant does not eradicate the intelligible
world. Kant shows that we do not have knowledge of
intelligible things, but he reopens the intelligible world
by placing the intelligible within a new interpretation.
Kant redirects the focus of the intelligible world toward
the sensible world. According to Kant, the subject has the
ability to know sensible things but does not have the
ability to know intelligible things. However, we can know
sensible things because the intelligible realm supplies a
structure and order to the sensible things. In other words,
knowledge is not subject to the flux of the empirical realm
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but is subject to an a priori structure. Thus Kant relegates
knowledge to the sensible world, while keeping the order and
structure of knowledge in the intelligible world.
Kant finds other uses for the intelligible realm.
Though our knowledge of the intelligible world is closed off
from us, there are still regulative and practical uses of
the ideas of pure reason. As Kant says, he "found it
necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for
faith" (Bxxx). Thus Kant reopens the door to the
intelligible world, and recenters the sensible/intelligible
opposition within a new ground.
The Kantian recentered reinterpretation of the
sensible/intelligible world is possible only because Kant
institutes a new ground into metaphysical thought.

Kant's

idea of the Copernican revolution is an expression of the
new ground Kant institutes in metaphysics. Just as
Copernicus changed the place of the spectator in physics,
Kant changed the place of the subject in metaphysics (Bxvi).
Seeking the possibility of a priori knowledge, Kant saw that
if our knowledge depended upon objects and had to "conform
to the constitution of objects," then we could not have a
priori knowledge (Bxvii). Things .in the empirical realm can
always be different than the way they appear at the moment.
Thus there would be no necessity to the things we know, if
our knowledge of things arose from the mere receptivity of
object. Hume exposed this radical possibility to Kant.
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However, if the object had to conform to our faculties
of intuition and conceptualization, then we could establish
an a priori necessity and certainty regarding our knowledge
of objects. The subject would be the one determining the
object in terms of his/her own power, and the subject would
be the ground of the possibility of all knowledge. This is
precisely the turn, or revolution, Kant performs. Kant
realizes that our knowledge of an object is always of the
representation of the object and not of the object itself.
If the power of representation is within the subject, then
this power makes the representation of the thing possible
and is prior to any empirical experience of the thing. So
the question arises: how are these representations possible?
The province of metaphysics has to do with the
possibility of experience and with the possibility of the
objects of experience. In other words, metaphysics is a
transcendental investigation. Empirical experience yields
judgments of specific things, but experience does not yield
their conditions of possibility. Nonetheless, we do make
judgments about experience and these judgments are
synthetic, since the predicate in the judgment amplifies our
knowledge of the subject beyond what the concept of the
subject has within its definition. I make apophantical
judgments constantly. But the fact that I can make empirical
judgments, for example,

'the grass is green,' or 'if there

is lightning, then there is thunder,

1

does not explain how I
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make these judgments. Kant wants to discover how we can make
these judgments, and how we account for the necessity of
these judgments. Due to the lack of necessity in empirical
apophantical judgments, they are not the proper object of
metaphysical inquiry. Thus the proper subject matter of
metaphysics must be intelligible, since the ground cannot be
located within empirical experience.
Besides empirical judgments, there are a priori
judgments. One type of a priori judgment is what Kant calls
analytic judgments. Analytic judgments are "explicative,''
not "ampliative" (A7, Bll). In an analytic a priori
judgment, there is no amplification of knowledge beyond the
subject of the judgment. In other words, the predicate of
the analytic judgment shows what is already contained in the
subject term, and the subject term of an analytic judgment
can be the concept either of an empirical thing or of an
intelligible thing. The following propositions are examples
of analytic judgments:
effect,'
male,'

'for every cause, there is an

'cogito ergo sum,

1

'a bachelor is an unmarried

'a body is an extended thing,' and 'a triangle is a

plane figure with three angles.' In all of these judgments,
the predicate term expresses merely what is contained within
the subject term. The only criterion needed to examine an
analytic judgment is the principle of non-contradiction. For
example, If I said a body is a non-extended thing, then this
statement would be contradictory with the established
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concept of a body, since a body cannot be both extended and
non-extended.
Analytic judgments were traditionally the basic
objects of study in metaphysics, and correspondingly the
principle of Identity and the Principle of Non-contradiction
became the basic principles of metaphysics. Without
specifically discussing analytic judgments, Aristotle sets
up the Principle of Non-contradiction as the basic principle
of metaphysics.

31

In Meditations on First Philosophy,

Descartes derives analytic judgments from the clear and
distinct ideas of the res cogitans and the res extensa. He
goes on from there to use these judgments within his act of
regrounding metaphysics. From the distinction between the
cogito and bodies, Descartes sees himself as being able to
prove the existence of god and the reality of the external
world.
Kant saw a problem with analytic judgments. While it
is true that a priori analytic judgments do yield necessity,
they do not show how disparate concepts can be connected
with each other, i.e, they do not expand our knowledge
beyond what is given in the subject term. Thus from the
analytic definition of a body, I cannot derive the concept
of color. Nonetheless, I see color in my experience of
bodies and I expect color to appear in a body necessarily.
Thunder is not an analytic constituent of lightning. Yet I
31 See Book 4 of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
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connect lightning and thunder in my experience, and I go so
far as to connect them necessarily. From these examples we
can see that empirical judgments are ampliative, but I
cannot derive necessity from experience. Analytic judgments
provide necessity, but I cannot expand my knowledge beyond
what is already contained in the subject term. So I derive
the necessity of the connection of disparate things neither
from experience nor from the analytic character of
something. This leads Kant to conjecture that the proper
object of metaphysics is something besides analytic and
empirical judgments.
For Kant, the proper study of metaphysics is a priori
synthetic judgments. These judgments expand our knowledge,
guarantee the necessity of the subject matter, and are not
based in experience. An example will serve to illustrate the
conception of an a priori synthetic judgment. If I strike a
match, then I expect ignition to occur. What occurs in this
context is that I perceive the match and the striker, but I
do not perceive the cause of the ignition. According to
Kant, I add the concept of causality to the event, and
thereby expand my knowledge beyond what I perceive in the
act. I do not empirically sense the cause, but I understand
the act causally. What I posit with necessity is not the
empirical material of the match and the striker, but the
causal relationship that should occur between the two. I do
not find the necessity in the concept of match, nor do I
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find necessity in the concept of the striker, nor do I find
the necessity of the causal interaction in the concept of
causality itself. Instead I find the necessity in the fact
that there is a law that relates the two things in an
essential way. I expect a necessary sequence of before and
after to happen. If the expectant empirical sequence fails
and ignition does not occur, then I do not question the fact
that causality is not present. Instead I find fault with the
material, and I know that either the match or the striker is
faulty. There is a necessity present to the way I regulate
my experience. The fact that I understand something as
necessary raises a question: how is it possible to
understand an empirical act as causally necessary?
This is the reason Kant investigates a priori
synthetic judgments, so that he can see how our empirical
judgments, our judgments about objects, possess the element
of necessity. On the one hand, the element of necessity lies
outside the sphere of the empirical. On the other hand, the
element of necessity pertains to the empirical. The
investigation of a priori synthetic judgments is the
investigation of the principles that provide certainty to
our experience. The investigation into a priori synthetic
judgments that provide certainty to our experience is an
investigation into the conditions of the possibility of
experience.
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Kant's tribunal, his critique of pure reason, is an
investigation into the conditions of the possibility of

~

Eriori synthetic judgments. These are judgments which make
knowledge possible, because they make experience itself
possible. Further, since Kant understands our experience as
being directed toward objects, the inquiry into the
conditions of the possibility of experience is also an
inquiry into the possibility of the objects of experience.
Kant's analysis into the possibility of a priori synthetic
knowledge is an investigation into the meaning of being we
call objectivity. Thus the Kantian project is an ontological
investigation.
Kant shows the possibility of the a priori synthetic
judgments through an investigation of our rational capacity
in its connectedness with our sensibility. Sensibility
becomes the limiting condition of reason for the finite
subject, and the infringement of reason upon sensibility
exposes reason's transgression. However, the issue of Kant's
thought is not the fact that we are both sensible and
rational entities. Kant accepts this fact without question.
What is at stake in Kant's thought is the issue of
connectedness, i.e., the way our sensible and rational
components come together. In other words, Kant's issue is
the problem of synthesis, and Kant's discussion of the
imagination is the place synthesis arises. Imagination comes
to play a key role in Kant's recentering of the
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sensible/intelligible opposition. We must see how Kant
understands the imagination.
C. THE EMPIRICAL IMAGINATION
In this section, I focus on Kant's empirical
description of the imagination in Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Point of View. I explain the Kantian sense of
anthropology, examine the Kantian conception of the
empirical imagination, and discuss the relationship between
the findings in the APP and the CPR.
I am justified in using the APP in this section for
three reasons. First, the APP has Kant's most complete
investigation of the empirical imagination. Second, since
Kant investigates the imagination in the A Deduction by
moving from the empirical to the transcendental level, an
. understanding of the imagination in its empirical employment
will facilitate an understanding of the imagination in its
transcendental employment in the CPR. Third, the way Kant
presents the imagination in the APP poses a problem for
Heidegger's claim that Kant recoiled from the imagination in
the second edition of the CPR. The third reason requires an
explanation.
Heidegger claims that Kant's rewriting of the B
Deduction is a movement away from the insights Kant had into
the imagination in the A Deduction. If Heidegger's claim is
justifiable, then Kant had to relinquish the insights he
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gained into the workings of the imagination. What lends
credence to Heidegger's hypothesis is the fact that the
detailed analysis of the imagination is lacking in the B
Deduction.
Based upon the way I have set up the issue,
Heidegger's claim can be brought into question if a text is
found that shows the same insights at work in Kant's thought
after the writing of the B edition of the CPR. This text is
the APP. The APP is a series of lectures Kant had published
in 1797. He had given the lectures for thirty years. This
means that Kant began to give his lectures on anthropology
before he published the CPR. He published the APP only after
he was too old to lecture any longer. Some sections and
insights of the investigation of the imagination in the APP
parallel the investigation of the imagination in the first
edition of the CPR. Further, Kant did not revise the APP in
view of his revision of the CPR. I infer from this fact that
Kant continued to maintain the same ideas about the
imagination in the B edition as he had in the A edition of
the CPR. If Kant maintained the same ideas of the
imagination, then the question of why Kant reworked the
deduction of the categories of the understanding needs to be
raised. Did Kant back away from the imagination, as
Heidegger states, or did Kant rewrite the deduction for
other reasons? At this point, I have not proven anything
either about Heidegger's hypothesis or about Kant's reason
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for rewriting the B Deduction. However, I have brought
Heidegger's hypothesis into question and suggested that the
APP provides a clue for reexamining the B Deduction in a
different way.
For Kant, anthropology is an empirical investigation
into the way human beings understand themselves and function
within their world. As a study of entities, anthropology is
an antic study. An anthropological study can investigate
human beings either physiologically or pragmatically.

32

In a

physiological study, we would investigate neurophysiological
and biological phenomenon that affect our interaction in the
world. In other words, a physiological study is study of the
natural causes of human interaction in the world of
experience. In Kant's time, this was a very speculative
study and remains so today. We have more information
regarding the workings of the brain than Kant had, and yet
we are not even sure today how to interpret the data we have
regarding brain interaction and human events. Even in our
contemporary times, we possess very little knowledge about
the way the brain operates.
Instead of speculating on physiological anthropology,
Kant focuses primarily upon what he calls pragmatic
anthropology. This is a study of the way human beings
respond and act within their world. In other words, a
32
View,
1974)

I

Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of
trans. Mary .J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
P• 3.
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pragmatic study investigates the effects we cause as

11

free

agents. 1133 As free beings, we never experience our causal
power, since causality is not an empirical event.
Nonetheless, I can experience and study the effects I
produce in the world. A pragmatic anthropology investigates
precisely this phenomenon. Furthermore, Kant deals with
anthropology pragmatically because an anthropological
understanding should instruct us on how to be better
persons, since we come to an empirical understanding of
ourselves and others.
Kant distinguishes anthropology from logic and
psychology. The three disciplines investigate the self, but
they investigate the self in different ways. Logic is an
investigation into apperception and supplies rules for the
employment of the understanding. Psychology studies the
province of inner sense and provides an empirical
understanding of the way we apprehend ourselves. Logic and
psychology provide a basis for anthropology, because the
understanding and inner sense have their effects in the
world. However, they are not the thematic investigation of
study in anthropology, since they do not involve an
empirical study of ourselves in the world. In an
anthropological study, we must presuppose the findings of
logic and psychology.

33

APP

I

p. 3.
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Kant divides the APP into two main parts, the
Anthropological Didactic and the Anthropological
characteristic. The Didactic deals with the ways in which
the cognitive faculty, the appetitive faculty and the
feelings of pleasure and pain pragmatically affect ourselves
and the world. The Anthropological Characteristic considers
empirical notions of the way we understand ourselves and
others in terms of personhood, sex, ethnicity, race, and
species. Since the imagination arises in the Didactic, I
focus on the analysis there.
The first part of the Didactic is a study into the
faculty of cognition, and Kant begins the Didactic with an
anthropological examination of self-consciousness. In other
words, Kant's begins the APP with the essence of the human
being by distinguishing us from entities that only possess
consciousness, viz., animals. From the analysis of selfconsciousness, Kant proceeds in his investigation to the
possibility of self-observation, to the conception of ideas,
to our passive power of sensibility, to the exterior senses,
to inner sense, to sense impressions, to problems with the
senses, to imagination and finally to cognition. In almost
all of these studies, Kant focuses on the experiential
characteristics of the cognitive faculties. At no point does
Kant try to justify this beginning. Since the anthropology
is an ontic investigation, Kant avoids transcendental
discussions. Instead he takes the beginning as being self-
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evident and uses his transcendental philosophy, i.e., his
understanding of the being of the subject, as a general
guide for these lectures.
The presupposition behind Kant's anthropological
investigation is that an understanding of the self is a
prerequisite for the understanding of our involvement and
others' involvement in the world. We see this understanding
emerge at the beginning of the APP , when Kant seeks the
generation of self-consciousness within our empirical
experience. For example, after stating that selfconsciousness constitutes our personhood and ranks us above
entities without reason, Kant speaks about the child's
growing awareness of selfhood and the onset of selfishness.
As the child becomes aware of her/himself, the child becomes
a

11

little dictator," and attempts to rule the world

. tyrannically.

34

The child's awareness of his/her own

selfhood brings with it an understanding of the world and
frames the child's experience.
In the APP, Kant assigns the imagination to the realm
of sensibility and groups the imagination with the exterior
and interior senses. There are five exterior senses and only
one interior sense. Kant calls the interior sense selfaffection. The imagination and sensibility are similar
because both powers involve the presentation of an object.
However the mode of presentation is different for the
34

APP, p.10.
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imagination and sensibility. Our senses are capable of
representing a particular object present to us at any given
moment, as long as I am present to the object. I must be
alongside of the object, if I am going to represent the
object sensibly. Our sensible capacities are merely
receptive of a given object, regardless of whether the
object is exterior or interior to us.
The mode of presentation for the imagination is
different from the mode of presentation for sensibility,
because the imagination can represent an object that is not
present to the subject at the given moment. In other words,
the imagination is capable of representing an object in the
absence of the object. The imagination is not creative of
the presentation ex nihilo. The senses underlie the
imagination and provide the material for the imagination.
The imagination would not function without sensibility.
However, the power of the imagination extends beyond the
receptive power of sensibility. The imagination is not
simply receptive but is recollective. Thus the imagination
can recall sensible objects without the presence of the
object, and imagination can play with the recollected
representations by connecting different impressions and
creating phantastic images.
According to Kant, sense and imagination are necessary
but not sufficient conditions for experience. Kant defines
experience, or empirical knowledge, as the connection of
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empirical intuition "with the concept of the object".

35

Experiential knowledge requires a cognitive and a sensible
element. Our sensibility must be supplemented by our
capacity for understanding. Thus there is both a passive and
an active component to the subject that allows for knowledge
to occur.
In the APP, Kant relates the discussion of the
constitution of experience to the roles of inner sense and
apperception. Both inner sense and apperception are modes of
consciousness. We apprehend ourselves as we appear to
ourselves within inner sense, and we grant unity to our
experience within apperception. In self-apprehension, we do
not understand ourselves as a unity. As a matter of fact, we
do not understand ourselves at all in this condition. In
inner sense, we gather receptively the manifold of intuition
and hold the manifold together. Further we have an
appearance of ourselves that is successively given and
simultaneously held together. Apperception has no content.
If the experience is going to possess any unity, then
apperception must accompany any representation I have. Kant
points out that this description does not belong to an
anthropological investigation. Instead the discussion of
knowledge belongs to a metaphysical investigation. However,
Kant's investigation of the faculties of the subject call

35

APP, p.44.
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for this brief aside in the APP, so that inner sense and
apperception can be distinguished from each other.
In this discussion of knowledge, Kant omits an
investigation of the imagination. He omits this discussion
because the issue would take him well beyond the sphere of
anthropology. Nonetheless a problem arises that Kant defers,
viz., the problem of how understanding and sensibility come
together. I postpone the discussion of the imagination and
its connection to knowledge until we look at the CPR.
However, the discussions of the imagination that follow in
the APP allude to the issue of synthesis.
In the section of the APP devoted to the imagination,
Kant states that the imagination can be "either productive
or reproductive. 1136 Reproductive imagination is simply the
ability to recollect an "empirical intuition," while the
productive imagination is

"a capacity for the original

presentation" of the object which is prior to the experience
of the object.
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The reproductive imagination recollects

objects in their absence. This is easy to exemplify. I can
form the image of an apple without having an apple in front
of me, because I have perceived apples during my lifetime.
We can reproduce images for anything we have perceived.

36

APP, p.44.

37 Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Anthropologie,
Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Padagogik, herausgegeben
Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977),
p.466. I have translated this section from the German.
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having defined the productive imagination, Kant gives his
example of an original presentation in productive
imagination. Original presentations in productive
imagination are the "pure intuitions of space and time."

38

Kant does not justify this claim and omits a discussion of
how the pure intuitions of space and time are original
presentations of the imagination. He defers the metaphysical
discussion and presupposes the findings of the CPR in this
text. The omission of the transcendental discussion is due
to the limits of the anthropological context in which Kant
is working. The interesting point to raise here is that
space and time are original exhibitions of the presentation
of the object for the subject, and they are not part of the
senses but rather belong to the imagination. The implication
is that space and time are pure images, but Kant does not

develop this implication. 3g
I contend that Kant is not clear in his discussion of
productive imagination in the APP, and this is very
uncharacteristic of Kant. Kant is usually very careful in
drawing distinctions between the phenomena he is
investigating. However, Kant introduces two senses of
productive imagination in the APP without clearly
38

3

APP, p.44.

s On the one hand, the idea of space and time as
products of the imagination gives support to Heidegger's
thesis of the connection between time and imagination. On
the other hand, his hypothesis of the recoil in the second
edition loses some of its power.
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productive imagination in the APP without clearly
distingu1sh1ng between them. On the one hand we are given a
view of the productive imagination in its transcendental
capacity, i.e., we see time and space as pure intuitions and
original exhibitions of the productive imagination. On the
other hand Kant discusses the productive imagination in an
empirical manner, i.e., the productive imagination employs
the material of sensibility and is creative of images. Kant
should have used different designations for the two
different employments of the productive imagination.

40

Kant understands the empirical, productive imagination
as a pichtungsvermogen, i.e., a capacity for creating and
manipulating images.

41

The entire investigation is on the

empirical invention cf images. Under this designation of the
empirically productive imagination, Kant examines
. experiences of genius, fanaticism, the image of man as the
rational being, the use of the imagination in place of a

40

I can only speculate on the reason Kant did not give
two designations to the productive imagination. One thought
that comes to mind is that Kant was caught in the idea of
poiesis. In empirical productive imagination, I can make new
images because I connect images I possess in new ways. We
have an original/copy opposition at work. The new image is
only a result of images which are copies of original things.
In transcendental imagination, this idea begins to break
down. There are no originals from which we can make copies.
So can we talk about the act as an act of production?
Perhaps Kant was not able to think this idea, since his own
idea of the finite was only comprehensible in reference to
the infinite.
41

Anthropologie, p.466.
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loss of one of the senses, fantasy, dreams and madness.

42

For the most part, Kant examines the empirical use of
productive imagination. However one section of the APP
deserves special attention, since this section has
ramifications for the CPR. The German title of the section
in the APP is "Von dem Sinnlichen Dichtungsvermogen nach
seine Verschieden Arten.

11

In this section, Kant describes

three modes of the imagination's ability to connect and
construct representations. Through the imagination, our
sensible capacity can form intuitions in space, associate
intuitions in time, and connect representations with one
another due to their affinity. The specific discussions of
these uses of the imagination are anthropological, and do
not constitute anything new regarding the imagination in its
basic determinations. In fact,

the anthropological

discussions of the imagination are reminiscent of Hume's
discussion of the imagination's ability to reproduce images
that resemble things, to hold things as being contiguous,
and to associate disparate events. However, there are two
issues that arise in this context.
The first issue concerns something I said previously.
The three uses Kant describes of the empirical imagination
involve the apprehension, reproduction and recognition of
representations. These three designations of the imagination

42

Note that Kant places madness within the imagination
and not within reason.
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are precisely what Kant used to describe the reproductive
imagination in the first edition deduction of the CPR. I
find this connection between the two texts to be important
because of the time factor involved in the publication of
the CPR and the publication of the APP. Kant began the
lectures of the APP while working on the CPR. Thirty years
later, after the republication of the CPR, and after Kant
totally reworked the deduction of the categories, Kant does
not bother to revise the section on the imagination in the
APP. It is true that the actual empirical investigation of
the imagination as Dichtstungvermogen does not specifically
pertain to the CPR. Yet Kant maintains the same functions of
the imagination in his anthropology as he does in the A
Deduction, and Kant maintains the imagination's connection
to time. There is an analogy between the two texts, and Kant
does not back away from his idea that time and imagination
belong together.
The second issue concerns the section Kant devotes to
the affinity of representations. The section on affinity
deserves some attention, since it bears upon both
Heidegger's and Kant's analyses of the imagination. In the
APP, Kant defines affinity as "the unification of the
manifold out of the origin from one ground.

1143

In affinity

we unify what we have associated and hold it together, so
that we can bring together different representations. We see
43

Anthropologie, p.479. My translation.
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how different representations contain a common descent.
Through an affinity of representations, what we have
associated is subject to a rule of the understanding and

prevents our experience from becoming haphazard. Kant says
he borrows the meaning of the word affinity, Verwandschaft,
from chemistry. In chemistry, an affinity results when two
different elements bond together to make a new molecule. For
example, there is an affinity between hydrogen and oxygen
when they bond together and form water. Kant likens this to
the affinity between sensibility and understanding. These
two capacities of the subject are "dissimilar elements,

11

and

yet their content binds together to make experience
possible.
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Kant says that this intimate bonding, or

affinity, seems to originate from a

11

common root."
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Kant

does not discount this possibility, but he says he cannot
understand how two heterogeneous elements can arise from a
common root. So he leaves behind the speculation on the
common root. Nonetheless, the issue of the common root
arises in the section on the synthesis of the imagination
that makes affinity possible. At this point in time, Kant is
still wondering how the content of sensibility and
understanding are unified. The

i~sue

of the imagination as

the power of synthesis is still very present to Kant and
44 The word Kant uses in this context is Abstammung.
45

46

I

p. 53.

APP I

p. 53.
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remains unresolved late in Kant's life. Let us now turn to
Kant's transcendental attempts to resolve the connectedness
of sensibility and understanding.

CHAPTER III
THE ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OF THE IMAGINATION
A. INTRODUCTION
My main purpose in this chapter is to examine the
ontological priority of the transcendental imagination in
Kant's metaphysics. Since Kant sees the fundamental project
of metaphysics as the establishment of synthetic a priori
judgments, the act of synthesis has a particular place of
importance in Kantian metaphysics. Imagination is the
subject's capacity for synthesis. I argue that the
imagination is the constituent factor for the possibility of
synthetic a priori knowledge, and I show that the
transcendental imagination makes an understanding of being
possible.
I concentrate on the areas in the CPR where the basic
character of the imagination arises, i.e., I concentrate on
the deductions of the categories of the understanding.
Through an analysis of the imagination in the metaphysical
and transcendental deductions of the CPR, I show how Kant's
understanding of the synthetic function of the imagination
69
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exposes the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments, and
thus exposes an understanding of being.
I am not focusing on the Schematism of the
understanding.

47

Unlike the Schematism, which is an

investigation into the possible temporal modes of
categorical employment, the deductions are Kant's arguments
for establishing the validity of the sensible employment of
the categories of the understanding. In other words, the
deductions are an investigation into the possibility of
metaphysics itself, and the findings of the deduction make
possible a discussion of the schematization of the
categories. Where the Schematism shows how the categories
are employable, the deductions show that the categories are
employable. Kant predicates the Wie-sein upon the Dasssein.
An investigation into the deductions of the categories
presents a particular problem not found anywhere else in the
CPR. The problem is that Kant completely rewrote the
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See pages 4 - 5 of my dissertation for a further
discussion of the reason I do not examine the Schematism.
Nonetheless, the Schematism is an interestipg and key
chapter of the CPR. Allison claims rightly that Kant
justifies the possibility of synthetic judgments in the
Schematism, since schemata show how the categories are made
sensible through the imagination. Thus the possibility of
schematization belongs to the imagination and not to the
understanding. The title "Schematism of the Pure
Understanding" is misleading, since schematization is
something the understanding undergoes and is not a property
of the understanding. See Henry Allison, Kant's
·
Transcendental Idealism, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1983).
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transcendental

deduction~

in the second edition of the CPR.

There are different wayc to deal with the problem of the twc
deductions. I can: 1. concentrate on the A edition deduction
and disregard the B edition deduction; 2. concentrate on the
B edition deduction and disregard the A edition deduction;
or 3. concentrate en both the A and B edition deductions. I
am going to concentrate on both the A and B edition
deductions for the following reason: I want to show the
imagination does not lose its ontological priority in the
second edition. So I am taking issue with Heidegger's claim
of the Kantian recoil from the imagination in the B
Deduction. Further, I want to explore the differences
between the two deductions to see why Kant rewrote the
deductions. I argue that Kant could not write the B
Deduction without having the findings of the A Deduction
before him.

48

I divide my investigation cf the imagination in the
deductions into three sections, taking as my clue the way
Kant conducted his investigations. First I examine Kant's
metaphysical deduction of the categories, since this is the
first place the imagination arises in the CPR. In this
section, we must come to understand both the role of the
metaphysical deduction and the place of the imagination

48

This argument of "A before B" would be trivial if I
were only referring to an empirical fact. Instead, I will
argue that without the foundation Kant laid in the A
edition, the B deduction would not have been possible.
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within the metaphysical deduction. In this section, I also
explain Kant's understanding of logic.
Second I examine the first edition transcendental
deduction cf the categories. I argue that we can and should
understand the A Deduction as a phenomenological
investigation into the employment of the categories of the
understanding. Kant's investigation of the synthetic
character of the imagination shows hew the transcendental
syntheses are always already operative within different
modes cf empirical syntheses. Thus Kant shows how we must
sight a sense of the a priori character of the capacities
fer knowledge within experience. In other words, there is a
sighting of essence within existence in the A Deduction. In
order to understand the phenomenological character of the A
Deduction, we must come to understand the relationship Kant
describes between the imagination and the understanding.
Moreover, since Kant rewrote the transcendental deduction, I
discuss the problems the A Deduction raises fer Kant's
understanding of his metaphysical project.
Third I examine the transcendental deduction of the
second edition of the CPR. The B Deduction does not
stylistically resemble the A Deduction, and thus the B
Deduction does not have the phenomenological character of
the A Deduction. Instead, the B Deduction has a strict
transcendental character in the Kantian sense, i.e., the B
Deduction begins from the essence of the understanding and
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descends to the employment of understanding. There is no
empirical admixture in the B Deduction, as there is in the A
Deduction. Through an examination of the argument of the B
Deduction, I want to see how the B Deduction differs from
the A Deduction, how the imagination arises in the B
Deduction, how the imagination does not lose its place of
priority in Kant's project, and how the A Deduction
underlies the B Deduction.
B. THE METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION
In this section, I investigate Kant's introductory
comments on logic and the metaphysical deduction of the
categories. These are the sections of the CPR p.receding the
transcendental deduction. Since Kant raises the issue of the
imagination in this section of the CPR, I concentrate
primarily upon an examination of the metaphysical deduction.
However, the metaphysical deduction is nonsensical without
an understanding of Kant's conception of logic. So I examine
first the Kantian conception of logic and second the
metaphysical deduction.
In order to understand the Kantian conception of
logic, we must understand how Kant partitions the CPR. The
basic division of the CPR is between the Transcendental
Doctrine of Elements and the Transcendental Doctrine of
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Method. 49

The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements has two

subsections, the Transcendental Aesthetic and the
Transcendental Logic. Kant derives the division of the
Doctrine of Elements into Aesthetic and Logic from the two
basic stems of knowledge, viz., sensibility and cognition.
The basis for this division lies in the paradigm of the
divided line and the division between the sensible/intelligible worlds. Kant's reappropriation of the divided
line represents the sensible/intelligible realms in terms of
the faculties of representation within the subject. In the
Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant investigates the pure,

~

priori sources of sensible reception. These two sources are
the pure intuitions of space and time, and Kant grants a
priority to time over space in his investigation. The
discussion of the intuitions occupy our attention in the
section on Heidegger's retrieval of the imagination, and so
I defer this discussion for now.
Kant divides the Transcendental Logic into the
Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic. In
the Transcendental Analytic, Kant investigates the proper
employment of our intellect. In this investigation, he shows
how the understanding provides unity to our experience and
that the proper destination of the understanding lies in its

49

Kant's discussions of methodology are fascinating,
but they do not pertain to my project. So I will not
investigate the Doctrine of Method. I will instead
concentrate on the Doctrine of Elements.
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directedness toward sensibility. In the Transcendental
Dialectic, Kant investigates the improper employment of our
intellect. In this investigation, Kant shows how reason
possesses a natural tendency to transgress its limits and
cross over into sensibility. In the Dialectic, we come to
understand that we must curb our insatiable appetite for
what we cannot know, and we learn recollectively the proper
employment of the intellect.
There is an ambiguity in Kant's thought regarding the
place of the imagination. The imagination does not occupy a
separate place in the CPR. In essence, the imagination did
not occupy a separate place in the APP. However, the
placement of the imagination exposes a difference between
the APP and CPR. In the APP, Kant assigned the imagination
to the sphere of sensibility, since both the senses and the
imagination involved a presentation of the object. Then
Kant's discussion of the empirical role of the understanding
followed upon his investigation of the imagination. Kant
does not change the stems of knowledge in the CPR, but he
does shift the locus of the imagination to the section
involving the understanding. As opposed to pis analysis in
the APP, Kant does not examine the imagination under the
province of sensibility. Even though Kant referred to the
pure intuitions of space and time as original presentations
of the productive imagination in the APP, the imagination
does not arise in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Instead the
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imagination appears in the Transcendental Logic.
particularly, Kant investigates the imagination in the
sections of the Logic called the Analytic of Concepts and
the Analytic of Principles. Thus Kant treats the
metaphysical conception of the imagination within the
confines of the understanding and not within the confines of
sensibility, as he had done in his anthropological studies.
This shift suggests a certain ambiguity on Kant's part
regarding the locus of the imagination. If Kant understands
sensibility as a receptive capacity of representation and
understanding as a spontaneous capacity for unifying
sensibly given representations, then the Kantian ambiguity
suggests that the imagination has both a receptive and
spontaneous character. We must come to understand the
ambiguity. In order to understand this, we must analyze the
imagination in the Transcendental Analytic, which we do when
we come to the deductions.
Kant had an uncanny ability for analysis. At the
beginning of any new section of the CPR, Kant saw the need
to demarcate what he was investigating. He would
painstakingly map out his territory. I have already shown
Kant's basic division of the territory in the Transcendental
Doctrine of Elements, viz., the division between the
sensible and the intelligible. The division occurs within
the subject itself. According to the psychology of Kant's
time, Kant conceived of the subject as possessing certain
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capacities, and a particular employment of these capacities
was the proper object of study in metaphysics. Kant called
the proper employment of these capacities transcendental,
and Kant saw that the transcendental employment of the
faculties made their empirical employment possible.
In a transcendental analysis, the empirical employment
of the faculty cannot serve as the basis of the
transcendental employment. The reason for this is simple. If
you are going to determine the being of entities, you cannot
speak about the entities until you determine their being.
Since the empirical employment of our capacities is oriented
toward entities, we must disregard this employment when
conducting a metaphysical investigation. Instead we must
focus on the condition of the possibility of the entities,
i.e., their being.
Having already investigated the pure intuitions of
space and time as the a priori conditions of sensibility in
the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant begins to investigate our
cognitive faculty. He performs this investigation under the
heading of Transcendental Logic. Kant wants to understand
what transcendental logic is. The term logic is a class
term, or a genus, and the genus of logic contains more than
transcendental logic. So Kant begins to analyze the class of
logic in order to see what properly constitutes
transcendental logic and how transcendental logic is
different from other modes of logic.
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The introduction to the Transcendental Logic is an
analysis of logic. Kant begins this section by repeating the
fact that knowledge originates out of "two primordial
sources of, the mind," viz. , sensi bi 1 i ty and understanding
(A50,B74). Sensibility is our "capacity for receiving
representations," while the understanding is the mind's
spontaneous power of "producing representations from itself"
(A51,B76). If understanding and sensibility did not come
together, we would have no knowledge. In the Aesthetic, Kant
was able to determine the rules for sensibility by
reflecting upon our transcendental intuition. In the Logic,
Kant determines the rules for cognition by reflecting upon
the understanding. As different sources of representation,
the two capacities have their own science, or determinative
area of study (A52,B76).
Having stated that we study the understanding under
logic, Kant divides logic according to its use. Since logic
provides the rules for the understanding, logic has both a
particular and a general employment. Logic can either
provide the rules for a particular domain of study or
provide the rules for thought in general. We can call the
rules for the particular employment of the understanding a
regional ontology.

50

A regional ontology establishes the

rules and method of a particular type of entity and its

°

5

Kant does not use the term regional ontology, but I
cannot see why he would mind the designation.
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correlative science, so that studies can be conducted in
this area. However the particular logic must presuppose for
its foundation a general logic that establishes the rules of
thought in general and has no particular domain of objects
for its study. General Logic is an abstract, formal mode of
thought that disregards all objects.
Kant divides general logic into pure and applied
general logic. Neither pure nor applied general logic deal
with entities. In pure general logic, we study the basic
rules and definitions of concepts, judgments and syllogisms.
This study is formal and devoid of all material content. In
applied general logic, we study how to correct our reasoning
about concrete matters. In other words, we learn how to
correct inferential error. Both modes of logic investigate
the rules of correct concept, judgment and syllogism usage.
However, pure general logic prescribes the rules in general,
while applied general logic shows the empirical employment
of the rules of pure logic. Only pure general logic is a
"science", since it supplies the rules of thought and is a
priori (A54,B78).
I should point out here that Kant's modes of analysis
can occur in three ways. Kant analyzes things in terms of
their objects, in terms of their source of knowledge, and/or
in terms of the direction of the knowledge. When we studied
the APP, we saw how investigations can be divided according
to the object of study. In the CPR, we can see the other two
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modes of analysis. Kant separates sensibility and
understanding according to the source of their knowledge.
They are two distinct elements of knowledge. As Kant says,
"the understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think
nothing" (A51,B75). Thus Kant treats them separately in the
CPR. However, when Kant investigates the single topic, he
separates the phenomenon in terms of its employment or
direction. Kant analyzes logic according to its direction,
and the analysis is always directed towards either
distinguishing the pure from the empirical employment, or
distinguishing the purely formal from the object-directed
employment. So far in this discussion, we have seen the
latter usage of analysis in the investigation of logic,
i.e., how Kant has distinguished the pure and applied usages
of logic. Further, whenever Kant makes a distinction between
the pure and applied employment of a faculty in a
metaphysical inquiry, he omits the applied employment and
concentrates on the pure employment.
Having determined that pure logic provides the formal
rules for thought in general, Kant directs his attention
away from applied logic towards the difference between pure
general logic and transcendental logic. What distinguishes
pure general logic from transcendental logic is not the
pure/applied distinction, since neither mode of logic is
empirical. Both general and transcendental logic

are~

priori. Kant distinguishes the two by looking at their
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direction. On the one hand, general logic provides only the
rules for thought in general and has no content. For
example, the rules of judgment formation are not contentoriented. The rule that all categorical propositions must
contain a quantifier, subject, copula and predicate has
nothing to do with the content of the judgments. The rules
of inference hold for all modes of reasoning regardless of
the content of the propositions. On the other hand,
transcendental logic is object-oriented, i.e., it is there
to prescribe the rules for the cognition of objects.
However, transcendental logic is not empirically directed,
rather it is directed to the constitution of objects in
general. Transcendental logic is a priori knowledge about
both the type of representations that constitute the being
of objects, i.e., their objectivity, and the employment of
these representations. The representations that constitute
the being of objects are the pure categories of the
understanding, and the pure intuitions of space and time are
the constitutive field of employment for the categories.
According to Kant, transcendental logic is "a logic of
truth" (A62,B87). However, if Kant understands truth as the
correspondence of the thing and the intellect, and if
transcendental logic is a priori and does not have any
connection with empirical things, then how can
transcendental logic be a logic of truth? Transcendental
truth is not empirical truth, but it is the condition of
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empirical truth. If empirical truth is the ''agreement of
knowledge with its object," then transcendental logic
establishes the conditions that make agreement possible.
(A58,B82). Thus the criterion of truth within transcendental
logic is not a criterion of correspondence.
In general logic, we have a sense of a priori truth.
The criterion of judging in general logic is the Principle
of Non-contradiction, whereby we can judge something to be
either true or false without the need of experience. The
problem with general logic is that there is no amplification
of knowledge beyond the subject term. We saw this in our
discussion of analytic judgments. Further, general logic is
merely formal in its operation and is indifferent to the
content of its propositions. The Principle of Noncontradiction provides a necessary condition for knowledge
but not a sufficient condition. Since transcendental logic
provides for the possibility of objects in general, its
criterion of truth cannot simply be the Principle of Noncontradiction.
Transcendental logic must provide both an a priori
condition for empirical truth and a sufficient condition for
knowledge. The establishment of a priori synthetic judgments
satisfies these conditions and shows how truth is possible.
However, the type of truth found in transcendental logic is
not the truth of entities. Transcendental logic shows how
the correspondence of the thing and the intellect are
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possible, but transcendental truth is not empirical truth.
As a disclosure of what constitutes the thought of an object
in general, the analysis of transcendental logic is a
disclosure of being. As Kant says, knowledge cannot oppose
the categories of the understanding and the principles of
thought "without losing all content, that is, all
relationship to any object, and therefore all truth"
(A63,B87). Transcendental logic is Kant's understanding of
the logos.

51

The next section in the Transcendental Logic is the
Transcendental Analytic. The first part of the
Transcendental Analytic is an analysis of the understanding
itself. Kant wants to determine what belongs to the
understanding and how the understanding functions correctly.
Kant investigates the content and function of the
understanding through the use of deductions. By deduction,
Kant is not referring to general logic and its process of
syllogistic inference. Instead, Kant has in mind the legal
meaning of deduction. This does not mean that Kant violates
the rules of logic. Kant is extremely rigorous in his
thought. This means that logical deduction is not what Kant
51

Within the Transcendental Logic in the CPR, Kant
also explains the difference between dialectical logic and
transcendental dialectic. Dialectical logic deals with
sophistical argumentation, while transcendental dialectic
deals with extension of our knowledge beyond the limits of
experience. Both logics are illusory and are in need of a
critique. I insert this brief summary of dialectic only to
finish Kant's discussion of logic. The content of the
Dialectic is beyond the scope of this project.
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has in mind when he uses the term deduction in the CPR. In
Kant's time, the word deduction had a specifically legal use
52
as well as a logical use.
We see this sense of deduction
in the CPR itself, where Kant speaks about deduction in
terms of "quid facti'' and "quid juris" (A84,B116). The
former designates what belongs to a legal claim, while the
later defends the claim. In other words, when a claim is in
dispute regarding its legal right, deductions were written
to justify the claim. Both claims of fact and claims of
right require proof. I refer to the metaphysical deduction
as the proof of fact and to the transcendental deduction as
the proof of right.
In the CPR, Kant does not specifically refer to the
metaphysical deduction in terms of quid fact!.
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However,

the designation fits the metaphysical deduction for the
following reason: the question of fact is the question of
content. In other words, an answer to the question of fact
reveals the contents of the legal claim. Once one knows what
belongs to the claim, then he/she can broach the question of
right.
52

Dieter Henrich has written an illuminating article
on this subject. See Dieter Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a
Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First
Critique," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckart
Forster (Stanford: Stanford University, 1989).
53

In fact, Kant does not call the first section of the
Analytic of Concepts in the Transcendental Analytic the
metaphysical deduction until the second edition of the CPR
(B159). However, since Kant is referring to the same section
in both editions of the CPR, I will keep the designation.
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Since a metaphysical deduction considers the quid
facti, the metaphysical deduction shows what belongs
properly to a faculty of the subject. Just as the
metaphysical exposition reveals the a priori content of the
pure intuitions, the metaphysical deduction reveals the
priori content of the understanding.
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Kant's purpose in the

metaphysical deduction is to show that the categories of the
understanding are the same as the logical functions of
thought. The difference between the two lies in their
employment. The logical functions of thought are not
directed toward any specific content, while the categories
are directed toward the pure intuitions of space and time.
In the metaphysical deduction, Kant takes us down a
path by offering us four Leitfaden. These four leads, or
clues, enable us to find our way down the path and into the
clearing.
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The key to grasping the metaphysical deduction

lies in grasping Kant's four clues that build consecutively
upon one another.
The first clue Kant offers us is the concept of unity.
54

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant discussed the
metaphysical and transcendental expositions of the a priori
intuitions of space and time. Expositions determine the
correct content and employment of a concept. Kant considers
the expositions of space and time to be the deductions of
space and time (A87,B119).
55

I have continued to translate Leitfaden as clues,
even though I think leads would be a better word than clues.
Kant is leading us in the direction of finding the
categories. Specifically, the four leads Kant offers are not
clues. Metaphorically, the metaphysical deduction is not a
detective story, rather it is a path.
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According to Kant, metaphysics must proceed from a
transcendental perspective and order everything "according
to a single principle" (A67,B92). If metaphysics does not
order everything according to a single principle, then there
is neither necessity to the order of the metaphysician's
findings nor necessity in the findings themselves. For Kant,
Locke's analysis is an example of the haphazard character of
the categories of the understanding. Locke was able to
identify the categories, but he was not able to order them
from a single principle, since he placed their origin within
experience. As I have discussed, there is no necessity to
empirical experience.
If we are to proceed transcendentally, we must
discover the principle that properly guides our
systematization of the categories. Since we are already
aware of a priori knowledge in logic and the pure
intuitions, we can at least look for a transcendental
condition for our understanding. We must only remember that
the principle must supply a necessary unity to the system.
Kant's second clue lies in his

con~eption

of judgment.

We know that we are searching for unity, so. judgment must
involve a sense of unity. Knowledge has two stems, intuition
and understanding. Intuition, i.e., sensibility, is the
affective mode of our being. We are able to be affected and
receptive to matters of sense. Unlike intuition, the
understanding acts discursively and represents conceptually.
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gant considers conceptual representation to be a "function"
of the understanding (A68,B93). For Kant, when the
understanding functions, it takes up numerous
representations into one representation and generates
concepts. Concepts do not have specific use in and of
themselves. We employ the concepts of our understanding in a
specific way, that is, we use our concepts to make judgments
about objects. Since concepts are the result of the
gathering of representations into a unity and judgment is
the employment of concepts, both concepts and judgments are
"mediate" modes of representation and knowledge (A68,B93).
Concepts do not refer immediately to representation of
objects. Instead concepts refer to either intuitive
representations or other mediated representations. Judgments
connect concepts and yield knowledge of objects. For
example, I can see a tree. I can also think "tree." My
perception of the tree is only possible as long as I am
present to the tree. I can have the thought of the tree
without being present to the tree, and the concept of the
tree is indifferent to any specific type of tree. So I have
gathered numerous representations under the concept of tree.
Nonetheless if I do not connect the mediated concept of tree
with other concepts, I do not have any knowledge. I have
knowledge only when I judge by means of concepts. When I say
"the tree is a body," I connect two different concepts
together and understand trees as being bodies. Since
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understanding gives rise to concepts and judgments, and
since concepts find their true employment in judgments, Kant
calls the understanding the ''faculty of judgment" (A69,B94).
An investigation of the conception of unity has led us
to the conception of judgment, and we see that every concept
the understanding can generate is usable in a judgment. Both
concepts and judgments are modes of mediation. While the
concept is a gathering of multiple intuitive representations
into a unity,

judgment is the connection of concepts to

comprise knowledge. If understanding is the capacity for
judgment, and if we can establish the basic modes of
judgment, then Kant says we should be able to comprehend how
the understanding functions.
The third clue brings us to an understanding of the
forms of judgment. Kant examines the basic, logical forms of
judgment. The logical forms of judgment are known to anyone
who has studied logic. Specifically the forms are the basic
modes in which the understanding generates propositions. The
logical forms of propositions lack content, i.e., they do
not refer to particular objects. We can analyze the form of
judgments and see what con~titutes their form in general.

56

An analysis of judgment reveals four basic characteristics
of judgment. First, every proposition must have a quantity.
56

Scholars who claim that the Kantian forms of
judgment are arbitrary do not understand Kant. The logical
forms of judgment are not arbitrary, and Kant sees no need
to explain them because they can be found in any
Aristotelian logic text.
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i.e., each proposition must be either universal, particular
or singular. Second, every proposition must have a quality,
i.e., each proposition must be either affirmative, negative
or infinite.

57

Third, every proposition has a specific

organized form. The organization occurs either in a
categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive way (A70,B95).
Fourth, every proposition has a truth-content, i.e., a
proposition can express something probably, actually or
necessarily. These are the basic forms of judgment, and all
instances of particular propositions fit into these forms.
Furthermore, these forms are the way the understanding
provides unity to its representations regardless of the
content of the proposition. In other words, we can derive an
analytic unity from the forms of judgment.
However, the fact that the forms of propositions are
contentless creates a problem for a transcendental logic.
The purpose of the Transcendental Logic is to show how the
forms of judgment have an objective reference. The forms of
judgment are the forms of the understanding. Unlike formal
logic, we use the forms of our understanding in order to
57 In the Logik, Kant discusses the quality of
infinity. Simply, the quality of infinity incorporates both
an affirmative and a negative quality into a proposition by
the use of class complements. For example, I can obversely
express the negative judgment 'No cats are dogs' as the
infinite judgment 'All cats are non-dogs.' The infinite
judgment expresses both class-exclusion, viz., that cats are
not dogs, and class-inclusion, viz., that cats lie in the
sphere of everything outside of the class of dogs. Schriften
zur Metaphysik und Logik, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, 1977) Bd. VI, p.534.
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know things. If the modes of understanding are empty, we
need something to make the forms of judgment correspond to
sensibility.
The final clue brings us to the problem of the
connection between understanding and sensibility, i.e., Kant
leads us to the problem of synthesis. The element of
synthesis completes the metaphysical deduction. There is no
knowledge of objects, unless we can connect the forms of
judgment with sensible representations. Understanding and
sensibility are two different functions of the subject. The
understanding performs spontaneously, while sensibility is
receptive. Our sensibility can provide material for the
understanding, but the senses understand nothing. The
understanding unifies representations, but the understanding
senses nothing. 58 In order to know something, I must be
cognitively able to synthesize what is given sensibly to me.
We are in need of a mode of synthesis to connect the forms
of judgment and sensibility.
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Kant does suggest other modes of intuition and
understanding. For example, both an understanding that
intuits and a mode of intuition that is discursive are ways
Kant describes god. What Kant calls intellectual intuition
is truly beyond our powers of comprehension. I can conceive
of the idea of intellectual intuition, but I cannot know it.
In fact, we cannot even truly comprehend this possibility,
since we describe intellectual intuition in terms of our own
finite perspective. We are not primordially intuitive, i.e.,
we are not creative of objects. This is not our way of
being. We are receptive intuitively of objects, and hence
our mode of intuition is "derivative" (872). There is a
sublime component to the idea of intellectual intuition that
we can neither image nor comprehend.
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As a mode of connection, synthesis is a gathering. In
a general sense, Kant defines synthesis as "the act of
putting different representations together, and of grasping
what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge"
(A77,Bl03). The general definition of synthesis makes
reference to our two sources of representations. On the one
hand, synthesis gathers different representations together
and allows the representations to be unified. The material
for synthesis comes from sensibility, and the unity given to
the synthesis comes from the understanding. The material and
the unification of the material can be either pure or
empirical, and we can perform either a pure or an empirical
synthesis. However, the main point of Kant's discussion of
synthesis lies in his claim that knowledge is only possible
through an act of synthesis.

Without synthesis, there is no

knowledge, i.e., there is no connection of the manifold of
sensible representations with the conceptual unity provided
by the understanding. Synthesis is the "first origin of our
knowledge" (A78,B103).
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59 We must realize the radical nature of Kant's claim
regarding synthesis. Synthesis makes knowledge possible and
the entire Kantian project possible. Kant is analyzing the
components of knowledge in the CPR. This analysis is
possible only if synthesis is already present and operative.
Synthesis precedes analysis, not vice versa. Kant's analysis
in the CPR is not creative of the elements of knowledge.
Kant's project is a description of the components of
knowledge and their proper employment. Kant's analysis in
the CPR is an attempt to wrest from the phenomenon of
subjectivity the transcendental conditions that lie hidden
within our own experience. Kant's project is
phenomenological.
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The subject's ability to synthesize disparate elements
of knowledge lies within the imagination.

60

In other words,

the imagination gathers what is given within sensibility and
connects it to the understanding. Neither sensibility nor
understanding synthesizes. The former receives
representations, while the latter unifies representations.
There is a strangeness to the imagination that the
other capacities do not possess. I know what belongs to
sensibility and understanding, viz., space, time and the
functions of judgments. However the content of the
imagination eludes us. I know that the imagination functions
synthetically, but I do not know what the imagination
contains. We know the imagination only through its synthetic
effect. As Kant says, the imagination is "a blind but
indispensable function of the soul, without which we should
have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely
ever conscious" (A78,B103).
The synthesis performed by the imagination does not
yield knowledge. In order to attain knowledge, the synthesis
must be unified and ordered according to a single principle.
The function of unification belongs to the understanding. We
have three factors at work in the attainment of knowledge
60

The connection between the imagination and synthesis
is not originally Kant's idea. The importance of the
imagination for knowledge arises within empiricism,
particularly Hume. Hume had made the connection between
synthesis and imagination prior to Kant. However, Hume's
analysis remained within the empirical realm, while Kant's
analysis moved into the transcendental realm.

93

that correspond to three different operations. Intuition
corresponds to reception, imagination corresponds to
synthesis, and understanding corresponds to unity.
Within transcendental logic, we synthesize the content
of the understanding and sensibility in an a priori manner.
In the act of synthesis, the understanding does not change
its content. As the functions of judgment unify different
representations "under one concept," the same functions of
judgment provide unity to the manifold of intuition when the
manifold is synthesized (A78, B104). When the functions of
judgment apply to sensibility, Kant calls the functions of
judgment the categories of the understanding.
Kant has presented the following steps in the
metaphysical deduction. First, we recognized that
transcendental philosophy must seek a single principle as
its starting point. The starting point is a unified
principle. Thus we realize that knowledge requires unity.
Second, the understanding unifies through judgment. Third,
there are basic modes of unity that are essential for the
creation of any type of judgment. Within general logic, the
functions of unity in judgment abstract from all content and
show how an analytical unity of

~epresentations

is possible.

Fourth, the content of the understanding and sensibility
must be synthesized in order for knowledge to be possible.
Furthermore, synthesis precedes analysis. So we base the
analytic unity provided in general logic upon a synthetic
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unity. The synthetic unity results when the imagination
synthesizes the functions of judgment and the pure
intuitions. Through the synthesis, the understanding can
apply its forms of unity to a sensible content. In this way,
the forms of judgment attain an objective reference. Kant
refers to the objective functions of judgment as the
categories of the understanding.
At this point, the question of quid facti has been
answered. We have seen the content of the understanding and
have arrived at the categories of the understanding.
However, the question of quid juris has not been answered.
The valid employment of the categories has not been
addressed. Thus the need for the transcendental deduction
arises. Kant's purpose in the transcendental deduction is to
show how the subjective categories of the understanding
obtain "objective validity" and thereby make experience
possible (A89,B122). In other words, Kant is investigating
how the intelligible realm interacts validly with the
sensible realm. This purpose remains the same for both the A
and B transcendental deduction, but Kant's mode of deduction
differs in the two editions. In the metaphysical deduction,
Kant has referred to the two basic elements that constitute
the transcendental deductions. These elements are synthesis
and unity. By emphasizing either synthesis or unity, Kant's
approach to the deductions is different. In the A Deduction,
the key element is synthesis, while in the B Deduction the
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key element is unity.
C. THE FIRST EDITION TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION
In this section, I examine the A Deduction and see how
Kant justifies the employment of the categories of the
understanding. By Kant's own admission, the transcendental
deduction is the most difficult investigation in the CPR.
The key element that unravels the intricate web of the A
Deduction is the Kantian conception of synthesis. Since
synthesis is a function of the imagination, an understanding
of the A Deduction requires an understanding of the
imagination.
Different Kant scholars have approached the deductions
in different ways. For example, there are dialectical,
epistemological and metaphysical interpretations of the
deductions. I have found in my study of the A Deduction that
the deduction resembles a phenomenological analysis. I
contend that we can understand the A Deduction better if we
regard Kant's

analysis as a phenomenological investigation

than if we regard the analysis as if it were an
epistemological argument for justification. I do not contend
that Kant understood the A Deduction as a phenomenological
analysis. I only contend that we can achieve a better
understanding of the deduction in this way. Kant's explicit
intention in the CPR is not to present the A Deduction as a
phenomenological analysis. This would be impossible, since
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Kant did not have the elements of phenomenology at his
disposal. However, this historical fact does not mean that a
phenomenological reading is an incorrect reading. We can
make the same claim about the epistemological reading of
Kant prevalent in contemporary thought. Both an
epistemological and phenomenological interpretation are
foreign to Kant's explicit intention. Nonetheless, the
epistemologists who interpret Kant contend that their
studies shed light on Kant's thought. In the same spirit of
understanding, I contend that a phenomenological reading of
Kant's thought can provide us with an understanding of the A
Deduction.
While I believe that much can be learned from studying
the epistemological investigations of Kantian philosophy, I
am in disagreement with the basic idea of reading Kant as an
epistemologist. Kant is not doing epistemology, i.e., Kant
is neither trying to justify true belief nor is he arguing
for contemporary versions of either idealism or realism.
Kant is performing an ontological investigation in the CPR.
By ontological investigation, I do not mean that Kant is
arguing for the reality of objects. Instead, an ontological
investigation is an analysis into the conditions that make
experience possible. In Kant's sense, an analysis into the
conditions of the possibility of experience is
simultaneously an investigation into the "conditions of the
possibility of the objects of experience" {A111). I base my
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contention that we can understand the A Deduction as a
phenomenological investigation upon the fact that the CPR is
an ontological project. To show this, I proceed in the
fellowing way: first I explain how I understand
phenomenology; second I show how Kant's discussion of
necessity and contingency allows us to understand the A
Deduction as a phenomenological investigation; third I
describe the structure of the A Deduction; and fourth I
examine the content of the A Deduction by following through
Kant's analysis of synthesis and imagination.
In order to claim that we can understand the A
Deduction in a phenomenological manner, I must explain how I
understand the term phenomenology. Following Heidegger,
phenomenology is not the mere description of entities.
Instead, phenomenology is an investigation into the being of
entities. If being is what lies concealed in any appearance
of entities, then phenomenology tries to remove being from
this concealment. Being is not something substantial that
exists apart from entities. Instead being is the way we
understand entities, and being "is in every case the being
of some entity."

61

A specific understanding cf entities

makes their appearance possible.
An understanding of being is not primarily a cognitive
comprehension. For the most part, an understanding of being

61

BT, p.61. I am following Heidegger's view of
phenomenology and not Husserl's view.

98

is pre-cognitive, i.e., pre-ontological. We are already in
our world with entities and grasping entities as entities. I
am never simply confronted with mere things. I exist with a
sense of what something is, that something is and how
something is. The possibility of having entities already
understood as entities is my mode of existence.
The pre-ontological understanding requires a
thematization if the understanding of being is going to
become clear. If being is always the being of entities, then
our access to being must come through either an entity or
entities. A different sense of beingness (Seiendheit)
emerges depending upon the type of entities we are
investigating, and yet a sense of being in general emerges
within the different conceptions of beingness. The mere
description of entities does not yield a specific or general
understanding of being. Instead we must see how an
understanding of being arises within the appearance of
entities.
62

62

Since we are the entities who understand being,

Heidegger's problem with Kant is not that Kant is
non-phenomenological. Heidegger's problem with Kant is that
Kant did not investigate the being of the subject in a
radical manner. Heidegger shows this in the first chapter of
BP. Nonetheless, Heidegger makes various claims about the
phenomenological orientation of Kant's enterprise in BT. For
example, Heidegger considers the CPR to be a regional
ontology "of that area of being called Nature" (BT, p.31).
Furthermore, Heidegger's discussion of phenomenon examines
Kant's use of the term phenomenon. On the one· hand,
Heidegger sees that Kant's use of phenomenon relates to mere
appearance and is not phenomenological. On the other hand,
Heidegger says that Kant's investigation of a priori
intuition has within it a phenomenological sense of
(continued ... )
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an investigation of the self ought to give rise to an
understanding of being.
Kant viewed being in terms of objectivity, but Kant
saw that we come to objects through the self. Thus an
investigation of the self and its mode of being yields an
understanding of the being of the object. Kant called the
ontological turn to the self the Copernican Revolution.
I can begin to show the phenomenological character of
the A Deduction through a brief discussion of Kant's
relationship to Hume. Hume's empirical analysis of
representation revealed the lack of necessity within the
empirical realm. Beginning with our confrontation with the
object, Hume showed that we did not experience substance or
causality, i.e., substance and causality did not appear in
our experience of things. Instead we experienced things with
particular properties, and only though habit did we expect
one thing to happen after another. From his observations,
Hume drew the following conclusions: 1. substance and
causality were interpolations that essentially did not
belong to experience; 2. there was no necessity to
experience.
Kant saw that Hume's conclusions were true only under
62

( •.• continued)
phenomenon. The Kantian conception of intuition allows
something to appear, while at the same time holding itself
back for the appearance of the entity. In other words, the
intuitions of space and time never themselves appear, yet
the intuitions can be explicitly grasped and show themselves
as the a priori conditions of appearances.
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one condition, viz., under the condition of being totally
dependent upon exterior objects for our experience. However,
Hume's own analysis suggested another possibility. On the
one hand, Kant saw that Hume was correct: I do not
experience causality. On the other hand, Kant saw that I
understand my experience in terms of causality. Hume could
not see necessity within empirical experience, i.e., within
our reception of objects, but Hume's own conception of habit
suggests that there is more to experience than the mere
reception of sensible appearances. There is an interaction
to experience between the subject and the object, or between
sense reception and understanding. However, Hume disregarded
this possibility and did not divulge what was concealed in
experience.
Awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, Kant saw a
hidden element within experience. Kant saw that we
understand experience causally and conjectured that
something may be hidden within the appearance of things that
nonetheless makes the appearance of the things possible.
Kant conjectured that if necessity cannot be found within
the empirical realm, then necessity may lie within the
subject and its modes of being. In other words, we possess
an understanding of the being of entities that is hidden
within our experience of entities, and yet makes our
experience of things possible. Kant saw the need to uncover
this understanding of being. Both the Transcendental
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Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic are Kant's
attempts to make the being of objects thematic, i.e., to
expose the being of objects. In this sense, Kant 1 s
investigation is a phenomenological investigation.
As I said previously, if being is always the being of
entities, then the access to being must come through an
entity. Kant understands the being of objects as
objectivity. Since the entity that has access to objectivity
is the subject, Kant analyzes the subject in the CPR. The

two possible ways the subject has access to objects is
through sensibility and understanding. Through sensibility,
we have the capacity to receive the impressions of objects
in virtue of the intuitions of space and time. Through the
understanding, we have the capacity to unify appearances.
Kant's problem in the deduction is how to connect the two
sources of knowledge. The mode of connection occurs through
the synthetic·power of the imagination.
Without explicitly calling the A Deduction a
phenomenological investigation, Kant explains the A
Deduction in terms of the play of the concealment of being
within the appearance of entities. This play occurs in three
places. The first occurrence takes place in the
Transcendental Aesthetic. Received appearances only appear
in the pure intuitions of space and time, while space and
time themselves do not appear. The second occurrence takes
place with the understanding. We do not experience the

102
categories of the understanding, i.e., they do not appear.
Nonetheless, there is an order to our experience that is
necessary. The necessity does not lie within the object of
my experience, since empirical objects can always be other
than they appear to be, i.e., they can change. The necessity
within my experience must lie elsewhere. If our access to
entities is through the subject and necessity does not lie
within the object, then the necessity must emerge from the
subject and the way the subject understands entities. In
other words, a sense of being must emerge that shows how our
understanding of entities is possible. As Kant says, the
deduction must determine if "a priori concepts do not also
serve as antecedent conditions under which alone anything
can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general"
(A93,B126}. The third and the most radical place the
concealment occurs is in the imagination. Kant. knows that we
have to synthesize sensibility and understanding to have
knowledge, i.e., to make objectivity possible. However he
does not know how the imagination functions. The imagination
is so concealed that it withdraws itself in the synthesis of
the content of sensibility and understanding.
The transcendental deduction arises within the
Transcendental Analytic and thus after the Transcendental
Aesthetic. Since sensibility has already been investigated
prior to the deduction, Kant turns his attention to the two
remaining sources of the "conditions of the possibility of
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experience" (A94). These are imagination and apperception.
Kant investigates these two sources in the A Deduction
within the context of synthesis.
The structure of the A Deduction displays the
phenomenological approach to Kant•s employment of the
categories. In the A Deduction, Kant seeks the a priori
concepts by taking his starting point from the metaphysical
deduction. In the metaphysical deduction, Kant has shown the
content of the categories of the understanding but has not
shown the right of their employment in experience. However,
the clues of unity and synthesis that led us to the
categories become the issues of the transcendental
deduction. Kant takes up the notions of unity and synthesis
in the transcendental deduction and investigates them
thematically.
Kant investigates the notions of synthesis and unity
by beginning with their empirical manifestation and moving
into their transcendental aspect. Kant adopts a method of
abstraction in order to show the movement from the empirical
to the transcendental. Kant says "we must enquire what are
the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of
experience rests, and which remain as its underlying ground
when everything empirical is abstracted from experience"
(A95-96). We should not understand abstraction as a
stripping away of layers, as if abstraction were an
eradication of empirical experience. Rather abstraction
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involves an articulation of what lies hidden within
experience. Since abstraction literally means to separate,
we can understand abstraction as analysis. In the analysis,
we should come to understand what makes experience possible,
i.e., how necessity arises out of experience. Essentially,
the analysis is an uncovering of the a priori out of the a
posteriori.
The structure of the A Deduction has two main
sections, which Kant calls a subjective and objective
deduction (Axvii). Kant's phenomenological analysis begins
in the subjective deduction. The subjective deduction is an
investigation into the subject's capacities of sensibility,
imagination and understanding in terms of their synthetic
character. Since the analysis of the subjective deduction
revolves around synthesis, the underlying theme of the
subjective deduction is the imagination. He begins with the
empirical senses of synthesis and sees how a transcendental
mode of synthesis is already present within the empirical
acts of synthesis. After Kant has accounted for the
transcendental function of synthesis and the unifying
function of the categories, Kant moves into the objective
deduction. In the objective deduction, Kant shows how the
transcendental employment of the categories constitutes our
understanding of the being of objects.
We can justify Kant's use of synthesis as the key to
an understanding of the A Deduction in two ways. First, the
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project of the CPR is to show how a priori synthetic
judgments are possible. Thus the notion of synthesis is
central to Kant's entire project. Second, the metaphysical
deduction shows how the understanding is in need of a
synthesis, if the understanding is to have an empirical
employment. In the metaphysical deduction, we came to
understand that knowledge is possible only if our capacities
for knowledge come together. If our capacities remained
isolated, there would be no knowledge. For knowledge to be
possible, it is necessary that intuitions be given and that
the categories think the objects. While intuition and
understanding are necessary for experience, a sufficient
condition is lacking for experience, viz., the way the two
come together. In other words, the account of synthesis is
lacking. The A Deduction is an attempt to account for the
synthesis of intuition and understanding by showing that the
goal of synthesis is unity.
The purpose of the subjective deduction is "to prepare
rather than instruct the reader" for the objective deduction
(A98). The reader's preparation occurs through an
investigation of the three subjective sources of knowledge
that make objectivity possible. Kant does not merely explain
the three sources of knowledge. He examines the three
sources of knowledge in terms of their cognitive functions,
i.e., in terms of their synthetic character. Knowledge is
only possible if the sources of knowledge function as a
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whole. Thus we must see how the capacities of the mind come
together.
In essence, the subjective deduction is not an
investigation into the modes of knowledge per se, but an
investigation into the function of synthesis. If synthesis
is the function of the imagination, then the subjective
deduction is an investigation into the imagination. Kant
does not overtly make this claim, but we can draw the
implication from what Kant does in the subjective deduction.
I should also point out that this continues in the objective
deduction. Kant justifies the employment of the categories
by showing how the imagination and the understanding come
together.
Before Kant gives the subjective deduction, he
prefaces his investigation with an important insight. The
insight is not only important for the subjective deduction,
the insight is also important for the objective deduction
and for the entire Kantian project. The insight is that all
a priori and a posteriori representations have as their
limiting condition the a priori intuition of time. Without
time, there are no representations and knowledge is not
possible. This insight is important for the following
reason: we do not know things in themselves. What we know
are representations, and representations are "modifications
of the mind 11 (A99). As modifications of the mind,
representations belong to inner sense, and the possibility
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of inner sense occurs through time. Time is the limiting
condition of our representations, and the sources of
knowledge are bound to time. In time, representations are
"ordered, connected and brought into relation," i.e., all
representations must be temporally synthesized in the way
that is proper to the source of knowledge (A99). The
conceptions of order, connection and bringing into relation
correspond to the three modes of synthesis functioning
within the three subjective sources of knowledge.
Kant begins the subjective deduction by introducing
the three subjective sources of knowledge. The three
subjective sources are sensibility, imagination and
apperception (A95). Kant introduces these subjective sources
of knowledge through the concept of synthesis, and each
subjective mode of knowledge has its own particular sense of
synthesis. Kant understands sensibility as being "synoptic,"
the imagination as being properly synthetic, and the
understanding, i.e., apperception, as being combinative
(A95). In sensible intuition, I gather the manifold
synoptically. In imagination, I synthesize the manifold. In
the understanding, I provide the form of unity for the
synthesis. Since the goal of knowledge is to give unity to
the manifold of intuition, Kant depicts the modes of
synthesis in a hierarchical relationship. Intuition is on
the bottom and understanding is on the top of the hierarchy
of knowledge. Thus intuition has to move towards the

108

understanding in order for knowledge to become possible. In
other words, the movement is from the most dispersed to the
most unified mode of the object.

63

In keeping with the phenomenological character of the
deduction, Kant begins his examination of synthesis by
analyzing the empirical elements of knowledge, and then
moving to the transcendental character that reveals itself
in each instance of the empirical instance of synthesis.
Since knowledge is a type of gathering to Kant, Kant
ascribes a mode of synthesis to each source of knowledge.
Thus Kant describes three modes of synthesis, viz., "the
apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind
in intuition, their reproduction in imagination, and their
recognition in a concept" (A97). I consider each mode of
synthesis in the above order moving from the bottom to the
top of the hierarchy.
For Kant, the act of apprehension is the mind's
ability to seize the appearance of something and arrest, or
hold, the appearance in view. When I sense something
empirically, whether I sense an external object or myself, I
receive a manifold of sensation. If I did not have the
ability to seize the manifold, I would have nothing in view
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One possible way to understand the hierarchy is in
terms of formal and final causality.The fact that intuition
lies at the base of the hierarchy does not remove intuition
from its place of importance. Intuition lies at the base
because intuition is the foundation of knowledge and
understanding is the goal of knowledge.
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except a chaotic flux of sensation. Instead I have the
ability to apprehend something intuitively. Through the act
of apprehension, I seize the thing with my senses and gather
the thing at some specific moment in time. As long as I keep
apprehending the thing, the thing remains intuitively the
same. Even if I am operating on the transcendental realm, my
pure intuitions of space and time are synoptic, i.e., viewed
as wholes wherein the manifold of sense appears. Things must
appear in space and be held together in discrete moments of
time, if I am going to know something. If I am going to have
knowledge, the synoptic character of intuition requires a
synthesis.
The only reason I can apprehend the manifold is
because the manifold is given to me in time, and hence is
apprehended in discrete moments. In other words,
apprehension is possible only because time is the limiting
condition of all knowledge. All our representations are
subject to the a priori intuition of time. The synoptic
manifold can only be held together if the manifold is
synthesized, i.e., apprehended. Apprehension is an intuitive
synthesis which is capable of grasping the manifold "in a
single representation" (A99). Our ability to grasp discrete
moments in time allows us to apprehend the present.
Apprehension is not simply empirical but must also be
a priori. If apprehension were merely empirical, then the
object would be the cause of my apprehension, i.e., the
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object would apprehend me. However, I could not even speak
about an object or a manifold, unless I was first able to
apprehend the manifold and have representations appear in
space and time. The fact that I can apprehend objects points
to a prior condition of the mind that makes empirical
apprehension possible. If we were not capable of a priori
apprehension, then we would not be able to represent space
and time. We can represent to ourselves the a priori
character of space and time only because we can synthesize
them.
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We could not hold the manifold together either

empirically or transcendentally without the synthesis of
apprehension.
Apprehension is necessary but not sufficient for the
knowledge of objects. We see in experience that we never
simply hold the manifold together at discrete moments in
time. If the past moments were not associated with the
present moments, then there would not be any experience.
Representations need to be associated with one another,
i.e., my perceptions of the thing I am perceiving at the
moment must be connected with the same thing I have
perceived at previous moments. Otherwise I could not connect
my past with my present perceptions and depict what I
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Without a pure synthesis of apprehension, the
Transcendental Aesthetic would not be possible. Space and
time would not be known, or at least representable to us.
The awareness of space and time requires our ability to
seize the intuitions as a whole and to represent them as
such.
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perceive as the selfsame object. Furthermore, the
association of representations cannot be contingent. If the
association were contingent, then there would not be any
reason for something being the way it is, since it could be
otherwise. Without this ability to associate
representations, i.e., to reproduce past representations
with present representations, I would not have any
experience. The least requirement of perception is the
connection of past appearances with the present appearance.
Since sensibility is only receptive, it cannot be
reproductive. The imagination is reproductive. Kant's
definition of the imagination in the APP described the
imagination as the ability to reproduce an image of the
object in the object's absence. Through the imagination, we
synthesize the manifold and connect the past with the
present. However, we do not find the necessity of the
reproduction of the past with the present in experience. In
experience, the representations I connect are appearances
that are mine. The object does not impress the necessity
upon me. As Kant says, "appearances are not things in
themselves, but are the mere play of our representations,
and in the end reduce to determinations of inner sense"
(AlOl). In other words, if I did not possess a prior ability
to connect representations with one another, I could not
reproduce things empirically. The necessity of the synthesis
must arise from my own synthetic ability to connect the
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representations with one another. Thus the reproductive
imagination must be productive, i.e., able to produce the
synthesis prior to the reception of impressions and prior to
the reproduction of representations. The imagination is not
productive of the representations ex nihilo, but is
productive of the possibility of the connection of the past
and present representations prior to experience. The
connection of the past and the present is the foundational
criterion for experience. Thus the imagination has a
transcendental capacity and is the condition of "the very
possibility of all experience" (AlOl).
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In other words, the

transcendental imaginative synthesis makes experience
possible.
The synthesis of the present and the past
representations is still not sufficient for knowledge.
Besides being able to apprehend and reproduce
representations, I must be able to unify my representations.
In other words, I must be able to recognize what is being
apprehended and reproduced. Recognition is the ability to
take up the synthesized flow of perceptions and grasp them
within an unified whole. Through recognition, I come to
acknowledge the object as being there. For example, I could
65

Smith's translation is confusing on Kant's last
point in the section on the synthesis of reproduction. Kant
says that both the synthesis of apprehension and the
synthesis of reproduction constitute "the transcendental
ground of the possibility of all modes of knowledge
whatsoever"(Al02). Smith's translation can be read as only
applying to the synthesis of apprehension.
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not have the concept of a tree, if I did not have the
ability to unify the representations and make them coalesce
into a whole. Recognition encompasses both the unity of the
synthesis and the acknowledgement of the object.
Regardless of the concept I have before me, I must
realize the object is only "an object of representations''
(Al04). What I am capable of knowing is what I am capable of
representing. An object separate from our representations is
something totally beyond our ability to grasp, since what we
possess are representations intuitively received,
synthetically apprehended, reproduced and recognized. This
does not mean that an object beyond my representations does
not exist. This means only that I do not know the noumenal
object. I know only what I can represent to myself.
The ability to bring our representations to concepts
brings with it "an element of necessity" (A104). When I say
"a tree is a living thing," I do not mean just one tree, but
all trees are living things. This is not an arbitrary
determination of experience. I expect this fact to
necessarily hold without exception. Yet if I do not know the
thing itself, then the necessity cannot arise from the thing
itself. Instead, the necessity must arise from the unity
consciousness bestows upon the representations I have
synthetically apprehended and reproduced. Redognition is in
need of cognition.
If a necessary unity is to happen, then the
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unification must happen according to a "rule 11 (A105).
Further, the rule must arise out of a transcendental
condition, since all necessity is transcendental. For
concept formation to occur, there must be a transcendental
unity of consciousness. Kant calls this "transcendental
apperception" (A107).
Transcendental apperception and concept formation are
essentially connected. If the concept is a function of unity
and if transcendental apperception represents the unity of
consciousness, then transcendental apperception makes
concept formation possible. All modes of synthesis find
their unity in transcendental apperception, i.e., the
representations are unified in apperception.
Apperception is not mere consciousness. Knowledge
would not be possible if we could not bring our
representation into one consciousness. When we apperceive,
we are aware of our consciousness of the object, i.e., we
are self-conscious. Within knowledge, the identity of the
self must accompany all of my representations, or there
could be no knowledge. The unity of experience is only
rooted in the unity of the self as remaining identical
throughout all change. So unity is not bestowed upon us by
the object. The Ding an sich is something beyond our
comprehension. Instead unity arises out of the self. Since
we are the same throughout the changes of representations,
we grant unity to experience prior to the reception of
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empirical intuitions. The unity of apperception represents
our condition of futurity, and our futurity lies in the mode
of possibility. This sense of futurity cannot simply be
characterized as the not-yet of a now point, i.e., as that
which is to become actual. The futurity of apperception is
never actualized. Instead, we must understand the futurity
of apperception in terms of the a priori. As a priori, the
futurity of apperception never becomes present. Instead, the
future makes possible the present while resisting
incorporation into the present. In other words, the unity of
apperception is always outstanding. The unity of
apperception occurs before the influx of sensation and makes
the unity of experience possible. If apperception were not
operative prior to the sensations, we could not unify the
sensations. Self-consciousness acts expectantly, i.e., the
unity is expected to happen.
If apperception is our ability to unify
representations and bring the representations to concepts,
then apperception is a faculty of rules, i.e., ways in which
intuitions are unified by the mind. These rules are the
categories, i.e., "the conditions of thought in a possible
experience" (A111). If the rules are the categories of the
understanding, then they are the "fundamental concepts by
which we think objects in general for appearances and have
therefore a priori objective validity" {A111). Further, if
the categories are the modes through which we combine what
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we have apprehended and reproduced, then Kant has justified
the legitimate use of the categories. The subjective
deduction proves the validity of the categories.
Throughout the subjective deduction, Kant has shown
how the empirical mode of our existence shows forth the
transcendental mode of our existence. The contingency of our
empirical experience expresses a necessity that does not
emerge in empirical experience per se, yet empirical
experience cannot be without the basic conditions set forth
in the subjective deduction. Kant lets the necessity emerge
from what shows itself in experience, viz., within empirical
experience a necessity is hidden that emerges through the
analysis of what shows itself in experience. The subjective
deduction is not constructive of the elements of experience.
Kant can only see what emerges from experience itself in
terms of its essence. Literally, the subjective deduction is
an apodictic description, i.e., a description of what shows
itself within the phenomenon.
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The subjective deduction

makes sense only as a phenomenological description of
subjectivity.
We can see the phenomenological

chara~ter

of the

subjective deduction of the categories further in Kant's
description of association and affinity. As has been stated,
66

Apodictic and apophantic are related to each other.
Both involve modes of self-showing or self-manifestation.
The revealment of necessity out of the empirical order is an
apodictic showing of what lies concealed within experience,
and yet experience cannot be without it.

117
the empirical experience of objects never shows a necessity
in and of itself. Nonetheless, the empirical rules of
association and affinity suggest a necessity within our
experience. Association is an empirical rule whereby we make
a connection of a before and after sequence in our
experience. For Kant, the ability to associate things in
experience lies in the condition of affinity. Affinity is
the ability to combine diverse representations and to
represent them as a whole. For example, I can associate
different representations of a tree occurring sequentially,
only because I can unify the representations into a concept
of a tree. If I could not depict unity within diversity,
there could be no association. The "affinity of the
manifold" is possible only because I can hold the affinity
within the selfsame consciousness. Thereby I give unity to
my experience. We have called self-consciousness
apperception. Since self-consciousness employs the
categories as its modes of thought, the categories are rules
according to which objects are thought. Thus the necessity
of the categories emerges out of experience, without their
necessity arising from experience.
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The subjective deduction establishes the validity of
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Not having at his disposal the findings of
phenomenology, Kant explains the subjective deduction as an
exposition that moves from effect to cause. I have explained
this movement from effect to cause in terms of a selfshowing that reveals the essence of the subjective sources
of knowledge within their empirical manifestation.
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categories by showing how empirical syntheses presuppose
transcendental syntheses. However, if Kant contends that the
subjective deduction proves the validity of the categories,
then why does Kant see a need for the objective deduction?
Kant explains the need for the objective deduction in the
preface to the A edition of the CPR. The subjective
deduction attempts to show how understanding is itself
possible (Axvii). Yet, the revealment of the a priori modes
of thought is not the main purpose of the deduction. The
main purpose of the deduction is to establish the limits of
understanding and reason (Axvii). On the one hand, we can
establish the limits of experience only by understanding how
the subject functions. On the other hand, we have to
establish the legitimate extension of the categories. The
subjective deduction shows how the subjective sources of
knowledge function in terms of their synthetic character.
The objective deduction sets up the legitimate employment of
the categories, i.e., it establishes the rights and limits
of understanding and reason. Nonetheless, the objective
deduction would not be possible without the subjective
deduction. At this point, we can turn our attention to the
objective deduction.
Kant divides the objective deduction into two
sections, and Kant uses the two sections to show how the
categories obtain their legitimate employment. In the first
section, Kant legitimates the employment of the categories
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from a transcendental perspective; in the second section,
Kant establishes the legitimacy of the categories by showing
how empirical experience necessarily depends upon the
categories for our knowledge of objects.
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Starting from his findings in the subjective
deduction, Kant takes transcendental apperception as his
starting point in the first section of the objective
deduction. Pure apperception is the understanding of
ourselves as self-consciousness. Experience would not be
possible unless I remained the same throughout all changes
in appearances. I could not even know that appearances
change unless I remained the same throughout my experience.
My empirical consciousness supplies unity to an experience
given at the time, but the unity of empirical c9nsciousness
is not necessary. Empirical consciousness is only an
awareness of myself in a given experience, and is always
undergoing change.
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In other words, there is a unity to my

experience that supersedes empirical consciousness. As we
saw in the subjective deduction, experience is only possible
if there is a synthesis of the manifold, and pure
apperception supplies the unity to the synthesis. As Kant
68

The first section of the objective deduction goes
from A115-A119. The second section of the objective
deduction goes from All9-Al28.
69

In the subjective deduction of the A
calls empirical consciousness 11 inner sense"
apperception" (Al07). I know myself only as
inner sense, so the necessity of thought is
empirical consciousness.

edition, Kant
or "empirical
an appearance in
lacking in
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says, "pure apperception supplies a principle of synthetic
unity of the manifold in all possible intuition" (A117).
In order for there to be a synthetic unity, a
synthesis must be present so that unification of the
synthesis can take place. Pure apperception provides only a
unity to the synthesis and does not yield a synthesis
itself. Therefore, apperception must be related to the
imagination, since the imagination is the power of
synthesis. The imagination has the power to reproduce past
images with the present image and thus makes the continuity
of experience possible. However, we saw that a productive
imagination founded the reproductive imagination. There is
no experience at all without the productive imagination,
since there would not be any synthesis of the manifold to
unify. If there is no experience without the synthesis of
the productive imagination, and if apperception unifies only
what the productive imagination can provide to it, then
imagination stands as the "ground of the possibility of all
knowledge, especially of experience" (A118).
For the synthetic unity to be pure, apperception must
be directed towards the productive imagination and its
synthesis. The understanding is a result of the interaction
between the unity of apperception and the synthesis of
imagination. As we saw in the metaphysical deduction, the
understanding operates according to categories. Since the
understanding is a result of the interaction of apperception
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and imagination, the categories become the modes of unity
for the manifold of intuition that is synthesized by the
imagination. If the imagination is synthesizing the manifold
of intuition in general, then categories are modes of unity
for "all possible appearances" (A119). Knowledge of objects
is only possible if all appearances stand in "a necessary
relationship to the understanding" (A119).
The second section of the pbjective deduction begins
at this point. Having shown how the knowledge of objects is
possible, Kant proposes to lay before our eyes how all
appearances stand in a necessary relationship to the
understanding and its categories.
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We need to see how this

necessity shows itself starting from appearances. In other
words, we are seeing how the essence shows itself within the
existent. In this sense, the phenomenological character of
the deduction arises again in the second section of the
objective deduction.
The movement in the second section of the objective
deduction goes from dispersion to unity. Beginning with the
lowest member of the hierarchy, sensibility, we first
experience appearances, and appearances contain a manifold
of sensations. Second, we have perceptions, which are our
consciousness of appearances. The distinction between
appearances and perceptions lies in their relationship to
70

In the KrV, Kant literally says he wants "vor Augen
legen, 11 to lay before our eyes, the necessity of the
categories by starting with the empirical (A119).
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consciousness. Kant points out that appearances cannot exist
without a "relation to a consciousness that is at least
possible" (Al20). Appearances are not things in themselves
but only an influx of sensation that must appear for a
consciousness. Appearances require the possibility of
consciousness. Perceptions move a step beyond appearances.
Perception is a gathering of appearances, where the form of
something emerges out of the influx of sensation. In
perception, consciousness stands actually in the face of
something and represents the thing in an image. Perceptions
move beyond the givenness of sensation and depict unique
forms within experience. From this brief description, we can
already see that perception possesses a unity that
appearances do not possess.
In order to combine the manifold of sensation given in
appearance, the perceiving subject must synthesize the
manifold. Since imagination is the power of synthesis, we
need the imagination in order to perceive. Apprehension is
the synthetic act of the imagination in combination with
perception. The image of the thing obtains its singular
character in the present moment through apprehension.
However, the synthesis of apprehension does not exhaust the
synthetic activity of the imagination. As we saw in the
subjective deduction, the synthesis of apprehension only
presents us with the present. Apprehension is in need of
synthesis of reproduction in order to connect past
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perceptions with the present perceptions. The synthesis of
reproduction gives rise to our continuity of experience,
since reproduction connects our past and our present.
Reproduction is not a haphazard activity. In other
words, the sequence of before and after does not occur
chaotically. Thus the synthesis of reproduction is subject
to a rule that associates the past and the present
representations in an order that does not change. As we have
seen, association is a synthesis of our time order according
to a rule. As a mode of synthesis, association is an
empirical act of the imagination.
The problem is how to institute an objective ground
for what we know to be a subjective operation of the mind.
In other words, if association is a "subjective and
empirical ground of reproduction according to rules," then
we need to establish the necessity of the rules for
experience (A121). We need to locate the "objective ground"
(Al22). The necessity for the rules lies within
consciousness itself. I recognize perceptions only because
they are mine. As Kant says,

11

it is only because I ascribe

all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception)
that I can say of

al~

perceptions that I am conscious of

them" (Al22).
The unity of consciousness cannot arise after I have
perceived images. If the unity of consciousness was only an
amalgamation of perceptions, then there could be no unity to
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experience. Consciousness would be changing with each new
perception. Since consciousness remains the same through the
diversity of perceptions and since all perceptions find
their place in the selfsame consciousness, consciousness
must be prior to the influx of sensation and perceptions.
Kant calls the ability to unify the synthesis "affinity."
Affinity is the "objective ground of all association of
appearances" and is the function of transcendental
apperception (A122). A unity of the manifold must be
possible a priori, or experience would not be possible. Thus
unity of apperception is not only subjectively necessary;
transcendental apperception is also objectively necessary,
since it stands as the condition of the possibility of
having objects. If there is no unity, then there is no
perception and no objects.
Pure apperception provides the possibility for a
unification of the synthesis. However, affinity is a mode of
synthesis and thus belongs to the imagination. Kant ascribes
a "transcendental function" to the imagination (A123). Since
Kant understands the notion of function as bringing
representations to a unity, the productive imagination
allows for the possibility of bringing the manifold to a
unity in apperception. Without imagination, apperception
would not be able to be in accord with sensibility. Thus
apperception provides a necessary unity to experience, but
the transcendental imagination makes experience itself
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possible (Al 23) .
As we saw in the subjective deduction, the imagination
is temporal in its synthetic function. Thus there is a
sensible character to the imagination. However, the
imagination is also intellectual in its interaction with
apperception. Since the imagination plays the mediating role
within the sensible/intelligible opposition, the imagination
is both receptive and spontaneous. The imagination as the
'between' of the sensible/intelligible opposition makes
experience possible.
The categories are the content of the understanding,
i.e., they are the forms of unity. Through the synthesis of
the imagination, the categories provide the possible modes
that can unify the manifold of intuition.
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Only through

their necessary connection with the transcendental
imagination are the categories legitimate, since they find
their necessary connection with sensibility through the
imagination.
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Thus synthesis is the force that legitimates

the employment of the categories.
Kant's conclusions in the A Deduction are very radical
and effect the way metaphysics itself comes to be thought.
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Heidegger is correct when he calls the 'I think' an
'I can', or an 'I am able'. The categories become the ways
we are able to provide unity to our experience.
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Kant finishes the A Deduction with a discussion of
the categories as being a faculty of rules and as being laws
of nature. This is not important for what we are
investigating.
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While the opposition between the sensible and the
intelligible remains intact, Kant redefines the limits of
their interaction. Knowledge remains a matter of
intelligibility, i.e., our knowledge is discursive and not
simply intuitive, but the categories are only applicable to
sensibility. There is no knowledge of intelligible things.
This conclusion is true for Kant's project in general.
However, the deductions reinforce the point, since Kant
defines the limits of the intelligible realm through the
deductions.
Even more radical than Kant's redefinition of the
sensible/intelligible opposition is Kant's findings
concerning the imagination. In the A Deduction, Kant has
shown that the imagination makes experience possible, or, in
other words, that the imagination functions as the ground of
experience. I want to draw out two consequences from this
conclusion. First, if the imagination emerges as the
possibility of experience and if we understand experience in
a Kantian sense as objectivity, then the imagination becomes
the basis of objectivity. If objectivity is the being of
objects, then the imagination is making an µnderstanding of
being possible. If the understanding of an entity is only
possible through an understanding of being, then the
understanding of being cannot emerge from an entity. To say
that an understanding of the being of an entity could emerge
from another entity would place us within a vicious circle,
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since we would be presupposing what we are trying to
explain. Thus an understanding of being requires the
difference between being and entities. If the imagination
makes the understanding of being possible, then the
imagination cannot be thought of as an entity. In other
words, the emergence of the imagination as the understanding
of being brings Kant to the ontological difference. Through
his analysis of the imagination in the CPR, Kant exposes a
sense of the imagination that is not interpretable merely as
a faculty of the subject, i.e., as an entity. Further, the
imagination is not the same as being, because the
imagination is what makes the understanding of being
possible. Thus the imagination is irreducible either to an
entity or to being. The problem is that the possibility of
the ontological difference that Kant exposes cannot be
thought within the onto-theological framework .of
metaphysics, since the understanding of the imagination as
the understanding of being takes us to the limits of
metaphysics. The question arises: What does it mean to make
imagination the possibility of experience? In other words,
what does it mean to make imagination a ground?
Second, the emergence of the imagination as the ground
of experience not only raises the issue of the ontological
difference, but also begins to bring the project of
metaphysics itself into question. In essence, the
imagination does not really appear within the sensible-
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/intelligible opposition. We see this in Kant's ambiguity
regarding how to define the imagination. By showing that the
imagination is the basis of experience, Kant has supplanted
the traditional role of the priority of the intelligible
within metaphysics. However, the displacement of the
intelligible does not place the imagination simply on the
other side of the opposition.
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The implication is that the

imagination is making the opposition possible, while
simultaneously not being accounted for within the
opposition. The

~magination

functions as a trace within

metaphysics, and I contend the trace of the imagination
disrupts the metaphysical project. The question arises: how
can we conceive of the imagination as a trace that disrupts
the metaphysical project? I must defer a response to both of
these questions until the next chapter. We must first
complete our examination of Kant through an examination of
the B Deduction.
D. THE SECOND EDITION TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION
My purpose in this section is to examine the
difference between the A and B Deductions and to show how
the imagination maintains its place of priority within
Kantian thought. I proceed in the following way: first I
address the differences between the first and second edition
deductions by examining Kant's introduction to the B
73

Recall the discussion of Nietzsche in Chapter One.

129

Deduction. Second I examine the B Deduction and show how we
can understand Kant's argument as a transcendental argument.
In order to explain the B Deduction in this manner, I have
to explain the difference between a Kantian transcendental
argument and a phenomenological argument. Third I examine
the role of the imagination in the B Deduction and show how
the A Deduction arises within the B Deduction.
Kant sees a need to rewrite the entire transcendental
deduction in the second edition of the CPR. Kant does not
rewrite the deduction because he conceived of a new purpose
for the deduction. The purpose of the transcendental
deduction does not change in either the A or B edition of
the CPR, and thus the difference between the A and B
Deduction does not lie within their purpose. Kant's issue in
the transcendental deductions remains the issue of quid
juris, i.e., both the A and the B Deduction attempt to prove
the legitimate employment of the categories. So the
difference between two deductions lies somewhere else.
Kant's reason for rewriting the transcendental
deduction is that the deduction in the first edition is too
obscure. However, Kant himself does not specify where the
obscurity lies. Instead, he leaves it up to his readers to
discover the reason he rewrote the transcendental deduction.
I do not find the obscurity of the A Deduction to lie
within Kant's execution of the deduction. The actual
undertaking of the A Deduction is very methodical and
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organized. Instead I find the obscurity to lie within the
subject matter itself. Kant's investigation in the A
Deduction is new within the context of metaphysical thought.
As I said in the section on the A Deduction, the
transcendental deduction redefines the basic opposition of
metaphysics, and thus Kant's undertaking disrupts
metaphysics. The obscure nature of the deduction arises by
necessity, since Kant is breaking new ground within
metaphysical thought.
Specifically, Kant sees the obscurity of the A
Deduction in terms of the way he approaches the subject
matter itself. Kant enacts the deduction through an
investigation into the capacities of the subject. The
capacities Kant examines are the imagination and the
understanding. The difference between the two deductions
. lies within Kant's different starting points for the
deductions. In the A Deduction, Kant chooses the phenomenon
of synthesis as his mode of access to the legitimation of
the categories. In the B Deduction, Kant chooses the
phenomenon of unity as his mode of access. In other words,
Kant approaches the A Deduction through an investigation
into the imagination, while he approaches the B Deduction
through an investigation into the understanding.

74

74 For the most part, the metaphysical deduction does
not change and remains applicable to the B Deduction~ The
only changes Kant makes in the metaphysical deduction are
additions to his explanation of the table of categories.
(continued ... )
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The basic difference between the two deductions
emerges at the end of Kant's introduction to the
transcendental deduction.
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In the A edition, Kant makes the

transition from the examination of the basic principles of a
transcendental deduction in general to the subjective
deduction through a discussion of the three sources of
representation that make experience possible. Kant removes
this introductory passage in the second edition of the CPR,
and instead he introduces the B Deduction through a
discussion of Locke and Hume. None of the commentators I
have read have addressed Kant's reason for this substitution
of passages. I contend that the substitution is not
innocent. Instead the passage provides the reason for the
rewrite of the second edition deduction.
The discussion of Locke and Hume centers around the
.categories of the understanding. Both Locke and Hume are
empiricists, and both discussed the categories of the
understanding. Kant sees Locke as the person who recognized
the categories of the understanding and attempted to justify
them. However, Locke tried to deduce the categories from
experience. According to Kant, Locke's undertaking did not
succeed because he failed to realize that the categories are
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( ••• continued)
These addenda do not alter the metaphysical deduction. They
are interesting but not applicable to our discussion.
75

B127 - B129 substituted for A94 - A95 in the B
edition.
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not experiential, i.e., they are not empirical. Hume
recognized that the categories were not empirical, and thus
saw that the necessity of the categories could not lie
within the empirical realm. Yet he could not locate

an~

Eriori realm for the categories, and hence saw the
categories as merely contingent possibilities of the
structure of experience. In other words, Hume contended the
categories were fictions generated by the habit of repeated
experiences, and thus saw only a subjective genesis to the
categories. For Kant, both Locke's and Hume's problem lies
in their empiricism. They did not realize that the
understanding possessed a content that could make the
objects of

expe.~ence

possible. While Locke did not realize

the impossibility of an "empirical derivation'' of the
categories, Hume could not raise himself out of his
empiricistic viewpoint and did not realize that necessity
lay within an a priori realm (8127).
Kant takes his impetus from these findings. On the one
hand, Kant agrees with Locke that there is a need to justify
the categories of the understanding. On the other hand, Kant
agrees with Hume that the deduction cannot be empirical.
Thus, the categories of the understanding have been revealed
and stand in need of justification. If Hume has shown that
we cannot derive the categories empirically, then Kant
conjectures that there must be a transcendental way to show
their legitimacy.
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Kant's problem with the A Deduction arises within the
context of his discussion of Locke and Hume. For Kant, the
obscurity of the A Deduction lies in its admixture of
empirical and transcendental elements. There was a back and
forth movement in the A Deduction between the empirical and
transcendental roles of synthesis. I explained the admixture
of the empirical and the transcendental elements within a
phenomenological context. However, the admixture installs an
element of impurity for Kant. Simply stated, Kant sees that
a transcendental deduction should have no empirical
admixture but should be transcendental. Kant maintains that
empirical experience cannot legitimate the categories and
should not be used in a deduction. Instead, Kant thinks he
must show the legitimacy of the categories in an a priori
fashion, and the B Deduction is an attempt to legitimate the
categories from a strictly transcendental perspective. As we
shall see, any time Kant allows an empirical element to
enter into the B Deduction, he relates the empirical element
immediately to its transcendental possibility.
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Another way of saying this is that Kant failed to
follow his own rules in the A Deduction. According to Kant's
own understanding of the rules of a transcendental
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As we shall see, Kant's only discussion of the
empirical dimension in the B deduction is in Section 26. In
this section, Kant refers the empirical synthesis of
apprehension in perception immediately to the a priori
intuitions of space and time, and he does not examine the
empirical character of perception's apprehensive synthesis
beyond the mention of it.

134

deduction, a transcendental deduction must proceed according
to a principle. The purpose of the deductions is to deduce
from the principle the right of the employment of the
categories of the understanding. Once the deduction shows
how everything follows from the one principle, the deduction
must proceed to show how everything in question refers back
to the principle. Kant does not show this in the A
Deduction. Instead, he attempts to prove the validity of
apperception through its connection to the other faculties.
The A Deduction does show how unity is not possible without
apperception, but Kant does not expose the necessity from
apperception itself. The problem with the A Deduction arises
through its emphasis upon synthesis and its lack of emphasis
upon unity. For a deduction to be strictly transcendental,
the deduction must begin from apperception itself. Thus the
need to rewrite the transcendental deduction arose.
As the metaphysical deduction provided a mode of
access for Kant in the A Deduction, the metaphysical
deduction provides Kant with a mode of access in the B
Deduction. Two phenomena arose in the metaphysical deduction
that Kant must account for in the transcendental deduction,
viz., synthesis and unity. Kant entered the A Deduction
through an analysis of the phenomenon of synthesis. The
analysis of synthesis led Kant into an investigation of the
imagination and its modes of synthesis, which finally led
Kant into an investigation of the unity found within the
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understanding. The analysis of the A Deduction proceeded
through the subjective sources of knowledge into the
objective possibility of the categories. As we saw, Kant
carried out the deduction by showing how the empirical
character of synthesis concealed a transcendental component
that made the empirical synthesis possible. As I said above,
the admixture of the empirical and the transcendental
elements that arose in the analysis of synthesis made the A
Deduction impure, i.e., the back and forth movement removed
the argument from its transcendental mooring. 77 Reason is
still adrift, and Kant wants to see if he can "find for
human reason safe conduct" into the harbor (B128).
If synthesis does not provide us with a safe mode of
access into the harbor, then the only other mode of access
available to us is through the phenomenon of unity. The
modes of judgments are modes of the understanding that grant
unity to our experience. Kant wants to see how the unity of
our experience is possible, and thus he begins to
investigate where unity arises, viz., the understanding.
The B Deduction encompasses pages B129-B169, comprises
twelve sections of the CPR, and has two main divisions. The
first division encompasses sections 15-21, and the second
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The word "moor" is polysemic in English. It means to
hold something. Thus we moor ships, i.e, we anchor them or
bring them to a safe harbor. Yet it also means sea and
wasteland. A moor is a bog where there is no harbor or point
of safety. Symbolically, a moor has no bottom, i.e., it is
an abyss.
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division encompasses sections 22-27.
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The division suggests

that the deduction has two parts. On the one hand, there is
a general agreement among Kantian scholars regarding the
sections of the main divisions of the B Deduction.

On the

other hand, there is a general disagreement about the way to
understand the two main divisions.
The two main divisions have been considered either as
two separate proofs or as two parts of one basic proof. I
view the B Deduction in the latter sense. The purpose of the
B Deduction in general is to show how the objects of
experience are possible, i.e., how objectivity is possible.
The first step of the proof reveals to us the a priori
legitimacy of the categories and reaches its climax in
section 20 and has its transition point in section 21; the
second step of the proof shows us the proper applicability
of the categories and reaches its climax in section 26.
The classification of the two divisions is a topic of
debate. I cannot agree with Paton that Kant continues to
classify the two sections of the B Deduction as a subjective
and objective deduction. This classification is precisely
what Kant drops in the B Deduction. The subjective deduction
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In sections 21 and 26 of the B deduction, Kant
discusses the divisions. In effect there are three steps to
the B deduction. The first step is the metaphysical
deduction, the second step is the transcendental deduction
of the applicability of the categories to intuition in
general, and the third step shows how the unity of empirical
intuition presupposes the unity supplied by apperception and
the categories of the understanding.
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led Kant into the admixture of the empirical and the
transcendental, and he wants to avoid this problem in the B
Deduction. Kant deletes the objective/subjective division
when he rewrites the preface to the B edition of the CPR,
and when he removes the introductory discussion of the three
subjective sources of knowledge. The idea of a subjective
deduction is seen as being too psychological in its
orientation.
I find that I have some affinity with Henry Allison's
division of the B Deduction, and I agree with his
classifications of the two divisions. He says that the first
section of the B Deduction deals with the "objective
validity" of

th~

categories, while the second part deals

with the "objective reality" of the categories.
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The first

part of the B Deduction is about the issue of the objective
validity of the categories, while the second part of the B
Deduction is about the objective reality of the categories.
However, I extend Allison's meaning of objective reality
beyond his own intended meaning.
For Allison, objective reality means that a concept
"refers or is applicable to an actual object. 1180 Since the
framework of conceptualization lies within the categories,
Allison says that "the claim of objective reality is
79

Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p.134.
80

Allison, p.135. Allison takes the term "objective
reality" from section 26 of the B Deduction.
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equivalent to the claim that they have a reference or
applicability to whatever objects are given to us in
intuition (objects of possible experience) . 1181 However, Kant
does not simply claim that concepts and hence the categories
have a reference to the objects given in our experience.
Instead, Kant claims that the categories stand as the
conditions of the possibility of the objects of our
experience. In other words, the categories are our
possibility of having any objects whatsoever.
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Allison's

use of the term objective reality suggests this possibility,
but Allison does not see all of the ramifications within the
ontological context of Kant's discussion in the second
section of the B Deduction. I see the second section of the
B Deduction as an investigation into our understanding of
objectivity. While I agree with Allison that the first part
of the deduction is an investigation into the pbjective
validity of the categories, i.e., an investigation into the
right of their employment, I consider the second part of the
B Deduction to be an investigation into our understanding of
the being of objectivity. In other words, once Kant shows
that the categories are applicable to experience, he can
then show how objects themselves are possible.
The paragraph immediately preceding section 15
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Allison, p. 135.

We must remember that the object for us is an object
of representations and not a Ding an sich.
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provides the starting point for the B Deduction. In this
paragraph, Kant focuses on the categories themselves. Kant
says the categories are "concepts of an object in general,
by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as

determined in respect of one of the logical functions of
judgment"

(~128).

This statement is a repetition of what

Kant revealed in the metaphysical deduction. However, the
purpose for the repetition is not one of summary. Kant
repeats what he exposed in the metaphysical deduction for
two reasons. First he wants to introduce the B Deduction by
mentioning the necessity of the categories for experience.
The categories are the logical functions of judgment
directed toward sensibility. As categories of the
understanding, the judgments that result from their use in
experience lose some of the flexibility they possessed as
mere logical propositions. Kant illustrates the loss of
flexibility through an example of a categorical proposition.
In logic, the subject and the predicate of a categorical
proposition are interchangeable according to the rules of
inference. However, experience does not allow the
interchange of subject and predicate, since experience gives
us a substantial reference. For example, when I claim that
all dogs are mammals, I am not referring to the concept of
dog merely as the subject of a sentence. I am referring to
the concept dog as the substance to which a mammalian
attribute inheres. As an universal claim about something in
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experience, this proposition could not be logically
converted without changing the whole referential structure
of the sentence and thereby shifting the meaning of the
intention in the proposition.

83

The categories have a

necessity to them in terms of order and sequence that the
logical functions of judgment alone do not possess. From
what Kant has said in the transition to the B Deduction, we
know that the argument of the B Deduction must be strictly
transcendental and must show how the categories are
necessary for an understanding of the objects of experience.
Second, Kant's strategy in the first division of the B
Deduction is to show how the categories are concepts of an
object in general prior to their reference to determinate
intuition. In other words, Kant wants to show how the
categories are valid for sensible intuition in general,
before he shows how they are applicable to our mode of
intuition. Thus Kant sets up his argument transcendentally
by showing the validity of the categories from themselves
prior to developing their connection with intuition.
However, we must keep in mind that the real validity of the
applicability of the categories arises only through the
exposure of their connection with intuition.
Kant begins his argument for the objective validity of
83 In Aristotelian logic, the valid conversion of the
proposition "all dogs are mammals" is "some mammals are
dogs." In this context, both the quantity and the subject of
the proposition would change, thus altering the experience
and intention within the sentence.

141
the categories in section 15 of the B Deduction by
attempting to show where and how unity arises within
experience. In order to show where unity arises, Kant looks
at the difference between sensibility and understanding. On
the one hand, our sensible capacity makes it possible for us
to receive a manifold of representation in intuition.
However, sensibility does not unify the manifold. What we
sensibly receive would remain a chaotic morass without an
act of unification, i.e., there would be a flow of
sensations without connection. On the other hand, our
cognitive capacity makes it possible to bring a manifold to
concepts. This requires an act of unification, and the act
of unification belongs to the understanding. Kant calls this
act of unification combination.
If unity arises in the understanding and is an act of
combination, then Kant must examine how the combined unity
is possible. Kant focuses his argument for the validity of
the categories in the B Deduction initially on the concept
of combination, so that he can gain access into the place
that unity arises. As I stated above, we have the ability to
receive the manifold of intuition through our senses, but we
cannot unify the manifold through our sensible capacities.
Instead, we combine the manifold through our cognitive
capacity and represent the manifold to ourselves as a
gathered unity. Combination is not receptive. Instead,
combination is a spontaneous act of the understanding that
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allows us to represent "the synthetic unity of the manifoldn
(B131}. Hence, combination is a representation of a
synthesized unity in experience.
As a mode of gathering, Kant says that the act of the
understanding called combination is a mode of synthesis, but
it is not synthesis per se. Combination is the
representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. As
Kant says, combination contains the givenness of the
manifold and its reproductive/productive synthesis.
combination can generate neither the manifold nor the
synthesis of the manifold. On the contrary, combination
represents only the unity of the two. I have problems with
Kant scholars who negate the role of the imagination in the
B Deduction. Kant does not equate synthesis and combination.
In light of the findings of the metaphysical deduction,
combination cannot be synthesis itself. 84 Synthesis is and
remains the function of the imagination. If Kant is not
going to contradict himself, then combination cannot be
identical with synthesis.
Kant raises the issue of combination because
combination is the act of the understanding that represents
84 In the B deduction, Kant does not alter the

metaphysical deduction, and the imagination retains its
synthetic role within the context of the metaphysical
deduction. Further, the imagination retains its synthetic
function in the APP. If Kant considers the understanding to
be synthetic in and of itself, then Kant is contradicting.
himself. However, I do not see Kant contradicting himself in
this context.
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the unity of our experience, i.e., combination is only a
representation of the synthetic unity. As a representation,
combination presupposes a condition that makes the
representation possible. Since combination is a
representation of synthetic unity, a unifying capacity must
make combination possible. Kant's argument proceeds along
the path that similar things produce similar things, or like
produces like. If we have a representation of unity, then
something that generates unity should make the
representation possible. Thus Kant needs to show the
condition of the possibility of the representation of the
synthetic unity.
If the possibility of unity does not lie within
sensibility, then the possibility of unity must lie within
the understanding. In this context, Kant is not referring to
the type of unity we find in a judgment. As he. says, the
unity found in judgment is only quantitative and presupposes
a combination of the manifold. In other words, the unity in
judgment is only a representation of the unity in
combination, which is only a representation of a primordial
unity.

85
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Thus judgment is twice removed from the primordial

Kant makes a distinction between quantitative and
qualitative unity. Quantitative unity is the type of unity
found in an universal judgment, where we predicate an
attribute to the entire class of entities contained in the
subject term. Qualitative unity represents the unity of a
whole. The plot of a novel is an example of qualitative
unity. The plot runs throughout the text and holds the text
together as an unity. In fact, the term qualitative does not
(continued ... )
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unity. The primordial unity Kant is referring to is a unity
that makes our experience of entities possible. The
primordial unity "precedes a priori all concepts of
86
combination" (B131}.
The possibility of having representations requires
that I am able to remain the same throughout all changes in
my representations of entities. Otherwise, I could not
retain what comes to me, and I would represent nothing. In
other words, experience is only possible if there is a selfidentity underlying the changes in appearances. Kant calls
this mode of self-identity "pure apperception" (B132). Pure
apperception is Kant's name for self-consciousness. If I did
not have the capability of remaining the same throughout the
changes in appearances that I receive, I would have no
experience. Further, mere consciousness of appearances is
not enough to make experience possible. I must be conscious
of my consciousness of appearances. Metaphorically,
apperception is the theme of experience as the plot is the
theme in a novel. If the theme is not present, the text does
85

( .•. continued)
fit the unity of experience, since the type of unity Kant is
referring to in the deduction makes the distinction between
quantity and quality possible. Kant makes the distinction so
that the category of the understanding will not be confused
with the condition of the possibility of the categories.
86 Kant says the primordial unity "vorhergeht" the
unity of conceptualization in an a priori manner (Bl31). The
idea of "going before" and "prior to" all point to a
temporal meaning. A notion of futurity arises in this
context.
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not hang together and falls apart. If apperception is not
present, experience lacks cohesion. As the intelligible
framework of experience, apperception interweaves itself
throughout experience and makes the unity of experience
possible. Self-consciousness and its ability to apperceive
the manifold grants a unity to the whole of our experience
and is "the highest principle in the whole sphere of human
knowledge" ( Bl35) .
Since apperception relates to the understanding, Kant
calls apperception the "I think" (B131). In other words,
apperception is the Cartesian cogito accounted for
transcendentally. In itself, the cogito is an "analytic"
judgment, i.e., the cogito only represents what belongs to
the self in and of itself. Knowing that I am a thinking
entity does not enlarge my conception of myself. The 'I
think' only represents an attribute that belongs to me and
contains no empirical admixture. In other words, the cogito
is an explicative and not an ampliative judgment.
Nonetheless, the analytic nature of the 'I think'
plays an important role within synthesis. On the one hand,
the cogito itself is impenetrable for Kant in its analytic
character.
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On the other hand, the cogito synthetically

unifies the manifold. The cogito combines and unifies the
manifold, thus making a representation of the unity of the
87

Heidegger takes issue with Kant on this point~ For
Heidegger, the 'I think' is penetrable. The being of the
'subject' is precisely what Heidegger undertakes in BT.
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manifold possible. The cogito combines intuitively given
representations and brings them to a unity. At this point,
we have an object. As Kant says, "an object is that in the
concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is
~nited"

(8137). In other words, intuitive representations

are not objective until they are unified by the
understanding, i.e., unified by apperception. Since the
unity provided by self-consciousness makes the object
possible, self-consciousness has objective validity, i.e.,
it is the "objective condition of all knowledge" (8138).
Once Kant establishes the pure apperception as the
basis for knowledge, he begins to show how we represent the

. un d ers t an d.ing. 88
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As we saw in the metaphysical

deduction, the logical forms of judgment make up the content
of the understanding, and Kant calls the forms of judgment
categories when they are employed experientially. In the B
Deduction, Kant defines judgment as "the manner in which
given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity
of apperception" (8141). Kant claims that when I make a
judgment about something, I am not expressing merely my
subjective impressions about the thing. Instead I am
asserting something about the object itself, viz., something
about the way the object is regardless of how I perceive the
object. A judgment expresses something about the being of
the object. Thus Kant focuses upon the copula in judgments.
88

Understanding is the "faculty of knowledge" (8137).
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When I say 'the chalk is white,

1

I am not saying something

about my impression of the chalk. I am claiming that this is
the way the chalk actually is. The judgment receives an
objective character through the copula, i.e., the judgment
becomes object-related.
From these investigations, Kant gives the proof for
the objective validity of the categories in section 20.

89

The argument is: 1. apperception is the condition for the
unity of the manifold of intuition; 2. understanding is the
faculty that makes objects possible; 3. we determine the
manifold of intuition objectively through judgment; 4. we
call the logical functions of judgment categories when we
employ them in the manifold of intuition; 5. therefore, the
categories are object-related and determine what we receive
intuitively. In Kant's terms, "the manifold of intuition is
necessarily subject to the categories 11 (8143).
Kant's remarks in section 21 of the B Deduction
complete the first division and provide a transition to the
second division of the transcendental deduction. In the
beginning of section 21, Kant repeats summarily the argument
of section 20 regarding the objective

vali~ity

of the

categories. The argument is simply that I combine
necessarily the manifold of intuition through selfconsciousness, or pure apperception, and thereby I provide a

89

The deduction itself is in fact only made up of
three sections of the CPR. These sections are 17, 19 and 13.
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necessary unity to experience by means of the content of
self-consciousness. Since the categories of the
understanding are the content of apperception, they provide
the means through which we unify our experience. It follows
from this that if self-consciousness provides a necessary
unity for the manifold of intuition, then any empirical
unity finds its necessity within the transcendental unity.
From this conclusion, Kant points out that pure
apperception, or self-consciousness, is the ground of any
particular "empirical consciousness of a given manifold,"
i.e., the necessity of the categories for experience
underlies our empirical possibility of categorization
(B144). Kant has shown in the first part of the deduction
how unity arises out of the understanding itself, and he has
shown this without moving through the empirical realm. Thus
we can see the professed transcendental character of the
deduction. There is no back and forth movement to the B
Deduction as there was in the A Deduction. Apperception
shows forth the necessary unity within experience, since
experience is not possible without self-consciousness and
the identity of the self that issues from apperception.
However, Kant has only shown that the categories
possess a necessary applicability to intuition in general,
but he has not shown how the applicability occurs. In other
words, Kant has proven that the categories are the
conditions through which we determine the manifold of
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intuition, but he has not established the connection between
the understanding and sensibility. This omission in the
first division of B Deduction results from the
transcendental nature of the deduction itself. Kant shows in
the first division how the understanding unifies intuition
in general, but he does not show how understanding unifies
our empirical intuition. Kant's contention in the first
division of the B Deduction is that understanding is
applicable to any mode of sensible intuition. In other
words, apperception is a requirement for any entity
possessing a mode of intuition that is sensibly receptive.
Apperception is there only to unify the manifold and not to
create a manifold. Kant sees apperception as a necessary
component for any finite entity. 90
However, the fact that apperception is necessary for a
finite entity does not establish how the categories function
for our mode of sensibility. The true proof of the
legitimate employment of the categories involves showing how
the connection between understanding and sensibility occurs

°

9

Kant is arguing that any sensibly intuitive entity
requires apperception for its unity of experience. This does
not mean that the entity must have the same exterior senses
that we have, but only that the entity must be finite. Thus
an intellectual understanding is not apperceptive, since it
is not finite. When Kant speaks about apperception belonging
to finite entities in general, I assume Kant has in mind
extra-terrestrial entities, cherubim, angels and other such
entities that could possibly exist. Animals would not fit
this category, since an essential component of finitude is
apperception. However, I do not know what this does for an
argument except bring in imaginary entities.
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for us. Kant must show empirical intuition stands in need of
apperception. Kant addresses the issue of the connection
between understanding and sensibility in the second part of
the B Deduction. Further, the examination of the connection
between understanding and sensibility is also an examination
of our conception of objectivity.
Kant begins the second division of the deduction with
a discussion of the difference between thinking and knowing.
I can think of numerous objects, but this does not mean that
I know these objects of thought. If the object is not given
intuitively, i.e., given in space and/or time, then the
object is unknowable. Intuition is the material of the
categories and the condition of the possibility of
knowledge.
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However, the same problem exists for Kant in

the B Deduction as in the A Deduction, viz., if we cannot
conflate intuition and understanding, then how do intuition
and understanding come together in order to obtain
knowledge?
Kant addresses the question of the connection between
intuition and sensibility in sections 24-26 of the B
Deduction. Sections 24-26 of the B Deduction are a
condensation of the discussion of synthesis and the
transcendental deduction in the A Deduction. The first part
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This conclusion has important consequences for the
Transcendental Dialectic. Due to the lack of intuition, the
area of special metaphysics comes to be excluded from the
area of knowledge.
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of section 24 is an investigation into the type of synthesis
needed to connect understanding and intuition. The second
part of section 24 and the entirety of section 25 follows
with an examination of the different conceptions of the
self, i.e., Kant examines the difference between inner sense
and apperception. Section 26 is the presentation of the
transcendental deduction in terms of synthesis and the need
for unity in experience.
In section 24, Kant distinguishes between two types of
synthesis. On the one hand, he discusses and has discussed

in the B Deduction "intellectual synthesis" (B151). On the
other hand, he discusses for the first time in the B
Deduction "figurative synthesis" (B151). Intellectual
synthesis is the same as the notion of combination that Kant
introduced in the beginning of the B Deduction. Intellectual
synthesis is the synthetic unity of the manifold of
intuition in general made possible by apperception and the
categories. As Kant showed in the first part of the B
Deduction, an intellectual synthesis is necessary for any
sensibly intuitive entity and provides the necessary unity
of experience.
In intellectual synthesis, we can see that
apperception is necessary for the unity of intuition.
However, the categories are empty until they connected with
intuition. Apperception and the categories cannot perform
the connective synthesis, since they only provide unity to
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experience. Instead, Kant sees that a figurative synthesis
is necessary for the connection of understanding and
intuition. The figurative synthesis is able to take up the
manifold of intuition in inner sense and connect it with the
understanding. Only through the figurative synthesis do the
categories "obtain objective reality, that is, application
to objects which can be given to us in intuition'' (B150). In
other words, only through the figurative synthesis is the
objectivity of the object possible.
The figurative synthesis is a result of the
transcendental imagination. Kant justifies the place of the
imagination in making objectivity possible by describing the
imagination as both a receptive and spontaneous capacity of
the subject. As we saw in our discussion of the imagination
in the APP, the imagination is sensible, since the
imagination can present an image of an object without the
object being present. In this sense, the imagination pushes
us beyond our sensible mooring, while still keeping us tied
to the sensible for the material of the imagination.
Nonetheless, the imagination has a spontaneous character to
it. The imagination functions without the mediation of our
sensible capacity. As an act of spontaneity, the imagination
and the understanding interact with one another and generate
the possibility of the categories being applicable to
sensible intuition. The act of figurative synthesis as an
act of spontaneity is a function of the productive
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imagination.

92

The transcendental synthesis of the

imagination creates a space where the understanding and the
imagination can come together. Kant says the transcendental
synthesis of the imagination stands as the ••ground" of all
the ways in which the categories are applicable "to the
objects of our possible intuition•• (5152).
Even though Kant did not refer to the imagination as
figurative synthesis in the A Deduction, a trace of the A
Deduction arises in the B Deduction through Kant's analysis
of figurative synthesis in the first paragraph. The first
paragraph of section 24 is somewhat confusing. In the first
half of the paragraph, Kant repeats his conclusions
regarding combination, or what he now calls intellectual
synthesis. In the second half of the paragraph, Kant
discusses figurative synthesis. However, he does not inform
us that he is discussing figurative synthesis until he has
completed the initial description of it. The discussion of
figurative synthesis involves a discussion of the phenomenon
of inner sense. Since time is the "form of inner sense," a
temporal element enters covertly into the discussion of
figurative synthesis (A43,B49). Through inner sense, we have
an intuitive awareness of ourselves as we are at any given
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Kant is very careful here to point out that the
reproductive imagination only applies to the empirical law
of association and "contributes nothing to the explanation
of the possibility of a priori knowledge" (5152). This is an
explicit instance of Kant trying to distance himself from
the analysis of the A deduction and its empirical admixture.
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moment. In other words, I appear to myself in inner sense.
As an appearance, inner sense occurs in the present moment.
Thus, inner sense is my awareness of the present. Figurative
synthesis creates an interplay between inner sense and
apperception. Imagination's ability to determine inner sense
and connect inner sense with intuition is the ability of
imagination to grasp the flow of time and offer it to
apperception for unification. Apperception has no intuitive
content and thus supplies nothing sensuous to experience.
Apperception is dependent upon intuition for its content.
Nonetheless, the unity provided in apperception is already
operative so that the received intuition can be taken up and
unified. Apperception reveals itself not merely as an "I
think," but also as an "I can. 1193 In effect, Kant has
maintained the character of futurity in apperception. The
categories are what lie ahead of intuition and anticipate
the unity in experience. The categories are prescriptive of
the unity of an intuition in general. Further, apperception
is a unity that is expectant of what is offered to it.
Figurative synthesis reveals the temporal interplay.
The difference between the A and B Deduction is the
lack of the empirical analysis of synthesis in the B
Deduction, and hence Kant omits the subjective deduction in
the B edition. The B Deduction suffers from this omission,
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This is reminiscent of what we saw in the A
deduction.
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because Kant seems to think he cannot explicitly raise the
issue of time in the analysis of the B Deduction. What comes
to take the place of the discussion of synthesis is a
discussion of the relationship between inner sense and
apperception.
Kant begins this discussion in the first paragraph of
section 24, continues the discussion in the second half of
section 24, and completes the discussion in section 25. In
these later sections, the discussion occurs within the
context of self-knowledge, i.e., how we know ourselves.
Further, the discussion of the relationship between inner
sense and apperception is about the limits of knowledge.
Kant pointed out in sections 21 and 22 of the B
Deduction that all our knowledge is subject to time, and
this condition extends even to the possibility of knowing
ourselves. Kant defines time as the form of inner sense,
i.e.,

11

the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state"

(A33,B49). In other words, inner sense is a mode of selfaffection. We can only know ourselves as we are affected by
ourselves, i.e., as we intuit ourselves. Apperception grants
my existence. In other words, my thinking and my existence
are given simultaneously with each other.
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However, since

apperception possesses no intuitive character, no self-
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Apperception is the cogito ergo sum, where my
thinking implies my existence. However, there is in fact no
act of inference in apperception, since the act of thinking
is immediately bound to existence.
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knowledge arises in apperception.
The pertinence of the connection of the inner sense
and apperception lies in Kant's discussion of what each
contains. As we have seen, apperception makes combination
possible, and apperception is the possibility of "object in
general" through its categorical usage (B154). Inner sense
is only the formal intuition of time. Inner sense allows us
to be receptive of external and internal appearances, but
inner sense ''contains no determinate intuition" (8154). On
the one hand, apperception stands out ahead of itself as the
possibility of unifying intuitions. On the other hand, inner
sense is the condition of receiving intuitions, while
possessing no determinate intuition itself. Intuition makes
the presence of the object possible, understanding
represents the present object. However, inner sense only
makes the presence of the object possible in each moment the
object is present. This is why inner sense has no
determinate intuition, since inner sense, as the form of
time, has no retentive capabilities. The possibility of a
determinate intuition lies within the retentive character of
the transcendental imagination, which Kant calls figurative
synthesis. Without the retentive character of the figurative
synthesis, which Kant calls productive synthesis, there is
no connection of the categories with our intuition. The
temporal character arises in the B Deduction, and thus the
ideas of the A Deduction are present in the B Deduction,
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onlY Kant does not develop the findings of the B Deduction
as well as he does the findings of the A Deduction.
The final step of the B Deduction arises in section
26. Kant's purpose in this section is to show that the
categories necessarily determine the objects we intuit. In
this

sectio~.

Kant intends to show how the categories are

"laws, 11 i.e., necessary ways of understanding objects.
Further, these laws are the ways we come to understand
objectivity.
This is the one place in the B Deduction where Kant
begins his argument with an empirical element. Kant begins
with a brief discussion of the synthesis of apprehension.
Kant describes the synthesis of apprehension as perception,
i.e., as a conscious synthesis of the manifold wherein
something empirically appears to us. Instead of describing
the synthesis of apprehension in terms of the imagination as
Kant does in the A Deduction, Kant describes the synthesis
of apprehension in terms of the pure forms of intuition. The
pure intuitions of space and time are the possibilities of
having appearances, thus we would not have any perception of
appearances without these conditions. Further, perception
presupposes a unity of the manifold of intuition, since
perception must be able to perceive something determinate.
The pure intuitions are not concepts. They are intuitions,
and thus they require a unity of the manifold if they are to
be grasped. Since perceptual experience presupposes the
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forms of intuitions for its appearances, and since intuition
in general needs apperception for its unity, therefore
apperception and its categories are conditions of the
possibility for the unity of experience. Thus the categories
make experience possible and are applicable to experience.
I can use Descartes' wax example to illustrate Kant's
argument. When Descartes put the wax by the fire, the wax
underwent an alteration. The wax went from a solid to a
fluid state.
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I perceive two different states of the same

object. The change of states occurs through a change in
time, i.e., the one state follows upon the other state. Thus
a temporal relationship emerges between the two events that
is determined sequentially. Time itself does not appear in
the experience. Rather I intuit the events temporally. My
mode of intuition is at work in the way I perceive the
event. The unity of the experience does not arise out of my
intuition. Instead, the sequence of before and after is a
result of the category of causality. The category of
causality determines the way I understand the temporal flow
and brings the flow to a unity. Kant says I can see this if
I abstract from the form of time and realize that I am
determining time by prescribing a rule to it.
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Other changes occurred, but I want to concentrate on
this change.
96 Descartes• problem with his description of the wax
example is that he conflates sensing and thinking. Thus
Descartes cannot see the intuitive character of the subject
(continued ... )
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The categories do not simply give unity to our
experience. Kant says they provide a priori "laws" to
experience (8163). The categories can provide this function
because what we know are our appearances and not the thing
in itself. As such, the categories are the a priori modes of
legislation for our appearances. Through their unity, the
categories allow the object to appear for us and grant us
our understanding of the object as object. The activity of a
receptive-synthetic unity is how Kant understands
objectivity, viz., these are the conditions of the
possibility of the presence of the object.
For the most part, Kant gives this argument without
mentioning the imagination. Still, Kant cannot ignore the
role of figurative synthesis and the findings of the A
Deduction. Kant does finally retrieve the imagination in
section 26, and Kant's remark at the end of this section is
important to our discussion. Kant says,
Now it is the imagination that connects the manifold of
sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the
unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the
understanding, and for the manifoldness of its
apprehension upon sensibility. All possible perception
is thus dependent upon ·the synthesis of apprehension,
and this in turn upon transcendental synthesis, and
therefore upon the categories. (8164)
This quotation represents the entire argument of the A
Deduction condensed into two sentences. Kant presents the
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( ••• continued)
offering material up for unification through the categories
of the understanding.
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imagination precisely as the capacity that connects the
manifold of intuition and offers the manifold up to the
understanding. The understanding can then perform its
intellectual synthesis upon the imagination and provide
experience with its necessary unity. Since perception is an
empirical synthesis, and the empirical synthesis presupposes
a transcendental synthesis, therefore the productively
synthetic power of the imagination makes perception
possible. Through the imagination, the categories become
applicable. If the imagination make the applicability of the
categories possible, then the imagination is responsible for
the presence of the object. Only through the imagination
does the objectivity of the object become possible. Without
synthesis, the understanding could not connect up with
intuition. In this sense, the imagination retains its place
of priority in the B Deduction. However, I must admit that
Kant does not explicitly draw out the imagination's
ontological priority as well in the B Deduction as he does
in the A Deduction.

CHAPTER FOUR
DOUBLE READINGS OF THE KANTIAN IMAGINATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Kant's investigation of the imagination in the CPR
gives rise to diverse possibilities that take thought down
different paths. On the one hand, Kantian metaphysics
disrupts the older dogmatic metaphysics and recenters
metaphysics around the ground established by the subject. 97
In other words, Kant's thought decenters metaphysics by
redefining the sensible/intelligible opposition and
recenters metaphysics in terms of the new definition. On the
other hand, Kant's thought gives rise to possibilities that
extend beyond the confines and intentions of his own
project, i.e., gives rise to possibilities that extend
beyond the metaphysical project in general. In other words,
Kant's investigation of the imagination gives rise to the
possibility of the displacement of metaphysics and
correspondingly to the displacement of concept of
97

For example, the Kantian recentering of metaphysics
gave rise to the possibilities of German Idealism and NeoKantianism.
161
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subjectivity.
In this chapter, I examine the latter possibility and
see how Kant's conception of the imagination decenters
metaphysical thought and displaces the concept of
subjectivity. Unlike metaphysical thought, which replaces
the decentered ground with a new ground, the latter
possibility of displacement does not give rise to
replacement. In other words, the displacement of the subject
as the ground of metaphysics does not give rise to a new
ground. Instead, the thinking that arises in the
displacement brings the very concept of ground into
question.
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Since I contend that the imagination is the

place where the displacement occurs in Kant's thought, and
since the imagination is essentially linked to synthesis,
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I call the type of investigation that examines
metaphysical displacement a double reading. A double reading
is an act performed upon a text, but a text is not simply a
book. A text is a play of differential forces that give rise
to meaning. Further, a text is structured according to
theories and practices that surround the situation of the
given text. However, there are elements within any text that
structure the text and yet are not accounted for within the
text. In other words, no text is completely self-contained.
In terms of metaphysical thought, no text is self-present.
A double reading examines the text in terms of
unaccountable elements within the text. As its name implies,
a double reading has two components. First a double reading
must allow the text to have its play. In other words, the
reading must make the intentions, arguments and purposes of
the text manifest. Second the reading must show from the
text itself how elements arise that disrupt the project of
the text. These unaccounted elements cannot be incorporated
into the text and thus disrupt the intended project. The
disruption of the original project of the text points to
other possibilities that cannot be thought within the
confines of the text itself.
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then the synthetic character of the imagination is the place
to investigate the displacement of the subject.
This chapter has three sections. First I examine
Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination in terms of
the phenomenon of transcendence. Specifically, I want to
show how Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination
exposes a need to rethink the phenomenon of the self outside
of the context of the metaphysics of subjectivity. Second I
explore the possibility of imaginative displacement by
examining Heidegger's destructive retrieval of the
imagination in KPM. Particularly, I want to show how the
retrieval of the imagination in terms of transcendence
brings the very concepts of subjectivity and ground into
question and leads to the f initude of Dasein. In this
section, I am also going to develop Heidegger's
understanding of self as the questioner. Third I perform a
deconstructive reading upon the Kantian investigation of the
imagination and see how the imagination functions as a trace
within Kant's metaphysics. In other words, I examine the
effect of the imagination upon the conception of subject and
show how the imagination introduces an irreducible absence
into the project of the metaphysics of presence. The
introduction of a irreducible absence into the project of
metaphysics disrupts metaphysics and brings the metaphysical
project itself into question.
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B. IMAGINATION AND TRANSCENDENCE
In this section, I investigate Heidegger's
interpretation of the imagination in terms of transcendence.
In order to understand the relationship between
transcendence and the imagination, I must first discuss
Heidegger's thesis in KPM. Here I discuss Heidegger's
conception of retrieval and the reason he reads Kant in
terms of transcendence. Second I investigate explicitly the
relationship between the imagination and transcendence. Here
I examine the relationship between the imagination and
temporality. This examination focuses on Heidegger's reading
of the Kantian analysis of the imagination's three-fold
synthesis and the phenomenon of self-affection. Third I show
how Heidegger's examination of the imagination in the
Critique of Pure Reason displaces the conception of a
rational self-grounding subject and calls for an
understanding of the self outside of the conception of selfconsciousness. The third part of this section provides the
transition to Heidegger's retrieval of Dasein and the
project of fundamental ont9logy from his interpretation of
the imagination.
In KPM, Heidegger undertakes a retrieval of Kant's
thought. The purpose of the retrieval is to uncover the
latent possibilities within Kant's philosophy that relate to
Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology in Being and
Time. Heidegger says that the project of KPM is to interpret
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Kant's analysis of pure reason as a ''Qrundlegung der
Metaphysik," i.e., to interpret Kant's project as
establishing a foundation for metaphysics in general, or as
a meta-metaphysics.

99

However, Heidegger's project does not

end with the exposure of the Kantian ontology. For the first
time in the history of philosophy, Heidegger makes
metaphysics itself a problem by showing that metaphysics has
not accounted for its own possibility, i.e., has not
accounted for its own ground. Thus Heidegger radicalizes the
project of metaphysics.
By claiming that Heidegger radicalizes the project of
metaphysics, I am claiming that there is a difference
between setting up a foundation and questioning the act of
foundation setting. Even though we can interpret Kant's
project in the CPR as a meta-metaphysics, Kant remains
entrenched within the problematic of his philosophical era.
Within his era, the questioning of the possibility of
metaphysics itself, i.e., the very happening of metaphysics,
is not what is questioned. Instead, Kant presupposes the
metaphysical project and only shows us how to set
metaphysics on its proper ground. Kant informs us of what
the ground is, but he does not question the phenomenon of
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Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p.l. Heidegger
points out that Kant was aware that his own project was a
meta-metaphysics. See KPM, p.238, and Immanuel Kant, "Letter
to Marcus Herz [about May 11, 1781]," in Philosophical
Correspondence, trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1967), p.95.

166

ground and thus is not able to account for the possibility
of metaphysics itself.
In order to account for the possibility of metaphysics
itself, Heidegger brings the phenomenon of ground into
question. In other words, Heidegger questions the act of
foundation setting. Questioning the act of foundation
setting requires the questioner to step back from the
unquestioned condition and to turn it into a problem. By
turning the act of foundation setting into a problem,
Heidegger shows how a conception of f initude makes our
comportment to being possible, and from this shows how
finitude leads to a fundamental ontology that underlies and
ultimately disrupts the metaphysical project. 100
Since the projects of Kant and Heidegger are
different, Heidegger's retrieval cannot simply be a
duplicating of the Kantian philosophy. Instead, the purpose
of the retrieval is to uncover latent possibilities within
Kant's thought that extend beyond the limits of the Kantian
philosophy. Since the project of fundamental ontology is the
disclosure of time as the meaning of being, Heidegger seeks

too I can specify the difference between Kant's and
Heidegger' projects in terms of the ontological difference.
Kant places the ground, or sets up the foundation, of
metaphysics in the subject. Thus he conflates being with an
entity. Heidegger recognizes that being cannot be an entity,
even though our access to being occurs through Dasein. For
Heidegger, being is neither reducible to nor founded upon an
entity. Thus the onto-theological condition of metaphysics,
which Kant stands within, becomes questionable through the
recognition of the ontological difference.
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for the meaning of being within Kant's thought and finds a
sense of the meaning of being within Kant's analysis of the
fundamental relationship between the imagination and time.
In other words, Heidegger shows in KPM how the finitude of
our existence makes metaphysics possible.
In KPM, Kant serves as a "Ftirsprecher" for
Heidegger. lOl Wh'i l e Kan t d oes no t exp li c i t 1 y express th e
possibility of fundamental ontology in CPR, i.e., does not
thematize human finitude as such, Kant does give a temporal
analysis of perception and hence gives a temporal analysis
of the being of the object, or objectivity. Thus Kant
glimpses the temporal horizon underlying being and entities,
and Heidegger exploits this Kantian insight. Heidegger
creates an affinity with Kant and uses the Kantian project
as a place of refuge for his own project of fundamental
ontology.

102

As a refuge, Heidegger reads Kant in terms of the
issue of transcendence. Heidegger presents the issue of
transcendence in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology.
Heidegger's interpretation of transcendence centers around
his retrieved conception of the Platonic "epekeina tes

101
102

Ibid., p.xiv.

The use of a thinker as a Ftirsprecher is very
prevalent in Heidegger's early thought. For example,
Heidegger uses Aristotle as a speaker for his thought in BP
and "On the Being and Conception of Physis in Aristotle's
Physics B,1."
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~sias", or that which is beyond being. 103 In Platonic
metaphysics, the sun stands as the image of that which is
beyond being, viz., the good. Heidegger understands the
beyond as "transcendence."

104

Transcendence is what makes

being itself comprehensible, and Heidegger understands the
beyond, or transcendence, as temporality. Temporality is the
horizon through which we understand being. As the horizon,
temporality stands as the limit that allows for being to be
understood. Since being is always the being of entities in
general or a particular region of entities, temporality
stands as the possibility of understanding entities in terms
of their being. In other words, temporality makes an
ontological understanding possible. For example, if we have
an understanding of entities as present things and being is
an understanding of entities, then we understand being as
presence.

105

Through our understanding of being as presence,

an entity comes to emerge for us as a present thing.

106

103

BP, p.283. I present the Greek in a transliteration
because that is the way the Greek passages are presented in
the English text.
104

BP,p.285.

105

Presence is an interpretation of the word
Anwesenheit.
106

Understanding and cognition are two different acts
in Heidegger's thought. On the one hand, understanding is a
mode of our being, i.e., we exist as being out in our world
already amongst entities. Without our projection into the
world, entities would not appear for us. The fact that we
are in the midst of entities shows us that we understand
being. Further, we understand being for the most part
unthematically. On the other hand, cognition is always
(continued ... )
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For Heidegger, transcendence is world-understanding.

107

since Dasein understands him/herself as being-in-the-world,
transcendence is a mode of self-understanding for Dasein.

108

In existing, Dasein is out beyond him/herself already in a
world and understanding him/herself from out of that world.
This is possible only on the basis of the ecstatichorizonal unity of temporality that allows Dasein to be open
to his/her world.

109

The temporal understanding allows

entities to appear and to be understood in terms of their
being.
The issue of transcendence is the issue that Heidegger
takes up with Kant. Heidegger is seeking the mode of
transcendence in Kant's philosophy. Since a retrieval is a
gathering of what is unthought within a thinker's thought,
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( ••• continued)
entity-related for Heidegger. We know things. However, we
know things only because we possess a pre-understanding of
being.
107

The world is neither an entity nor a collection of
entities for Heidegger. The world is the contextual horizon
through which we have entities. Heidegger calls world
"being" in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans.
Michael Heim, (Bloomington! IN: Indiana University, 1984),
p.218.
108 Dase1·n 1·s H id
e egger 1 s name f or th e re 1 a ti ons hi p
between ourselves and our comportment to being. What is
unique about the human being is that the human being directs
him/herself toward entities in their being and never simply
comports him/herself toward entities. Dasein·is not a
subject, since the understanding of ourselves as subjects
arises in opposition to an object. This is why Heidegger
does not use the term subject in his philosophical analyses.
109

The term ecstatic means to be outside or displaced.
Heidegger refers to the dimensions of time as ecstases.
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Heidegger is seeking for the place in Kant's thought where
transcendence manifests itself. Heidegger finds
transcendence within Kant's analysis of imagination. Since
transcendence is the unthought element within Kant's
thought, Kant could only glance at the beyond and thus could
only hint at the possibility of transcendence. In seeking
for the element of transcendence in Kant's thought,
Heidegger reads Kant as seeking for what makes metaphysics
itself possible.
In order to move to the core of Heidegger's analysis
of Kant, I focus on Heidegger's analysis of the three modes
of synthesis in the CPR and on Heidegger's analysis of selfaffection. I analyze the syntheses of the imagination and
self-affection because both phenomena lead Heidegger into a
retrieval of fundamental ontology. Heidegger finds a mode of
transcendence in Kant's conception of the imagination, and
he finds a radical sense of finitude in self-affection. Thus
the analysis of the imagination moves us into Heidegger's
retrieval of fundamental ontology. Keeping within
Heidegger's purpose, I investigate only the analysis of the
imagination in the subjective deduction of the A edition. 110

llO Since I have shown that the A Deduction arises in
the B Deduction, I can legitimately combine the insights
from both Deductions together. On the one hand, Kant's
investigation into the imagination is developed better in
the A Deduction than in the B deduction. On the other hand,
the relationship between self-affection and apperception is
developed better in the B Deduction than in the A Deduction.
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However, the analysis of self-affection in the B edition of
the CPR assists us in our understanding of Heidegger's
account of self-affection.
My investigation of the A and B Deductions in the CPR
has shown that the imagination has an ontological function
within Kant's thought. Further, the imagination does not
lose its place of priority in the Kantian project. Without
the synthetic character of the imagination, there would not
be any experience. Since the place of the imagination in the
B Deduction does not change, the same issues arise for the B
Deduction as they do in the A Deduction.
In my analysis in this section, I must repeat the
analysis of Kant given in the preceding chapter. However, I
am not simply reiterating what I examined previously. The
repetition must bring out the possibilities suggested by
Kant's text itself. In other words, the analysis of the
imagination and self-affection must turn metaphysics into a
problem. Since Heidegger is reading Kant's text from the
horizon of time as the understanding of being, we must see
where the temporal understanding of being arises. 111 Once I
expose the problematic character of metaphysics, I can turn

111

The horizon is also a margin, since the horizon
demarcates the text and exposes "latent" possibilities
within the text. Prior to the actual retrieval in KPM,
Heidegger is bringing the horizon to the forefront and thus
incorporating the margin into the text. The act of
incorporation is disruptive to the metaphysical text. I will
examine the disruptive character of incorporation when I
examine the retrieval.
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mY attention to the retrieval.
Heidegger's thesis in KPM regarding the Kantian
conception of the imagination is that the transcendental
imagination is the "common root" out of which spring the
"two stems" of intuition and understanding.

112

Heidegger's

thesis of the common root has been contested, but it
presents a fascinating reading of Kant.

113

If the imagination

is the common root of the other faculties, then the issue of
synthesis is a key element in understanding the role of the
imagination.
If Kant is seeking for the conditions of the
possibility of the ground of experience in a priori
synthetic judgments, then the place we find synthesis should
provide us with the account of the ground. Imagination is
the place where synthesis takes place. Kant says that:
synthesis in general ... is the mere result of the power
of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of
the soul, without which we should have no knowledge
whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever
conscious (A78, B103).
The imagination synthesizes the content of the
faculties of the subject that need to come together in order
to have knowledge. These faculties are sensibility and
understanding. On the one hand, sensibility provides us

112
113

KPM, p.41. Also pp. 144-176.

An interesting variation on Heidegger's thesis is
Deleuze's reading of Kant in Kant's Critical Philosophy.
Deleuze reads the three Critiques around the idea of common
sense, which involves the imagination in each Critique.
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either with appearances in the empirical realm or with the
possibility of appearances on the transcendental level. In
other words, sensibility provides the subject with a
manifold of intuition that is in need of unification. On the
other hand, understanding provides us with a way to grasp
the appearances as an unity or a whole. The understanding
supplies modes of unity to sensibility.
The imagination brings the content of sensibility and
understanding together. Without the ability to bring the
modes of representation of the two together, knowledge would
not be possible. We have seen this in the investigation of
the transcendental deductions. The synthetic function of the
imagination illuminates being and entities and thus makes
knowledge possible. If entities are what is known in terms
of their Being, then the imagination is the condition making
this possible. As an illuminating power, the imagination
must be beyond being and entities, since imagination opens
up the space within which the two can be understood. We can
already see an element of transcendence arise in the
imagination.
If presence is our understanding of being, then the
element of temporality that emerges in the imagination
should reflect this understanding of being. The
understanding of being as presence arises in the CPR. Kant's
analysis of a priori synthetic knowledge is not only an
analysis of pure mathematics or pure natural science. The
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project of the CPR is also an investigation into the
possibility of objectivity, i.e., an investigation into the
possibility of the presence of the object. Since the
presence of the object happens for a subject, the
investigation into objectivity is an investigation into
perception. Specifically, the CPR is an investigation into
the conditions of the possibility of perception.
Since the act of perception is always a perception of
the perceived object, perception takes place in the presence
of the object. Within a temporal framework, perception
encounters the perceived object as the object is given at
the moment, i.e., as the object is given now.

114

If the CPR

is an investigation into the conditions of the possibility
of the object, then the CPR is an investigation into the
presence of the object. In other words, the CPR is an
investigation into the mode of temporality we call the
present and its mode of constitution. As Kant goes on to
show, the constitution of the present is a result of
synthesis.
In the A Deduction, Kant attempts to show how a
synthesis is present in each of the subject's faculties. In

114

The Kantian project in the CPR is an investigation
into the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. !
priori synthetic knowledge comprises theoretical physics,
formal mathematics and metaphysics. However, empirical
knowledge presupposes our a priori capacities. Without pure
intuitions and the categories, there would be no perception.
Thus the CPR becomes an analysis of the possibility of
perception.
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other words intuition, imagination and understanding utilize
a mode of synthesis. The three modes of synthesis correspond
to different modes of time. Intuition has a mode of
synthesis that uncovers the present, imagination has a mode
of synthesis that uncovers the past, and understanding has a
mode of synthesis that uncovers the future.
Kant calls the synthesis operative in intuition the
"synthesis of apprehension 11 (A99). The problem that Kant
considers in this context is how the present moment is
possible. On an experiential and intuitive level, a manifold
is given. However, the appearance of a thing requires that
the manifold of intuition congeals into whole. In order to
have an appearance, the manifold has to be held together so
that the given impressions are

11

distinguished in timen and

"contained in a single moment." (A99). The single moment is
the present. In other words, the present is synthesized out
of the manifold of intuition. The present moment occurs
because the manifold can appear in time and is held
together. The present is the result of a synthesis that
occurs a priori in intuition.
Without synthesis, the manifold would have no cohesion
and experience would not occur. Sensibility itself does not
synthesize, only imagination synthesizes. For a thing to
appear and be held in the now, imagination must be at work.
The imaginative synthesis makes the empirical apprehension
of something possible because it makes the present moment
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itself possible. Further, if imagination is making the
present possible and we conceive of time as a succession of
now points, then the imagination actually takes on the
character of time.

115

The second synthesis that occurs is on the level of
the imagination, and Kant calls the imaginative synthesis
"reproduction" (AlOO). We can only understand the synthesis
of reproduction in reference to synthesis of apprehension.
If there were no way to connect the present moment with the
moment that preceded it, then there would be a disconnected
bundle of appearances. In other words, if I were always "to
lose" what preceded my present thought or experience, then I
would not have any continuity to my thoughts or experience
( A102).

116

However, experience is not a bundle of random,

disconnected perceptions. Experience is only possible if
what is given in the past moment is brought along in the
present moment, i.e., reproduced. Empirically, this is a
result of the imagination's ability to associate various
images and hold them together. In other words a synthesis
connects the past images of the thing to the present

115

1n light of this, one can see why Heidegger entitles
this section in KPM "Pure Synthesis as Pure Imagination,"
because time and imagination are joined together.
116

Norman Kemp Smith translates "verlieren" as "to
drop," and I am translating it as "to lose." Smith makes it
sound as if the loss of preceding representations were an
intentional act, which could not be the case. Moreover,
Smith's translation in this particular section is
questionable.
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perception.
As reproductive, the imagination is in need of a
productive power that allows for the empirical gathering to
occur. Thus an a priori imagination arises for Kant that
makes possible the continuity of the past with the present.
on the a priori level, the imagination's synthetic activity
is not one of associating or reproducing images. Instead the
imagination becomes the synthesis of the time-series itself.
The past is kept with the present. Thus the synthesis is
temporal, i.e., the imagination's synthetic activity
constitutes time.

117

Imagination takes on a retentive

character that holds the temporal flow together. This makes
empirical experience possible, since we retain the past with
the present.
Having shown the temporal character of synthesis and
the emergence of the past and the present, we are left with
one mode of time, viz., the future. If the present emerges
intuitively and the past emerges productively in
imagination, then the future should emerge from the
understanding. However, a problem arises regarding the
traditional interpretation of both the

und~rstanding

and of

Kant's philosophy in general. We do not generally consider
understanding and apperception, or self-consciousness, to be

117 The empirical association of representations takes
place in time. However, the possibility of association does
not take place in time, since the possibility of association
occurs as the constitution of time.
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temporal.

118

The general interpretation of the understanding

Js that it is atemporal.

119

Thus the question arises: is it

possible to interpret the understanding temporally?
The third sense of synthesis that Kant discusses is
the "synthesis of recognition in a concept" (A103). If a
sense of the future is to arise in the understanding, then
the future should appear in the synthesis of recognition.
Kant introduces this section through a reference to time. He
states that reproduction is "useless" without the ability of
consciousness to generate a sense of sameness to the
reproduced moments ( Al03) . 120 Thus there must be an act of
consciousness that provides a unity to what is apprehended
and reproduced. Based upon what I show regarding the
temporal interpretation of the syntheses of apprehension and
reproduction, I can say there must be an act of
consciousness that provides a unity to the

pa~t

and the

present. Kant calls this act of consciousness "recognition."
The synthetic act of recognition takes place in the
understanding through the act of concept formation. In order
to be able to represent the thing I perceive as the self-
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KPM, p.189.

119

Heidegger takes issue with the interpretation of the
atemporal character of the understanding by showing how the
future emerges in the understanding.
120

The German reads: "Ohne Bewusstsein, dass das, was
wir denken, eben dasselbe sei, was wir einen Augenblick
zuvor dachten, wiirde alle Reproduktion in der Reihe der
Vorstellungen vergeblich sein" (A103).
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same thing, I must be aware that what I am perceiving is
what I perceived previously and am continuing to perceive. 121
For Kant, I can only maintain this awareness if the unity
stands out ahead of me and generates the possibility of the
unity. The way unity arises in consciousness is through the
concept. Through the concept, the understanding unifies the
past and the present, since the understanding possesses a
mode of unity that stands in advance of the other two
temporal modes.
As standing in advance of the past and the present,
the understanding is anticipatory. Without the anticipatory
character of the understanding, I would never know that the
thing I see before me right now is the thing that was there
a moment ago. The anticipatory character of the
understanding exposes the role of the future and completes
the circuit of time. The purpose of the synthesis of
recognition is to move beyond the present perception of the
object and the retained images by forming a unity that
allows us to recognize the experienced thing as the selfsame thing. The recognition occurs only if that which is
being cognized anticipates the connection of the past and
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Since I am describing an act of perception, I must
assume that I only continue to re-cognize the thing as I am
perceiving it. However, the act of recognition extends
beyond the act of perception. All acts dealing with entities
involve recognition. For example, recognition must be
operative in memory. If I were not able generate a sense of
sameness, then I could not recall and recognize what I
remember.
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present. The a priori unity is futural, in the sense that
apperception precedes the empirical experience and gives
unity to the experience. 122 This unity rendered by the
concept in apperception must already be given in advance, or
the unity is only haphazard. As a projection of unity, the
understanding has the ability to project the possibility of
unity in advance. The understanding finds itself in the
temporal structure as being "Vorbildung" i.e., preformative.

123

If we interpret understanding in terms of

apperception, then the unity of apperception serves as that
which grants in advance the possibility of unity. Since
unity is a result of synthesis, the imagination operates in
the gathering. As such, the three-fold structure of time
emerges within a unified horizon made possible by the
imagination.
If we direct our attention to what Heidegger has
exposed in these sections, we see that the three ecstases,
or modes, of time, viz., the past, the present and the
future, emerge in terms of the syntheses operative in each
faculty. If time is a whole as Kant says it is, then the
three ecstases must be connected. Since synthesis is the
connective power and imagination is the power of synthesis,
then imagination appears as the whole in which the three
modes interweave with each other.
122 Kant says literally vorhergehen, to go ahead of.
123

KPM, p.191.
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A problem arises here regarding the imagination. On
the one hand, imagination plays a specific role within
knowledge by making the past possible. On the other hand,
imagination is responsible for the three modes of synthesis,
since imagination is the power of synthesis in general. The
two-fold function of the imagination exposes a fundamental
ambiguity in Kantian thought. On one level of the Kantian
analysis, imagination is a faculty and has its own place
within the possibility of knowledge. On another level,
imagination is a power that opens and holds together the
temporal horizon where things appear. This ambiguity
expresses the fact that while on one level imagination can
be regarded as a faculty of the subject, on another level
the imagination makes subjectivity itself possible.
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How

can the imagination be a synthetic power operative
throughout each of the faculties and still have its own
place in one of the modes of time? How is this ambiguity
reconciled?
Kant does not reconcile the ambiguity. Since Kant
operates with a faculty psychology, Kant maintains
consistently the role of the three faculties in his
philosophy. Yet, the questionable role of the imagination

124

We have also seen the ambiguity expressed in Kant 1 s
inability to assign the imagination a definitive place in
his works. In the APP, Kant analyzed the imagination in
terms of sensibility, while he analyzed the imagination in
terms of the understanding in the CPR. As Heidegger says,
"the transcendental imagination is homeless." KPM, p.142.
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keeps arising in the Deductions, particularly in the areas
where Kant analyzes the self. The strength of Kant's
analyses brings the ambiguity to the surface, even though
Kant cannot see that the ambiguity requires moving beyond
the conceptual framework of metaphysics.
In order to deal with the ambiguity, Heidegger
analyzes the sense of the self that emerges in Kant's
thought. Heidegger's argument is that the self is
essentially temporal. The argument for the temporal
character of selfhood does not mean that the self is in
time. Rather, the argument for the temporal character of
selfhood means that the understanding of our being and the
being of objects is temporal. Heidegger calls this mode of
ontological self-understanding finitude.
The basis of Heidegger's argument rests upon both the
conception of the imagination as the common root of
intuition and understanding and the temporal understanding
of the imagination that arises in the analysis of synthesis.
Heidegger understands the conception of the common root in
terms of the concepts of origin and reduction. As the common
root, the imagination functions as the origin of intuition
and understanding. However, the imagination is not the
origin of the two stems of knowledge in an ontic sense, as
if the imagination could give birth to intuition and
understanding. Instead, the origin is a disclosure of the
ontological possibilities present within the phenomena
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themselves. In the context of Kantian thought, the
imagination is the disclosure of the ontological
possibilities of the intuition and the understanding for
objectivity.
We must grasp the origin of the understanding and
intuition in the imagination as a reduction. The use of the
concept reduction in this context has an ontological
signification just as the term origin does. In other words,
reduction does not mean to shrink or condense in size.
Instead, an ontological reduction exposes the understanding
of being operative within a given context. We must
understand the reduction of intuition and understanding to
the imagination in the same way as we understand the
imagination as an origin, i.e., the imagination shows forth
the inherent possibilities of the two stems of ontological
knowledge. In terms of the reduction, the imagination is the
understanding of being for the two stems of ontological
knowledge.
The origin and reduction of the two faculties to the
imagination arises in Heidegger's examination of the Kantian
conception of the self. Two senses of the

~elf

emerge in the

CPR. The self emerges as self-affection in the
Transcendental Aesthetic, and as apperception or selfconsciousness in the Transcendental Analytic. First
Heidegger analyzes self-affection. 125 Self-affection, or
125

KPM, p.193.
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inner sense, is essentially temporal. As Kant says, time is
"the form of inner sense'' (A33, B50). Unlike the exterior
senses that function only in proximity to something
external, inner sense does not possess the requirement of
external proximity in order to function. I only have to be
in proximity to myself in order to be affected by myself.
Since I am always in proximity to myself, the spatial
character, understood as outer intuition loses its
designation.

126

Pure self-affection is a feeling of myself

without being affected by my exterior senses. The ability to
feel myself as existing occurs through the intuitive
character of time. Time does not affect the self from the
outside, i.e., time is neither a Ding an sich that contains
the self nor a perceivable entity. Instead time is the way
in which the self is able to be affected. I feel myself as
enduring throughout change, and I feel this sense of
duration in terms of succession and simultaneity. In other
words, I feel my presence. This occurs due to time's
11

formative 11 and "receptive" character.
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As formative, time

presents the field, or horizon, in which things can come to
appear. Yet at the same time the possibility of this field
126

A character of spatiality emerges in the context of
being in proximity to myself, but the spatial character
cannot be accounted for within Kantian philosophy. Kant
conceives of space only in terms of being directed to things
outside of me. A sense of spatiality as differing, as
creating a space where I can appear to myself is something I
will take up in the deconstructive reading.
127

KPM, p.194.
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already being there with me allows the self to be receptive.
The auto-affective mode of the self is a structure of the
self's being.
However, Kant tells us in the CPR that "intuitions
without concepts are blind", and that

11

concepts without

intuitions are empty" (A51,B75). Thus along with being selfaffective, we are also apperceptive. Apperception has a
temporal character. This implies that the sense of the self
involved in the understanding is a temporal self. The
possibility of bringing appearances to unity as objects that
stand over and against the self, which Heidegger calls the
act of "ob-jectification,

11

depends on the fact that

apperception also involves a pre-formative act.
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Thus

apperception is ready for time, since apperception is always
already there to give unity to the field. I am ahead of
myself apperceptively. Apperception is only there to give
unity to the open field that time creates or forms for
apperception.
If self-affection opens up the field where
apperception can function, then auto-affection and
apperception are not disparate views of the self merely
alongside one another. Instead the two are

11

the same. 11129

This does not mean that the two are identical, for Kant does
not conflate the two senses of the self. They are the same
128

t29

KPM, p.195.
KPM, p.197.
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because they expose the self in its unified character. The
unified character of the self arises out of the self's
temporal character. Only a unified finite self can be a
knower and receiver. In other words, the self emerges as
transcendent, i.e., the self emerges as receptive and
apperceptive due to the self's temporal condition. As Kant
points out repeatedly, if there is no time then there are no
objects.
The imagination emerges in this discussion of selfhood
as the essence of selfhood. As Kant shows, the imagination
is that capacity that is both receptive and spontaneous. The
characteristics of receptivity and spontaneity are precisely
the characteristics of selfhood that emerge in selfaffection and apperception. The receptive character of the
self allows the self to be in the present through its
retention with the past, while the spontaneous character of
the self maintains the presence of the self by allowing the
self to be out ahead of itself. Heidegger interprets Kant as
saying that the self is necessarily finite. This does not
mean that the self predicates finitude to itself, as if time
were merely an attribute of the self. Rather the self is
radically finite, meaning that all understanding proceeds in
terms of a temporal interpretation.
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If we recall the

three-fold synthesis of the imagination, then the temporal

130

I understand this sense of temporal understanding in
terms of Heidegger's fore-structure.
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character of the imagination operates in both the intuitive
and apperceptive dimensions. Auto-affection and apperception
are intimately bound to time, hence bound to the
imagination. If the self "in its innermost essence is time,"
then the unity of the self must emerge in terms of the
imagination.
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We do not merely understand ourselves as

finite entities. We understand ourselves essentially in
terms of f initude. Our understanding of finitude is an
understanding of our being.
If the imagination makes finitude possible and if
finitude is the meaning of temporality, then imagination and
time are the same. Since imagination and time are the same,
we must now view inner sense in terms of the imagination. As
auto-affective, the self emerges as being radically finite
in the core of its being. The radical finitude of selfaffection gives rise to two possibilities: the self is
receptive of what is given to it and apperceptive of its
temporal condition. The apperceptive condition provides
unity to what we receive.
The relationship between self-affection and
apperception raises the problem of the interpretation of
apperception as "abiding and unchanging".
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The problem is

how to reconcile apperception with the radical finitude of
the self. We cannot understand apperception either in terms
131
132

KPM, p.202.
KPM, p.197.

188
of eternity or in terms of the concept of substance.
substance is a way the self thinks permanence in experience,
and the concept of eternity lies beyond our experience and
knowledge.

133

Further, we cannot regard the temporal

determinations of selfhood as antic characterizations, i.e,
mere descriptions of an entity. Temporal determinations are
ontological determinations. The self is neither an entity in
time, nor an entity outside of time, nor is time itself an
entity.
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Rather the self and time are ontologically

connected to the extent that the "ego is so temporal that it
is time itself. 11135
The abiding and unchanging character of apperception
refers merely to the self in its temporal determination as
being out ahead of itself, i.e., anticipating unity. The
spontaneous, anticipatory unity of apperception connects
itself to receptive self-affection. The past and the future
intertwine so that the present becomes possible.
Apperception is always already there to be affected, auto133

Kant develops these issues in the Paralogisms, where
he investigates what we can know about the soul. The self
is neither eternal nor substantial in its core of being.
13•

.

Kant describes time as an a priori intuition, i.e,
as a condition of the appearance of things. Time is not seen
but makes the place of visibility possible. Thus time is not
an entity, i.e., not a receptacle where things appear. If
time were an entity, then we would have to explain how time
is itself possible as a present entity that remains absent
when entities are present. Also, if time were an entity,
then the problem of how two entities can occupy the same
space would arise.
135

KPM, p.198.
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affection is there to be unified. Both determinations emerge
in terms of the imagination, since imagination is

temporality.
Thus we understand ourselves ontologically as the
imagination, which manifests itself as a temporal unity.
Heidegger says that thinking the imagination in this sense
even makes the "name imagination inadequate", since the
imagination is "transformed into more original
possibilities.''

136

The imagination is no longer a mere

faculty of the subject, but in its temporal and synthetic
character makes subjectivity itself possible. Imagination
becomes the name for the temporal horizon and makes
transcendence possible. As Heidegger says, transcendental
imagination is ''primordial time," conceived here in terms of
its ecstatic-horizonal unity. 137 The self is thus not simply
intuitive or rational; the self is imaginative. As temporal,
the imagination makes an understanding of being possible. If
imagination is the ground of our understanding of being,
then an understanding of the being of the self emerges only
because of the imagination's unified temporal structure.
Kant sees the temporal horizon only in terms of the
objectivity of the object. Nonetheless, temporality emerges
as the ground through which we understand the being of the
object in Kant's philosophy. If we interpret Kant within the
136
137

KPM, p.147.
KPM, p.202.
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Heideggerian framework, then we see that imagination emerges
as the temporal horizon. In other words, imagination
discloses itself as the meaning of the being of the self,
which Heidegger calls Dasein. Imagination is a way we can
understand the finitude, or the care structure, of Dasein.
Imagination as primordial temporality reveals Dasein as
being

11

ahead-of-itself-already-in-(the-world)-as-Being-

alongside-( entities-encountered-within-the-world)."

138

The

imagination presents a unity of the future, the having-been
and the making-present and is what allows us to be out into
our world. Heidegger calls being out into the world
transcendence. Thus the imagination, understood as finitude,
makes transcendence possible.

C. THE HEIDEGGERIAN RETRIEVAL OF THE IMAGINATION
After showing how the imagination is temporal, how
temporality is an understanding of being, and how an
understanding of the self emerges in terms of temporality,
Heidegger undertakes a retrieval of the possibilities that
emerge in Kant's ontology. The need for the retrieval lies
in Kant's inability to thematize the temporal horizon that
emerges in his analysis of selfhood and temporality. Kant
understands time explicitly in terms of a sequence of nowpoints. However, Heidegger's analysis of the· Kantian
imagination reveals that Kant's analysis gives rise to a
138

BT, p.237.
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different possibility of understanding time than as the mere
succession of now-points. We can to understand time in terms
of finitude, and we see that finitude gives rise to the
possibility of transcendence. Since Kant does not thematize
the phenomenon of transcendence, Heidegger sees a need to
push Kant's thought beyond the intended limits of the
Kantian philosophy.
A retrieval of a thinker's thought is an act that
wrests from a thinker's thought what the thinker "intended
to say" but did not say. 139 In other words, the purpose of a
retrieval is to bring out the unsaid in the explicit saying
of a thinker's thought.
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As an explication of the unsaid, a

retrieval is an act of violence, since the purpose of the
retrieval is to generate a dissonance within the thought
being interpreted. I interpret the retrieval of the unsaid
in a thinker's thought within the Heideggerian framework as
a thematization of what metaphysical thought leaves
unthematized, and what metaphysics leaves unthematized is
the possibility of the metaphysical enterprise itself.
An explication of the unsaid does not occur
haphazardly. In other words, the violent retrieval performed
on the text is not capricious. Instead, the retrieval
139

KPM, p.206 ... Intended to say" is the translation of
"haben sagen wollen, 11 pp. 195 and 196 Kant und das Problem
der Metaphysik.

uo Heidegger says that a retrieved interpretation
should reveal "was sie als noch Ungesagtes durch das Gesagte
vor Augen legt. 11 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p.195.
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operates according to an idea that implicitly guides the
text and receives its confirmation from the text.

141

Thus the

possibilities retrieved from a text must be seen within the
text itself.
While Heidegger's conception of retrieval is unique to
his own understanding, a sense of retrieval is not foreign
to philosophy. The notion of explicating what a thinker
intended to say is not Heidegger's expression but is
actually Kant's expression.

142

Heidegger repeats Kant in the

context of his discussion in order to show that the notion
of a retrieval of a thinker's thought is integral to the
vocation of philosophy.
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My problem with this conception of retrieval
revolves around the conception of intention. This problem
also extends into the notion of the Kantian recoil. It is
one thing to derive the unsaid from the said, i.e., to
derive possibilities from the text. It is another matter to
say a thinker intended to say something when the thinker did
not intend to say it. The idea of intention introduces a
psychological element into the notion of retrieval that
should not be there. I can see in the CPR a temporal
understanding of being. However, I cannot see that Kant
intended to discuss transcendence, just as I cannot see that
Kant intended to displace the subject. What is uncovered in
interpretation and intended in analysis are two different
issues. To some extent, Heidegger conflates these issues.
142

KPM, p.207. The exact quote in Kant is found
precisely at the end of his text entitled Uber eine
Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft
durch eine altere entberlich gemacht werden soll. In this
text, Kant shows how Eberhard's attacks on the Critical
Philosophy are unjustifiable. Moreover, Kant claims that his
philosophy is the true defense of the Leibnizian philosophy.
Thus Kant sees himself as an apologist for Leibniz by
bringing out what Leibniz intended to say but did not say.
In the same sense, Heidegger sees himself an apologist for
Kant.
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The specific purpose of the retrieval in KPM is to
expose the possibilities that arise once Heidegger reveals
transcendence as the being of the subject. 143

However, the

disclosure of transcendence as the being of the 'subject' in
the Heideggerian retrieval turns metaphysics into a problem.
Metaphysics becomes a problem because Heidegger thinks what
metaphysics has left unquestioned, viz., the condition of
the possibility of metaphysics itself as it arises out of
the phenomenon of transcendence. Further, if the metaphysics
of subjectivity bases itself upon reason and if the
metaphysics of subjectivity expresses the essence of the
subject in terms of reason, then the conception of
transcendence discloses a more basic understanding of the
subject than rationality discloses. In other words,
subjectivity also becomes a problem.
The Heideggerian retrieval involves developing an
understanding of the self beyond the confines of the
metaphysics of subjectivity. In terms of the retrieval, the
self does not understand him/herself in relation to
entities. Instead, the self understands him/herself in
relationship to being, i.e., the self understands
143

KPM, p.213. Heidegger also calls the transcendence
of the subject the "subjectivity of the subject.'' Heidegger
means by subjectivity of the subject a disclosure of the
being of the subject and the subject's understanding of
being. Since the subjectivity of the subject is not
questioned in metaphysics, the designation of the self in
terms of subjectivity loses its power. A need arises for a
term that designates the self in terms of the character of
transcendence, which Heidegger calls Dasein.
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him/herself as the entity that has an understanding of
being. Specifically, Heidegger understands the self as an
entity that asks after the meaning of being. 144 Thus, an
understanding of the self arises in terms of questioning,
and, in fact, Heidegger understands the self as a
questioner. So, I stand in a relationship to being as a
self, and my basic question becomes: how am I implicated in
an understanding of being, or how am I implicated in
metaphysics?
In this section, I develop the sense of the self as
the questioner that emerges in the retrieval and the
ramifications that emerge in this conception of selfhood. In
order to develop Heidegger's conception of the self as the
questioner, I focus on two possibilities that arise in the
retrieval. First I investigate Heidegger's retrieval of
Dasein from his analysis of the transcendence.of the
1

subject. Second I examine the disruptive effect of the
retrieval upon the metaphysics of the subject that bases
itself in reason. In the first part of my investigation of

tu BT, p.27. I want to make two comments. First,
Heidegger undertakes an investigation of Dasein in BT. We
are Dasein, and Dasein is the one who asks the question of
being.The entirety of BT is a working out of the being of
the questioner, so that we may arrive at an understanding of
being in general.
Second, I maintain the translation of der Sinn des
Seins as the meaning of being to maintain the continuity
with the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of BT. I could
translate the phrase as "the sense of being," but the exact
translation is not as important in this instance as .
understanding the meaning of what Heidegger is trying to
convey.
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the retrieval, I perform an interpretation of Heidegger's
analysis of Dasein in the fourth section of KPM. In the
second part of the retrieval, I show why the sense of
selfhood that arises in the retrieval disrupts the
metaphysical conception of subjectivity. For the first part
of the retrieval, I remain within the confines of KPM.
However, in order to undertake the second part of the
retrieval I must move beyond the confines of KPM, since
Heidegger does not develop the problem of the displacement
of the subject and the decentering of the ground of
metaphysics in this text. Instead, Heidegger brings us in
KPM to the point where the question of the ground arises and
then ends the text with the question of ground. Thus, I
extend my analysis into the MFL and the text On the Essence
of Ground. Heidegger undertakes an analysis of the problem
of the displacement of the subject and the decentering of
the ground in these two texts, in order to develop the issue
regarding the question of the ground and the understanding
of the self as the questioner.us
145 I find it interesting that Heidegger raises these
two possibilities in terms.of questions. The retrieval of
Dasein from the transcendence of the subject occurs through
a structure and order of questioning that constantly drives
Heidegger to the place where the.questioning begins.
Essentially, the retrieval Heidegger undertakes in KPM moves
through two basic questions: how does transcendence, which
leads to f initude, turn metaphysics into a problem; and how
does finitude disrupt the metaphysical project of rational
selfhood? The theme of the first question moves from the
issue of transcendence to the issue of finitude, while the
theme of the second question shows how an understanding of
(continued ... )
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The retrieval of Dasein in KPM begins with an
examination of the type of inquiry that arises from
transcendence. For Heidegger, the transcendence of the
subject requires an ontological, not an anthropological
inquiry. A study of the subjectivity of the subject is not
an anthropological study because the investigation of
transcendence is not a study of the relationship between
entities. Instead, a study of the subjectivity of the
subject is a study of myself in relationship to entities as
a whole. In other words, the investigation of transcendence
is an investigation of being. Thus the inquiry that arises
from transcendence is ontological.
Heidegger shows how the investigation of transcendence
is not an antic-anthropological study through an
interpretation of Kant's understanding of the basic
interests of the human entity. For Kant, there are three
essential interests that the human entity possesses and that
are basic to any other interest that may arise.

146

Kant

expresses these three interests in terms of questions. These

145

( ... continued)
being arises out of Dasein's finitude and displaces the
concept of the rational subject from its place of
prominence.
146

The word 'interest' literally means 'to be in
between'. Thus an interest is a mode of being that places us
in the midst of things or concerns. This no+ion of interest
fits in very well with Heidegger's thought. For Heidegger,
an interest places us in the midst of entities and brings
these entities to show themselves, so that they can be
questioned in terms of their being.
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questions are: "what can I know?"; "what ought I to do?":
and "what may I hope for?"

(A805,B833). These questions

express different modes of being for the human entity: the
metaphysical, the ethical and the teleological modes of
being. The three questions express the interests of the
human entity in terms of an ability, an ought and a
permissibility.

14 7

According to Kant, the three basic

interests and the questions that arise from them are really
subdivisions of one question, viz., "what is man?"

148

In the analysis of the basic questions and their
reference to the encompassing question of the self, or to
the subjectivity of the subject, Heidegger shows why

147

Heidegger turns the auxiliary verbs of konnen,
sollen and dtirfen into nouns. Sherover translates these as
power, duty and hope, while I translate them as ability,
ought and permissibility. I try to maintain the verbal
quality, since Heidegger concerns himself with the act of
questioning and what the act of questioning reveals.
148

KPM, p. 214. The question "what is man?" arises in
Kant's Logik, Section III, A26. In the actual text of the
Logik, Kant says that the question "what is man?" is
11
anthropological, 11 and that the three other questions refer
to the issue of who I am. In other words, the question of
who I am is the most basic question and the other three
questions are derived from it. If Kant intends the question
of the self to be strictly anthropological, i.e.,
understands anthropology as empirical, then the reference to
the other questions does not make sense. Instead, since the
self implicates him/herself in the other three questions, an
answer to the three questions leads to a sense of a complete
understanding of the self in Kant's thought. This complete
sense of the self must have both transcendental and
empirical ramifications. Thus the question "what is man?"
must transcendentally encompass the other questions.
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the interests lead to the basic questions. 149 The interests
lead to questions because the interests possess a mode of
compulsion. I find myself situated in the midst of entities,
and these situations call for me to respond to what is
around me. In other words, the interests compel me to ask
basic questions about my existence and to try and understand
my existence.
The fact that the interests find their true expression
as questions reveals something about myself, viz., that I am
not self-contained, or self-present, in my existence. In
other words, the act of questioning itself reveals an
absence that essentially belongs to me. The absence finds
expression through the act of questioning.
A mode of absence arises in each of the interests.
First an absence arises in terms of my knowledge. My ability
to know something is only possible because I do not know
what I want to know. A certain sense of ignorance underlies
the ability to obtain knowledge, and I reveal to myself that
there are limits to my knowledge. The notion of limitation
reveals a lack of completion. So my ability to ask what I
149

Heidegger interprets the last question, "what is
man?" in terms of the question of selfhood and the
subjectivity of the subject, or transcendence. In this
context, another possible formulation of the question "what
is man?' is "who am I? 11 The later formulation takes into
account a sense of selfhood and distinguishes the sense of
the being of the self from the self as a thing. Thinking of
myself as a who is not the same as thinking of myself as a
what. The transition from the what to the who shows that I
implicate myself in the question of being, and that I am not
simply one entity among other entities.
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can know reveals a non-ability at the same time. The nonability is not a lack that we can fill. Instead, the nonability expresses a basic sense of finitude,

in the sense

that what I am not able to know is always outstanding,
stands out ahead of me. within what I am able to know. lSO
Second an absence arises in terms of actions. When I ask
myself what I ought to do, I reveal to myself that I am not
complete. My actions stand out in front of me as things that
I ought or ought not to do. In other words, the actions
stand out in front of me as actions that I have not yet
performed. The character of the not-yet reveals my finitude.
Third a sense of absence reveals itself in hope. Nhen I ask
myself what I may hope for, i.e., what is permissible, I am
asking for both what I can expect and what I cannot expect.
The mode of expectation reveals a sense of
privation reveals a sense of finitude.
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11

privation,

11

and

I express the

privation in terms of hoping for what is not yet here, as
150

Heidegger says that the non-ability that manifests
itself with the interest of knowledge is a 11 Unbert1hrtheit 11
from all lack and the nothing. Sherover translates this as
absence, but distance might be a better translation than
absence. Heidegger does not conceive of the non-ability as
an absence of deficiency and the nothing. Instead, Heidegger
conceives of the non-ability as distance, or a non-contact,
with deficiency and the nothing. The non-ability opens up
the place where deficiency and the nothing can be
experienced, but the non-ability keeps the deficiency and
the nothing at a distance in the sense that they cannot be
filled. Thus the non-ability itself is not a deficiency but
an excess. The non-ability may give rise to a desire for
knowledge, but the non-ability is not itself a desire. Kant
und das Problem der Metaphysik, p.210.
151

KPM, p. 223.
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well as recognizing that some things that I may hope for can
never be.
In each of the interests, there is a reference back to
the self. In other words, the interests give rise to a mode
of self-understanding, and, according to Heidegger, finitude
is the mode of self-understanding that arises in the
interests. The three interests reveal finitude in two ways.
First, the ability to ask the questions, i.e., to have an
interest in such matters, means that we find ourselves
already in the world in the midst of entities. My ability to
know something, to decide what I ought to, and to know what
is allowable in terms of hope expresses the fact that I find
myself situated in the world. In other words, I find myself
thrown into the world. Second, the questions are
projections. The questions show me that I am not complete,
and that I stand out into my world in various modes of
expectation. Thus I am equiprimordially situated in my world
and directed out into my world. This mode of being already
in a world among entities and being directed out into the
world as ahead of myself is what Heidegger means by
finitude, or care. As modes of thrown projection, the three
interests reveal the finitude of our reason.
We are only given something to think due to the finite
character of our existence.

152

Thus another factor besides

152 Reason itself cannot give rise to the interests. If
reason could give rise to the interests, then god,
(continued ... )
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reason must give rise to our interests. Heidegger locates
this other factor in our transcendence and hence in our
finitude. In Kant, our finitude finds its expression in our
sensible character, i.e., in our temporal character. In
other words, our finitude gives rise to the interests that
reason holds close to the heart.
Thus the interests are a result of our finite
transcendence. If we were not transcendent, thrown and
projected into our world, we would have no interests. The
interests are only expressions of who we are, i.e.,
expressions of our being, and thus are only expressions of
our finitude. We do not direct our basic interests towards
specific entities. Instead, we direct our basic interests
toward entities as a whole, since the interests are modes of
our being.

153

However, the fact remains that the direction of

our interests towards entities as a whole presupposes an

152

{ ... continued)
understood as the most rational entity, would have
interests. By definition, however, god cannot have
interests, since the possession of an interest always
involves an absence. Since the conception of god includes
necessarily the concept of completion, god cannot have
interests and cannot question. The idea of god possessing no
interests presents a problem for the Jewish and Christian
conceptions of god, since these conceptions always imbue god
with human attributes.
153 For example, the interest I take in my ability to
know something is not directed toward a specific entity.
Instead, my interest in my ability to know something is
directed toward the conditions of the possibility of knowing
anything. The same is true of my actions and my hopes.
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understanding of the being of entities as such.

154

Thus our

basic interests push us back to the question of being and to
the question of our understanding of being.
The interests are not initially explicit,
comprehensive understandings of our being in the world.
Instead, the interests are initially pre-thematic, i.e.,
they are what make it possible for us to be open to
entities. Thus, the interests presuppose that we understand
an entity in terms of its being and that we already find
ourselves existing in the midst of entities.

155

In other

words, asking a question about what an entity is presupposes
a question of the being of the entity.
Thus the interests allow us to be open to
possibilities. For Heidegger, one of the most basic
possibilities we possess is the ability to make a thematic
study of our basic possibilities. If our basic possibility
lies within our understanding of being in terms of finitude,
then we can thematize our understanding of being. Since we
first understand being prethematically, the need to clarify

154

I translate the German word Seiendheit as beingness.
I understand beingness as a particular mode of being of a
type of entity. I reserve the term being for Sein, and I use
the word being to designate being as such.
There are as many types of beingness for Heidegger as
there are types of entities. Since there are different types
of entities, there are different conceptions of beingness.
The question that arises for Heidegger is how to understand
being in terms of its unity.
155 Heidegger calls this fact of our existence the
hermeneutical circle.
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the meaning of being arises. From this prethematic
understanding of being, the question arises for Heidegger:
how does the human entity understand being? In other words,
the question of being, die Seinsfrage, arises.
Just as the basic interests and the questions that
arise from the interests are due to our finitude, so too the
question of being arises for us because of our f initude.
Since finitude lies at the basis of the interests, finitude
lies at the basis of our understanding of being. Moreover,
since the human entity understands being through finitude,
the thematization of finitude should result in the explicit
understanding of being. However, if the thematization of
finitude becomes the mode of access to an understanding of
being, then the entity that understands itself as being
finite becomes the mode of access to being. In other words,
the entity that asks the question of being becomes the
central focus of the inquiry into our understanding of
being.
Since the entity that asks the question of being is a
self, Heidegger begins to investigate the being of the
questioner.

156

This new sense of selfhood H~idegger calls

Dasein. Heidegger understands Dasein to be the human
entity's mode of being in his/her relationship to the being
156 Heidegger understands the being of the human entity
in terms of questioning. However, I am only introducing
Dasein at this point. The reason why Heidegger understands
Dasein this way will not become clear until I deal with the
issue of ground.
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of entities. In every encounter with entities, our Dasein is
also manifest. The understanding of being is there with us
in any encounter of entities, and thus is there with us at
all times. Thus the question of being arises out of our very
existence.
Heidegger understands existence as always being in the
midst of entities manifest to ourselves and to other things
which are not us. Our relationship to these entities shows
us our

11

dependency 11 upon the entities for their appearance

or manifestation.

157

As being dependent upon entities, the

dependency shows that I have power neither over entities nor
over myself, i.e., I am not creative of entities. My very
existence is an

11

irruption 11 into entities as a whole.

158

The

irruption of Dasein into the totality of entities makes
possible the emergence of entities as entities. This is
Dasein's existence, i.e., to be given over to entities and
"of being answerable to oneself as an entity. 11159 The
irruption is a result of my finitude.

I understand my

existence in terms of my finitude, and my finitude is my

157

KPM, p.235.

158

KPM, p. 235. The word translated as irruption is
Einbruch. The word also means invasion or burglary. Our
emergence into entities as a whole is an invasion, an act of
violence that does not result in mastery over entities. My
irruption into entities as a whole disturbs their
tranquility, and entities appear as entities for the first
time. However, I can only recognize my dependency upon
entities in the irruption.
159

KPM, p.236.
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understanding of being.
If I understand being in terms of finitude and
finitude is the fundamental way I find myself in the world,
then I always exist with an understanding of being, and
therefore the possibility of metaphysics is not a foreign
possibility to me. In other words, I do not need to go
outside of my existence in order to take up metaphysics. On
the contrary, the fact that I always already have an
understanding of being shows that metaphysics is a
possibility that arises out of my own existence. If
metaphysics is possible only upon the basis of my finite
existence, then metaphysics is only possible because we
exist as Dasein. Thus the metaphysics of Dasein takes on a
different meaning than simply a thematic study of the
structures of being of Dasein. Instead Dasein is
metaphysical, i, e,

I

Dasein happens as metaphysics.

160

The

irruption of Dasein into entities as a whole and his/her
existing with a preconceptual understanding of being show
that metaphysics is Dasein's "destiny."

161

We can thematize

160

The idea of Dasein happening as metaphysics is a
retrieval of Kant's idea o~ metaphysics as a natural
disposition in the CPR.
161

KPM, p.239. We can only understand destiny as the
way in which we find ourselves situated in the world. In
other words, thrownness gives rise to an understanding of
destiny. Our destiny is not a result of some· agency that
predestines us. For Heidegger, our irruption into entities
as a whole has nothing to do with the concept of agency. Our
thrownness occurs neither through ourselves nor anot~er
entity. We find ourselves as irrupted, i.e., thrown into our
world.
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our understanding of being only because Dasein exists as the
metaphysical event him/herself.
Heidegger calls the understanding of being a
projection, i.e., an understanding that we have out in front
of ourselves in our encounter with entities. Heidegger says
an understanding, or a projection, 11 is not only a mode of
cognition, but is primarily a fundamental moment of
existence in general. 11162 Heidegger means that being can be
cognized, but for the most part being is not cognized.
Instead, our understanding of being is more basic than our
cognition of being. I exist with an understanding of being,
which does not need to be thematically cognized.
However, we can thematize our understanding of being
and bring our understanding of being explicitly out in the
open. Heidegger calls the thematization of being a
"construction. 11163 In other words, a construction is the
thematization of a projection of being. Fundamental ontology
is an example of a construction, since fundamental ontology
makes the ontological structures of Dasein explicit.
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KPM, p.241. I have altered the English translation.
The German reads 11 ••• nicht nur eine Art des Erkennens,
sondern primar ein Grundmoment des Existierens uberhaupt
ist ... 11 German text, p.226.
163
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KPM, p.240.

If metaphysics is onto-theology, i.e., both a study
of being as such and a study of entities as a whole, then I
must grasp metaphysics from an understanding of f initude. In
Kantian terms, this means that general metaphysics, which
Heidegger interprets as the study of being as such, has to
(continued ... )
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However, since the possibility of metaphysics resides
within Casein, the construction of fundamental ontology
takes place as a recollection.

165

The fact that construction

takes place as recollection leads Heidegger to note that the
understanding of being and ourselves is not explicitly there
with us at all times. Instead, we generally comport
ourselves toward entities in our everyday dealings with
them. Being is forgotten for the most part. Thus a
constructive recollection of our understanding of being must
investigate the oblivion of being.

166

For Heidegger, the finitude of Casein lies within the
16'

( ... continued)
be developed prior to special metaphysics, which Heidegger
interprets as the study of entities as a whole. Thus
Heidegger retrieves the idea of the distinction between
general metaphysics and special metaphysics in terms of the
distinction between being as such and entities as a whole.
In terms of Heidegger's understanding, fundamental ontology
becomes the inquiry into being as such and metontology
becomes the inquiry into entities as a whole. The idea for
Heidegger is that being as such must be understood prior to
an understanding of entities as whole, since an
understanding of entities as a whole presupposes an
understanding of being.
165

Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p. 227. The
word I am translating as recollection is Wiedererinnerung.
166

In Heideggerian circles, oblivion is the translation
of Vergessenheit. The word 'oblivion' has both a strong and
a weak sense. The strong sense means complete forgetfulness,
while the weak sense means an instance of forgetting. While
it is true that Heidegger contends that the tradition of
Western Philosophy has never investigated the meaning of
being, nonetheless a sense of being has always emerged in
the tradition. Thus being has not been completely forgotten.
We must understand oblivion in the weak sense. The idea of
complete forgetfulness borders on the contradictory, since
if something is completely forgotten, then the forgotten
thing cannot even be recalled as forgotten.
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oblivion of being. This means that for the most part we
understand being in terms of our everyday dealings with
entities and others, which we are lost and absorbed in for
the most part. Thus any thematic approach to our
understanding of being must show how the understanding of
being is already at work in our everydayness. As already
being in the world, Dasein is indigent, i.e., in need of an
understanding of being that is not determined by the
oblivion of being. In Heidegger's understanding, this means
that we must become aware of our transcendence and finitude,
so that we can come to an understanding of our finitude. In
other words, we must come to an understanding of ourselves
in our temporal character.
My finitude gives rise to a conception of selfhood
that differs from the conception of self-consciousness that
emerges in the metaphysics of subjectivity. In other words,
the conception of the self as Dasein displaces the
conception of the self as self-consciousness. Displacement
means neither eradication nor forgetfulness.

Instead,

displacement means moving something out of its place. Once
Dasein becomes the basic understanding of

~he

self, self-

consciousness can no longer occupy this position. Heidegger
retrieves this possibility from the Kantian analysis itself.
On the one hand, Kant is describing the structures of
immanence, i.e., the relationship between the subject and
its corresponding object. In other words, Kant is trying to
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establish how there are structures of representation that
constitute the being of the object. As long as we remain
fixed upon the notions of understanding and reason, we will
continue to understand the Kantian project in terms of the
structures of immanence. On the other hand, once we can see
finite transcendence emerge out of the imagination, the
conception of the immanent, rational subject must come into
question. The Heideggerian retrieval of the imagination
shows us how we are already in the world. The work done in
the CPR "threatens the supremacy of reason and the
understanding. 11167 Thus a displacement of the conception of
the rational subject takes place once we see the
understanding of being in terms of finitude.
Thus the deed, or the Geschehen, of the Kantian
philosophy presents Heidegger with the problem of how to
understand the phenomenon of ground. While Kant's explicit
intention in the logos of the CPR is to expose the rational
ground of metaphysics, the deed of the Kantian laying of the
foundations shows that reason does not function as the
ground. Instead, the imagination emerges as transcendence
and supplants reason. Heidegger's insights into the Kantian
conception of the imagination bring the Copernican
revolution into question by displacing reason and the
corresponding understanding of the rational subject from its
167

KPM, p. 252. The understanding of being in terms of
finitude also threatens the conception of logic that arises
in epistemological circles.
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foundational position. Instead of reason being the ground of
metaphysics, the imagination, understood in terms of
finitude,

is what makes metaphysics possible. By placing the

imagination at the basis of the subject, Kant places us
before the "abyss,

11

or

11

Abgrund" of metaphysics.

168

In the Heideggerian retrieval, the displacement of
the subject from its foundational position results in a
replacement, i.e., Dasein comes to take the place of the
subject. However, the replacement of the subject with Dasein
is not a mere exchange of one conception of the self for
another, because the replacement of the subject in this
instance carries with it a displacement of the basic
concepts that belong to the subject, viz., the concepts of
unity and ground. Thus the displacement of the subject and
its replacement with Dasein is not a simple decentering and
recentering as would be the case in metaphysics.

169

The

displacement of the subject and its replacement with Dasein
brings the concepts of reason, unity and ground into
question. In other words, we cannot understand the
decentering that occurs in the retrieval as a simple
recentering. So the question arises: how does Heidegger
168
169

KPM, p.222. German text,·p.209.

I discussed the ideas of decentering and recentering
in the first chapter. The entity that occupies the ground
may change in metaphysics, but the idea of the ground does
not change. Regardless of whether the ground is god or the
subject, the concepts of ground and unity maintain their
priority. In Heidegger's thought, these concepts become
questionable.
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understand the phenomenon of ground within the framework of
the displacement of the subject and its replacement with
Dase in?
The explicit investigation of this question does not
occur in KPM, and thus the inquiry into the question of
ground pushes my investigation beyond the retrieval
undertaken in KPM.

170

Nonetheless, I must recall that

Heidegger's undertaking in KPM is an investigation into the
foundation, Grundlegung, of metaphysics. In other words,
Heidegger is seeking for the ground of the possibility of
metaphysics in KPM. Thus Heidegger's investigation into the
foundations of metaphysics is an investigation into the
phenomenon of ground. By taking an explicit investigation of
the phenomenon of ground, I am continuing the construction
already at work in KPM.

171

170

As I stated in the introduction to this chapter,
Heidegger investigates the phenomenon of ground in the
lecture course entitled The Metaphysical Foundations of
Logic and the essay Vom Wesen des Grundes, so I am directing
my attention to these texts.
171

The investigation in the CPR is not an analysis of
the phenomenon of ground in and of itself, but an analysis
of how to understand the ground within the context of
metaphysics. Thus Kant leaves the phenomenon of ground
undeveloped. In other words, Kant sought for the ground but
left the issue of ground unthematized.
Kant develops his conception of ground in terms of
synthesis, unlike Leibniz who understands the concept of
ground in terms of ident!~y. As Heidegger sees correctly,
the principles of all principles in Kantian thought, i.e.,
the highest principle of knowledge, is precisely the
Principle of Sufficient Reason. Kant understands the
foundational ground of knowledge to reside in the necessary
interplay of the faculties of the subject, which Heidegger
(continued ... )
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In fact, the analysis of KPM ends with an issue that
directs us to the need to investigate the phenomenon of
ground. The issue is that Dasein's indigency reveals that
oasein stands equiprimordially in the truth and the
untruth.

172

If I understand truth as the disclosure of being

and untruth as the oblivion of being, and if Dasein finds
him/herself primarily within the context of the oblivion of
being, then Dasein must recollect the truth out of his/her
untruth. Since Dasein's understanding of being emerges as a
recollection, Dasein does not primarily understand
him/herself and other entities in terms of being. Instead,
Dasein's everyday sense of understanding being is a result
of his/her comportment toward entities.
Dasein's standing in the truth and the untruth has two
consequences. First, the fact that Dasein exists in the
untruth means that he/she does not for the most part
recognize the difference between entities and being, or what
is called the ontological difference. An entity cannot be
being, since calling something an entity already presupposes
an understanding of being. Nonetheless, there is a general
confusion about the difference that finds expression in

171

( ... continued)
retrieves under the concept of transcendence. The synthetic
interplay of the faculties generates the possibility of the
understanding of being and hence generates a ontological
conception of world.
172 By untruth, Heidegger does not mean falsity. Falsity
is an antic comportment, while untruth is a mode of being.
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everyday life and in philosophy. For example, the
metaphysics of subjectivity does not recognize the
ontological difference and thus tries to establish the
entity called the subject as being.

173

Second, the fact that

Dasein exists in both the truth and the untruth, and thus
understands him/herself in terms of being or entities, means
that Dasein is free. Dasein 1 s freedom finds expression in
his/her ability either to recognize the truth or not to
recognize the truth of his/her being.

174

However, this

173

Kant falls into this problem. Kant's inability to
recognize the difference between being and entities lies in
his ambivalence on how to regard the subject. On the one
hand, Kant knows that the subject is an entity. On the other
hand, Kant sees that the subject serves as the ground of our
understanding of objectivity. The exposition of the subject
as self-consciousness does not solve the problem, since Kant
does not explicate thematically the being of the subject.
For the most part, metaphysics places being in the
entity that understands being. Thus Kant's ambivalence about
the subject arises due to the nature of subject itself,
since the subject is unique and stands out from other
entities due to its capacity to understand being.
174

The traditional, metaphysical conception of freedom
and determinism does not fit Heidegger's meaning of freedom.
In a metaphysical context, freedom is always related to
choice and determinism is always related to ground. However,
metaphysics thinks freedom and determinism ontically, i.e.,
metaphysical thought understands freedom and determinism in
terms of entities. For example, the ground.that determines
us is an entity, and choices we make freely are choices of
some particular thing or action.
The type of freedom that Heidegger is talking about is
not antic but ontological. Heidegger addresses the issue of
freedom, though not explicitly, in the beginning of BT.
Since Dasein is free, or exists as being in the world,
Dasein makes choices about his/her own being. These choices
allow Dasein to understand him/herself either as being
determined by entities or as determining him/herself from
Dasein's own possibility. In other words, Dasein can be
authentic and inauthentic because Dasein is free.
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expression of freedom depends upon an original sense of
freedom, which Heidegger calls transcendence. As
transcendent, Dasein is free. We need to see how Heidegger
understands freedom and how the phenomenon of ground belongs
to freedom.
Heidegger's mode of access into the meaning of freedom
is through the phenomenon of transcendence. In KPM,
Heidegger shows how imagination emerges as transcendence,
and we understand transcendence as being in the world. If
transcendence is being in the world and Dasein is free in
his/her transcendence, then Dasein's being in the world is a
result of Dasein's freedom. 175
For Heidegger, freedom is an ontological condition of
Dasein prior to his/her ontic state. In other words, freedom
is Dasein's a priori. If I were not existing already as
free,

i.e., as transcendent being in the

worl~,

then I would

have no choices in my dealings with other entities or other
selves. More importantly, if I were not free,

then I would

have no conception of entities and hence no self-conception.
In other words, if I were determined, then I would not
surpass entities, i.e., I would not be in a world and hence
I would not be Dasein.
The key to understanding freedom is transcendence,
i.e., only a free entity can surpass and encounter entities

175

In MFL, p.185,
Heidegger says that "Dasein's
transcendence and freedom are identical.,"
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like him/herself and other than him/herself. Thus, being
free means being in the world, i.e., surpassing entities,
seeing entities as entities and possessing an understanding
of the being of entities. Thus freedom is Dasein's way of
being, Dasein's mode of beingness, as understanding
him/herself from a world.

176

Since freedom is an

understanding of Dasein in terms of world, freedom belongs
essentially to transcendence.
If freedom and transcendence belong together, and if I
understand transcendence through temporality, then I can
understand freedom through temporality. As I show in my
analysis of the imagination, we exist transcendentally,
which means we understand the being of entities temporally.
Since Dasein is the entity who is transcendent, Dasein is
the entity who understands him/herself and the world
temporally. Dasein's self-understanding and worldunderstanding are not qualities Dasein adds to his/her
experience of things. Instead, Dasein and world happen
through temporality. Heidegger calls the happening of

176

.
Heidegger understands freedom in terms of the 'for
the sake of which. 1 In relationship to the phenomenon of
world, the 'for the sake of which' is Dasein's way of
understanding him/herself as the· stopping point of Dasein's
involvements. In other words, Dasein is the entity who has
concernful activities in the world and to whom the totality
of references refer back to in his/her concernful
activities. As free, Dasein exists for the sake of
him/herself. This statement does not mean that Dasein is
solipsistic, but that Dasein understands him/herself in
terms of his/her possibilities that arise from being in a
world.
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temporality the "temporalization of temporality. 11177
Heidegger understands freedom as the temporalization of
temporality. Temporalization is "the free oscillation of the
whole of primordial temporality. 11178 In other words,
temporalization is a unity that is both ecstatic and
contractible. 179
As oscillating, temporalization takes place as an
uninterrupted swinging, i.e., temporalization occurs in a
back and forth motion that is both contractible and
ecstatic.
177

180

As ecstatic, Dase in is transcendent, i.e.,

MFL, p.193.

178

MFL, p.208. In the Language of Difference, Charles
Scott discusses the temporalization of temporality in terms
of the middle voice, a verbal mode that is neither active
nor passive. Dasein does not generate its temporality from
him/herself nor does Dasein let time come upon him/her from
the outside. Instead, the temporalization of temporality is
the way Dasein happens.
179

The metaphor that comes to mind for temporalization
is breathing. On the one hand, temporality breathes in the
sense that it exhales and inhales, pushes out and takes in,
or expands and contracts. Thus breathing is a constant
oscillation. On the other hand, breathing must take place as
a whole that cannot become constrictive, or self-contained.
For if breathing becomes constrictive, or closed-in, we die.
180

Oscillation is the word used to translate the German
word Schwingung. Oscillation is a good word to translate
Schwingung for two reasons. First, oscillation captures the
swinging motion Heidegger is referring to in his analysis of
freedom and temporality. Second, the English word
'oscillation' comes from the Latin word 'oscillum.' An
oscillum is a mask of Bacchus that was hung in a vineyard
and swung back and forth in the wind. The Bacchus mask was
used as a charm to make the grapes grow and possibly used to
ward off crows. I find the reference to Bacchus interesting
because a mode of the oscillation of temporality is its
ecstatic character. Bacchus, as the wine god, brought on
(continued ... )

217

he/she is always already in the world. As contractible,
Dasein is always coming back to him/herself within the
world. Temporalization carries me away into the world in
terms of my projection, and yet temporality is not simply a
carrying away of ourselves into the world. As I move out
into my world, I am drawn back to myself. Thus,
temporalization is a constant movement that "reaches and
contracts itself. 11181
As a whole, temporalization occurs as a unity. If
there were no unity to the ecstatic contracting that takes
place in temporalization, then neither world nor Dasein
would

exist. In other words, there could be no

understanding of being without the unity. Thus, the
ecstatic/contractible character of temporalization requires
a unity, and Heidegger expresses the unified character of
time in terms of a horizon. Heidegger calls this horizon
"ecstamatic,

11

and the ecstamatic horizon is "the condition

of the possibility of world. 11182 World is the enclosure where
the ecstases move, and neither world nor the ecstases can
exist without the other. World happens only through the
happening of temporalization, and we only enter into our
180

( ... continued)
fits of ecstasy. So the sense of time as ecstatic is a part
of the word oscillation.
181
182

MFL, p.208.

MFL, p.208. Heidegger also says that each ecstases
has its own horizon, i.e., a mode through which the ecstasis
has its own unity.
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world when temporalization takes place. Thus the
ecstatic/contractible temporalization of Dasein is what
makes Dasein's understanding possible, and the unity of the
enclosure of world is the counterhold of Dasein.
As he/she finds him/herself already ecstatically
projected out into a world, Dasein finds him/herself
existing freely. As being in the world, Dasein surpasses
entities and thus generates an understanding of entities.
However, the fact that Dasein surpasses entities does not
mean that Dasein's freedom consists of the control of the
entities Dasein encounters. Instead, Dasein's freedom means
that Dasein lets entities be as they are and encounters
entities as they are. Thus Dasein's freedom is powerless.
Dasein does not emerge as a first cause, i.e., as a ground.
Instead, Dasein enters its world powerlessly surpassing
entities, encountering entities, and with the capability of
understanding· entities in terms of their being. 183 Thus an
understanding of being requires the freedom of Dasein and
freedom's requisite powerlessness.
Heidegger understands ground in terms of the

183

If Dasein were not powerless in his/her encounter
with entities, then Dasein would not understand entities as
they appear to him/her. Instead, if Dasein had power over
entities, then Dasein would be the cause of the entities and
Dasein would only understand entities from his/her own
ground. In other words, Dasein would not be able to
encounter entities in terms of their being at all, since
their being would never manifest itself. If Dasein were a
first cause, then Dasein would not be temporal, and thus
Dasein would not be Dasein.
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understanding of being. If Dasein comes into his/her world
and encounters entities in terms of an understanding of
their being, and if the understanding of entities in terms
of their being is the meaning of ground, then Dasein finds
him/herself in the world in the act of "grounding.

11

18t

World

entry, or the happening of temporalization, allows Dasein to
ground, and the world is where Dasein seeks for this ground.
If Dasein understands being due to his/her ability to
surpass entities, and if freedom is ability to surpass
entities, then freedom emerges as the possibility of
understanding being. Further, if understanding the ground of
entities means understanding the being of those entities,
and if freedom is the possibility of understanding entities,
then freedom is the possibility of grounding.
Since there is an interrelationship between the
phenomena of freedom and temporalization, and since freedom
is the possibility of grounding, an understanding of freedom
in terms of temporality should yield an interpretation of
the act of grounding. In other words, ground should occur
temporally. Essentially, Heidegger understands grounding in
terms of temporality and explains grounding in terms of the
unified, ecstatic character of temporality. Since there are
three components of the unified, ecstatic character of time,
there must be three ways to describe grounding. The three

lU WG, p.104,105. Grounding is an interpretation of the
German word Grunden.
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senses of grounding are: endowing/establishing, taking up a
b as i s, and

.
185
f oun d ing.

I understand the first two senses of grounding,
endowing/establishing and taking up a basis, in terms of
Dasein's futurity and having-been. 186 Grounding as endowing
takes place in terms of the future and is a way to
understand projection. When Dasein endows, Dasein
establishes for him/herself a possibility of his/her own
existence. In other words, Dasein comes to understand
him/herself and/or entities through the projection that
Dasein establishes. This endowed/established possibility is
something Dasein exists for the sake of and is something
Dasein has either chosen or taken over in his/her existence.
However, Dasein can endow/establish his/her own possibility
because Dasein is already among entities. As already being
among entities, Dasein has always already been in his/her
world. In other words, Dasein is able to project a ground
for him/herself because Dasein takes up a basis from within
185

WG, p.104. I am translating Stiften as
endowing/establishing, Boden-nehmen as taking up a basis,
and Begrunden as founding._
186

Having-been is a translation of Gewesenhei t. I do
not refer to Dasein's having-been as a past for two reasons.
First, Heidegger does not refer to Gewesenheit in terms of
the past. Second, the past denotes an event that is
completely over. Dasein's Gewesenheit is not something over
and done with as the term past denotes. Instead, Dasein
having-been is something Dasein carries with him/her as
along as Dasein exists. Thus the use of perfect tense gives
us a better sense of Dasein's 11 past, 11 since Dasein's· "past"
has happened and is continuing to happen so long as Dasein
exists.
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the world. Having already taken up a basis, Dasein can
establish his/her possibilities from this basis.

187

Thus a relationship develops between these two modes
of grounding. On the one hand, Dasein must surpass entities
in order to take up a basis in the midst of entities. In the
surpassing of entities, Dasein is able to project
possibilities. On the other hand, Dasein's possibilities are
limited by the way Dasein finds him/herself inscribed in the
midst of entities. Dasein's futurity allows him/her a mode
of understanding that arises out of his/her having-been.
The twofold relationship of grounding as
endowing/establishing and taking up a basis results in a
plurality of possible modes of grounding. In other words,
different possible senses of self-understanding occur
through this twofold grounding. Through the activity of
grounding, Dasein reveals entities and can understand
him/herself in various ways through the understanding of
entities. Thus Dasein finds him/herself disseminated in the
world, i.e., Dasein finds him/herself thrown into his/her
possibilities.
Dasein's dissemination is not accidental but is
necessary. Dasein is disseminated because Dasein is worldly.
In other words, since Dasein has the ability to endow

187 Heidegger interprets both modes of grounding in
terms of Dasein's disclosedness, or being-in. Endowing is
interpreted in terms of Verstehen and taking up a basis is
interpreted in terms of Befindlichkeit.
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possibilities from a basis that he/she takes over from
existing in the world, Dasein has "a variety of ways of
inquiring, knowing, grounding and proving" in his/her
tactical existence.

188

Endowing/establishing and taking up a basis give rise
to a third mode of grounding that Heidegger calls
founding.

189

Founding has both an on tic and ontological

meaning. As an ontic activity, founding is the ability to
substantiate or offer proofs for whatever entity is under
investigation. However, as an ontological activity, founding
is the act Dasein takes up when Oasein finds him/herself in
the world already. In other words, a person begins to seek
for the reasons or causes of entities because that person
finds him/herself irrupted into entities as a whole and
understanding preconceptually the being of entities. Thus
founding precedes and gives rise to the possibility of
proof.
As being in the midst of entities, Dasein raises the
question of 'Why?'. In fact, founding is the act that gives
rise to the 'Why?'. Thus the questions of
188
189

11

why is something

MFL, p.214.

In the German text, Heidegger says that the first
two modes of grounding 11 mitzeitigen 11 the third mode of
grounding. On the one hand, mitzeitigen means 'give rise
to. 1 On the other hand, mitzeitigen has a reference to
temporalization. Since I translate 'zeitigen' as 'to
temporalize,' I could translate 'mitzeitigen' as 'to cotemporalize.' Regardless of the translation, the use of the
term mitzeitigen expresses a connection between ground and
temporality. See WG, p.112.
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the way it is? 11

,

or "why is there something rather than

nothing?" arise due to our finite transcendence. Thus Dasein
can as founding understand him/herself disseminatively
because the need to establish a basis for Dasein's own
understanding and the understanding of entities is part of
the way Dasein exists. In other words, Dasein finds
him/herself in the world as projected and disposed and thus
finds him/herself as temporalizing. The irruption that
occurs in temporalization allows entities to appear to
Dasein and allows Dasein to question them from out of
his/her understanding of being.
The why arises because of our freedom. In other words,
Dasein can ground because Dasein is free. Thus Heidegger
characterizes Dasein's freedom as the "freedom toward
190

ground.

11

The freedom toward ground has two meanings:

first,

the freedom toward ground can mean to seek for the

reasons why things are the way they are; second, the freedom
toward ground can mean to take up a possibility out of one's
ground.
The first sense of the freedom toward ground results
in the dissemination of grounds, where Dasein understands
him/herself in a multiplicity of ways. Thus freedom finds
expression in terms of understanding, since I understand
myself in terms of possibility and the dissemination of
190

MFL, p.214. In the German, Heidegger calls Dasein's
freedom "die Freiheit zum Grunde. 11 Metaphysische
Anfangsgrunde, p. 276.
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grounds are modes of understanding. The second sense of the
freedom toward ground involves thrownness, i.e.,
understanding myself in terms of possibility involves taking
over my thrownness. As Heidegger says, the dissemination of
ground in Dasein recoils "into one ground," viz., recoils
into

11

9
thrownness in itself. n l l In other words, the

possibility for Dasein's ontic activity of grounding that is
rooted in Dasein's understanding happens only because Dasein
finds him/herself as thrown into the world. World is there
with Dasein, and, as such, Dasein finds him/herself irrupted
into the midst of entities. As thrown, Dasein cannot remove
him/herself from the world that Dasein is always in already
and thus cannot be the ground for entities or him/herself.
In other words, "Dasein never comes back behind its
thrownness.

11

192

Thus, the grounding that occurs in projection

is only possible because Dasein is thrown, and thus the
understanding that seeks into the why and how of entities is
only possible because Dasein is free.
However, the relationship between freedom and ground
is still in need of explanation. Heidegger refers to freedom
as the "ground of ground,

11

and I interpret this statement in

the context of Dasein' s thrownness. t

93

On the one hand, I can

only seek grounds because of my freedom, and thus freedom
191
192

193

MFL, p. 215.
BT, p.434.

MFL, p.214.
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becomes the possibility of grounding. In this sense, freedom
is the ground of ground. On the other hand, my ability to
seek for grounds is only a result of my thrownness, and I
cannot take control of my thrownness. Thus my freedom toward
ground is only possible if I am groundless, which means
Dasein is not a ground but is able to ground. In other
words, "freedom is the abyss of Dasein. 11194
Thus there is an abyssal character to Dasein's
existence, and the abyssal character emerges in terms of
Dase in 1 s finite transcendence or temporal i ty.

195

The

temporalization of temporality is precisely where the
powerlessness of Dasein arises. I never get outside of the
world, i.e., my transcendence is not an escape from the
world but an immersion in the world. Temporality is always
already in play, and the cessation of temporalization
results in the cessation of Dasein. Thus the abyssal
character of Dasein is not something to avoid or overcome,
since it cannot be avoided or overcome.

196

The disclosure of the abyssal character of Dasein
leads back to the sense of Dasein 1 s self-understanding. On
194

WG, p.127.

195

I have chosen the word abyssal over abysmal because
abysmal is an ugly word that possesses many negative
overtones in English. Abyssal is a synonym of abysmal does
not make Casein sound so wretched.
196 All attempts to avoid or overcome the abyssal
character of our Dasein would already be modes of grounding,
and thus the attempts would already be involved in the
abyss.
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the one hand, Dasein understands him/herself in terms of the
dissemination of grounds, and the disseminated modes of
self-understanding give rise only to factical modes of selfunderstanding. On the other hand, the abyssal character of
Dasein gives rise to an ontological mode of selfunderstanding. In this instance, Dasein understands
him/herself as being free and hence as being abyssal.
I am able to understand both the factical and
ontological modes of self-understanding in terms of the
'why.' In the factical mode of self-understanding, raising
the question why something is the way it is disseminates me.
In other words, this mode of questioning thrusts me into the
world, where I seek for the ground of things. In the
ontological mode of self-understanding, I do not direct my
question of the why toward entities. Instead, I direct the
why toward the question of why. As Heidegger states the
issue, I ask the question: "Why the why? 11197 In the question
"why the why?", the second why refers to my factical
questioning and my situatedness in the midst of entities,
while the first why refers to the inquiry into my
situatedness. In other words, the first why expresses my
freedom. This sense of the why Dasein never overcomes, since
it is the way Dasein finds him/herself in the world. Thus
Dasein is the "why-questioner" because of the abyssal free
character of Dasein.
197

MFL, p.214.
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D. THE DECONSTRUCTIVE READING OF THE KANTIAN IMAGINATION
My analysis of the Heideggerian retrieval of the

Kantian imagination results in possibilities that extend
beyond the intended limits of Kantian philosophy. However, I
do not introduce the possibilities into the text as if the
text did not suggest the possibilities. On the contrary, the
possibilities that result from extending the limits arise
from a reading of the Kantian philosophy and thus are not
external to the text. 198 Specifically, I am able to see a
sense of the self emerge in the Heideggerian retrieval of
the imagination that extends beyond the conception of
subjectivity. Further, the temporal character of the self
reveals the freedom of the self in terms of his/her
groundless character and exposes an understanding of the
self as the questioner.
However, these possibilities neither terminate the
questioning nor exhaust the possibilities present in the
Kantian imagination. As I state in the introduction to this
chapter, the Heideggerian reading of the transcendental
imagination is only one reading of Kant's thought. Thus

198

In a strict sense, the possibilities are neither
external nor internal to the text. The possibilities do not
flow from the text as conclusions from syllogisms. No text
is self-present. Instead, the possibilities arise from the
text through the play of differance. Hence, the
possibilities that flow from the text are inexhaust~ble. The
only limiting condition is that the text serves as a
guardrail for the development of the possibilities.
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there are other readings of the Kantian imagination.

199

I want to perform one of these other readings, and the
particular reading I want to perform is a deconstructive
reading. My deconstructive reading of the Kantian
imagination in this section has three parts. First I show
why the need arises to advance into a deconstructive
reading. Second I explain deconstruction. Third I perform
the deconstructive reading upon the Kantian imagination.
The need for a deconstructive reading of the Kantian
imagination arises from the results of the Heideggerian
retrieval. On the one hand, we see that Heidegger's
retrieval shows how Dasein is metaphysical. On the other
hand, we see that Dasein's metaphysical character rests in
the abyssal character of Dasein. If metaphysics and ground
belong together intrinsically, and if an abyss lies at the
basis of metaphysics, then metaphysics is groundless. The
question that arises is: how does the groundless character
affect metaphysics?
The possibility of the groundless character of Dasein
that arises out of the Heideggerian analysis of the Kantian
imagination leads to questioning the project of metaphysics
itself. In other words, I come to question the very
possibility of metaphysics and its corresponding concept of

199

As I have stated previously, there are many other
possible readings of Kant. For example, there are the
readings of the German Idealists, the Neo-Kantians, the
Frankfurt School, and the Anglo-American philosophers.
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presence. Thus, Heidegger shows that the traditional
conception of metaphysics, which I call the metaphysics of
presence, is problematic. If the purpose of the metaphysics
of presence is complete self-containment, or closure, then
metaphysics becomes a problem if presence cannot be
fulfilled. The deconstructive reading takes up the
problematic character of metaphysics and shows how the
notion of presence is necessarily self-defeating. Thus, the
deconstructive reading carries on the play of displacement
and takes us into another mode of the decentering of
metaphysics. 200
I am strategically employing the deconstructive
reading at this juncture, because the deconstructive reading
brings the very project of metaphysics into question in
toto. At the time of KPM, Heidegger's retrieval of Kant
remains too metaphysical in its orientation. On the one
hand, Heidegger is beginning to question radically
metaphysics. On the other hand, Heidegger is still exploring
the conditions of the possibility of metaphysics, albeit in
a completely different way than the metaphysical tradition
explores the conditions of the possibility of metaphysics. 201
200 One basic difference between the deconstructi ve
reading and the destructive reading is that the destructive
reading functions within the text of the oblivion of being,
while the deconstructive reading sees the oblivion of being
as part of the metaphysical text.
201 Heidegger's decentering displacement does not allow
for a strict recentering, since the ground is displaced and
(continued ... )
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I want to show at this juncture how another reading of the
Kantian imagination brings the conception of metaphysics
itself into question, and this reading provides a transition
into Heidegger's later thinking. Thus, I am going to show
through a deconstructive reading of the Kantian imagination
how an irreducible absence enters into the project of
metaphysics and thereby brings the project of metaphysics
into question.
In general, deconstruction is a strategic reading of
texts that shows how a text is structured by forces that the
text cannot account for within its own limits. In other
words, deconstruction shows that the closure, or full
presence, of a text is impossible, due to undecidable
factors within a text which Derrida calls

11

traces. 11202

Specifically within the context of metaphysics,
deconstruction is a strategic reading of the metaphysical
text that reveals how the text is structured by a movement
of "differance. 11203 The movement of differance exposes both
201

( ••• continued)
Dasein is abyssal. Nonetheless, the metaphysical project
remains, since Dasein is tpe very possibility of the project
itself. Heidegger comes to question his conception of
retrieval and his reading of Kant in his later thought.
202

Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomenon, trans. David
B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973),
p.156.
203

SP, p.129 ff. Derrida spells differance
intentionally with an 1 a 1 , in order to distinguish the word
from difference. The difference between the two is that
differance is the movement that puts the play of differences
(continued ... )
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the structured play of signification operative within the
metaphysical text and an irreducible absence, or a "trace,"
that arises within the text and disallows presence. In order
to understand these descriptions of deconstruction, I must
explain the terms text, differance, trace and strategy.
For Derrida, a text is a heterogeneous play of
differential forces that we find ourselves inscribed within
already.

204

In other words, a text is any structural

configuration of forces that results in a differential
system of signification. The text orders and structures
conceptual and practical oppositions such that meaning
arises within the text. Further, we are already interpreting
the text since we are inscribed within it. 205
What appears in the text are the oppositional forces
that structure the discourse. However, the oppositional
forces are present because of a movement within the text
203

( ••• continued)
into motion and allows the differences to differ, while
difference is a term caught up within the metaphysical
system of signification. Differance may be said to be the
possibility of difference, as long as we do not conceive of
possibility as a metaphysical term. In other words, the term
'possibility' must be put under erasure.
204

Jacques Derrida, "Critical Response,
Inquiry, 13, Autumn 1986, p.168.
205

11

Critical

We should not banally conceive of a text merely as
book or a written document. Any structure that is a play of
differential forces is a text, and thus, for example,
institutions are texts. The notion of a text as a play of
differential forces is an insight of structuralism and not a
creation of Derrida. Derrida's addition to the notion of
text is the post-structural insight of the non-closure of a
text.
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that does not appear, and this movement is called
differance. Differance is the play of "spacing" and
"temporalizing" within a text that allows the text to be a
structure of signification.

206

As a play of spacing and

temporalizing, differance is play of "differing" and
"deferring" that gives rise to the field of presence.HT
However, differance is not a present thing and is not caught
up into the system where presence is found. As Derrida
states,
Differance is what makes the movement of signification
possible only if each element that is said to be
"present," appearing on the stage of presence, is
related to something other than itself but retains the
mark of a past element and already lets itself be
hollowed igiut by the mark of its relation to a future
20
element.
I take Derrida to mean that whatever is before me only
appears because what is appearing has been spatially marked
off from what has preceded it and yet also allows the space
of what is to come. Thus the movement of differance
temporalizes and spaces, i.e., the movement of differance
allows what is being signified to be present because the
signified carries its past, awaits its future, and yet
constantly separates itself from what it is not. Thus

206

SP , p . 14 3 •

207

SP, p.136. Differance is similar to Heidegger's
conception of the ontological difference, and yet they are
not the same. Derrida understands differance as the
possibility of the ontological difference.
208

SP, p. 142.
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differance sets up a play of temporalizing and spacing, such
that spacing is "time's becoming-spatial" and temporalizing
is "space 1 s becoming-temporal. 11209
If the play of signification is to occur, then
differance must hold itself back and not appear in the play
of signification. Thus a deconstructive reading exposes an
element lying at the heart of presence such that it cannot
be drawn into presence and yet makes the notion of presence
possible. This undecidable element within a text is called a
trace. By definition, a trace cannot appear in the text,
i.e., cannot be present within a text. However, elements
arise within a text that cannot be accounted for within the
confines of the text. These elements reveal the operations
of a trace. Thus the trace is not a present thing but is a
"simulacrum of presence. 11210 The trace appears in the text
virtually in the guise of something

signified~

However, the

trace decenters and displaces the text while effacing itself
within the text. The trace has no place within the text,
i.e., it is marginal. Yet, the trace makes the space of the
text possible.
The exposure of the movement of differance and the
trace operative in the text of metaphysics, or any text,

209
210

SP, p.143.

SP, p. 15 6. The trace is an inass imi la bl e alter i ty
that opens the space of a text.
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requires a strategy, and a strategy involves

11

risk. 11211 As a

strategy, deconstruction must show how the displacement
arises out of the text itself, and it must show the
displacement by recounting the structure of a text, showing
what allows for the possibility of the structure, and
exposing the trace element within the text that gives rise
to the displacement. Further, deconstructive strategy
involves risk taking because there is no final goal in this
strategic play. However, deconstruction is not meaningless.
Instead, deconstruction affirms the unnameable play of
differance that results in the lack of totalization.
I refer to deconstruction as a strategy rather than a
method, and I make the distinction for two related reasons.
First, the notion of method is metaphysical, and thus the
use and understanding of method is already inscribed within
the metaphysical text. 212 As being within the metaphysical
text, the notion of method is capable of being subjected to
a deconstructive reading. Second, a philosophical method
attempts to gain a transcendent starting point and form the
text from the ground up, while a strategy must recognize
that there is no transcendent position and no absolute

211
212

SP, p.135.

Modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel is totally
characterized by the concept of method, i.e., these thinkers
understand philosophy as a method. Particularly, they
understand philosophy as a reflective method that analyzes
consciousness and establishes subjectivity as being.
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·
. t . 213 Th us a s t ra t egy must arise w1. th.in a t ext
star t ing
po1n
because there is nothing outside the text. Thus
deconstruction puts into question the metaphysical text from
within the metaphysical text itself, because there is no
transcendent signifier that could function as a starting
point.
The problem with trying to explain deconstruction is
that deconstruction has to do with the reading of texts.
Thus we can arrive at a better understanding of
deconstruction if I enact a deconstructive reading. As I
state above, a deconstructive reading must recount the
structure of the text in question, show what makes the text
possible, and then expose the trace within the text. I have
already allowed the Kantian text to have its say. Now I must
show how Kant's own intentions undercut his metaphysical
project and the notion of presence, i.e., I want to show
that the imagination disrupts the Kantian conception of the
metaphysics of subjectivity.
The Kantian critical project is a metaphysical project
213

In The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1986), Rodolphe Gasche describes
deconstruction as a method. However, he predicates his
description of deconstruction as a method upon an
examination of the difference between reflective method and
deconstruction. Gasche's claim is that deconstruction is not
a method in the way modern philosophy characterizes method.
To me, Gasche's approach is very convoluted. He wants
to show that deconstruction is a method but not a method
like this method and so on. Since Derrida claims that
deconstruction is not a method, I contend we should take the
claim seriously. My question to Gasche is: why not take
Derrida seriously and explain deconstruction in another way?
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and thus is a text inscribed within metaphysics. An
understanding of the notion of critique shows how the
Kantian project is inscribed within the metaphysics of
presence. The notion of critique characterizes the Kantian
project in general, and the CPR is a critique of reason.
Kant understands critique as the delimitation of the power
of reason, and Kant employs the critique in two related
directions. First, Kant establishes the transgressive
character of reason by showing that reason cannot
legitimately overstep the limiting condition of sensibility.
Thus the finite, self-conscious entity cannot know the
highest ideas of god, the world and the soul. 214 Second, Kant
establishes the proper limits of reason. Reason,
characterized as the understanding, comes to know entities
through its connection to sensibility. In the first sense of
critique, presence is an ideal, and the complete closure of
knowledge stands before us as an unattainable goal. The
ideas are necessary for the critical system, but they are in
principle never fulfilled. Reason cheats itself of
fulfillment due to reason's own structure.

215

In the second

214 The ideas have a regulative, not a constitutive,
function within knowledge. As ideas, the ideas function as
ideals that allow for the continuation of seeking knowledge.
However, the ideas are never sensibly realized. Thus the
ideas stand as the goal of the complete presence of a system
that by definition remains unattainable.
215 In this sense of critique, reason remains cheated
because reason can never attain the status of the divine.
Finite intuition will never become original intuition, and
(continued ... )
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sense of critique, a sense of presence also arises. In other
words, reason fulfills what it is capable of fulfilling, and
reason is capable of fulfilling the objectivity of the
object. As a mode of being, objectivity is a mode of
presence. Thus, a deconstruction of presence must aim at the
area where presence, or objectivity, arises, and presence
arises in the CPR in the Transcendental Analytic.
Kant's purpose in the Transcendental Analytic is to
establish a priori synthetic judgments, and these judgments
are the way presence arises. However, what makes presence
possible is synthesis, and Kant locates synthesis within the
province of the imagination. Thus, the deconstruction of
presence in the CPR must arise within the context of
synthesis and the imagination. The issue I am investigating
is how the imagination disrupts presence within the Kantian
216
t ex t .
215

( ... continued)
thus human knowing will never become divine knowing. Once
Kant frames his project in terms of the human/divine
opposition, the fulfillment of presence on the side of pure
reason must be infinitely deferred, since the human entity
can never escape his/her sensible condition.
216

One possible strategy that I am not. employing is to
play off the multivalent character of the imagination.
Simply, the imagination has within the context of
metaphysics a reference to sense and nonsense, or to reason
and non-reason, or to sanity and madness. The metaphysics of
presence has always believed the truth of the imagination to
lie on the side of reason. However, the privileging of
reason and the imagination functions within the space of the
metaphysics of presence. Once this space comes into
question, the privileged coupling of reason and imagination
comes into question, and the imagination allows for the
(continued ... )
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I locate the place of presence in the imagination
because of the imagination's synthetically productive power.
The imagination becomes the place to locate presence due to
Kant's establishment of the opposition between derivative
and original intuition.

211

Kant shows that the finite,

sensible entity cannot create his/her object, since only a
divine entity can create its object. However, the finite,
sensible entity, or the subject, is productive of the
structure of his/her representations, and thus the subject
is productive of the way the object comes to be present.
Therefore the subject is productive of objectivity, or the
presence of the object.

218

In a limited and analogous sense,

the productive power of the imagination is like the power of
the divine entity.
If imagination gives rise to objectivity and thus to
the presence of the object, then synthesis is ,the place to
locate presence. Kant describes synthesis in the A

216

( ... continued)
displacement of reason. From a Nietzschean perspective, I
could say that metaphysics has been a form of madness since
the time imagination became a part of the metaphysical
corpus.
217

Kant makes constant references in the A edition to
human intuition and other types of intuition, but he makes
an explicit distinction between derivative and original
intuition in the B edition. The seeds for the distinction
are in the A edition and are found in the Transcendental
Aesthetic and in the section dealing with the difference
between phenomenon and noumenon.
218

I established the subject 1 s production of
objectivity in the sections on Kant and Heidegger.
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Deduction, particularly in the Subjective Deduction.
Therefore I direct my attention toward this section.
Part of what characterizes the metaphysics of presence
is the privilege given to the mode of time called the
present. Thus being is interpreted within the metaphysics of
presence through a sense of the present. The privileging of
the present arises within the metaphysics of subjectivity,
and the mode of being that is interpreted through the
present is called objectivity. The purpose of objectivity is
to establish the presence of the present object. My strategy
is to see whether a play of differance arises in the
privilege given to the present. If a play of differance
arises in the present, then I must show the trace that
exposes the play of differance in the text. Moreover, if I
can show the operation of the trace, then I can claim that
this trace disrupts presence.
As Kant says, the imagination is the power of
synthesis that connects the representations provided by
sensibility and understanding. As connective of the
representations of sensibility and understanding, the
imagination is itself "blind," i.e.,

the imagination

functions without sight and is without direction (A78,B103).
Further, I understand the blind character of the imagination
to mean that the imagination is without content. The
imagination can reproduce images or produce schema, but the
content for reproduced images and produced schema arises
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from the senses and the understanding. The imagination does
not add anything to the images or the schematized concepts
but only synthesizes images and the schematized concepts.
However, there is no knowledge without the imagination.
As Kant says, "we are scarcely ever conscious" of the
synthetic function of the imagination (A78,B103). We are
rarely aware of the imagination, because we are mostly
directed toward entities such as sensible things and
concepts, and the imagination withdraws in favor of the
appearance of entities. 219 However, what happens when we
become aware of the imagination?
In order to answer this question, let us examine the
synthetic character of the imagination. As I show in the
second section of this chapter, the imagination is temporal,
and thus the three modes of synthesis that Kant describes in
the A Deduction are the three modes of temporality. Kant
discusses the present under the heading of The Synthesis of
Apprehension in Intuition. Let me recall what Kant says:
Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which
can be represented as a manifold only in so far as
the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of
one impression upon another; for each representation,
in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can
never be anything but absolute unity. In order that
unity may arise out of this manifold (as is required
in the representation of space) it must first be run
through and held together. This act I name the
219

The ambiguous character of the imagination arises
again. The closest we ever get to the imagination is our
understanding of it in terms of synthesis. Otherwise, Kant
describes the imagination always in connection with another
faculty.
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synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed
immediately upon intuition, which does indeed offer a
manifold, but a manifold which can never be
represented as a manifold, and as contained in a
single representation, save in virtue of such a
synthesis (A99).
I cite almost the entire passage of this section, because
Kant shows in this passage, contrary to his intention, that
the present is a constituted moment. Kant's intention is to
show that the present is an absolute unity, i.e., a selfcontained moment. However, what Kant shows is precisely that
the present cannot be an absolute, self-contained unity.
Essentially, Kant shows that I can represent a manifold only
insofar as one moment distinguishes itself from another
moment. In other words, the moments must differ from one
another. Without the differing that occurs temporally, i.e.,
without the spacing of impressions, the present could not
arise.

220

Each moment is an absolute unity but only as a

constituted unity. Thus each moment must be "run through"
and "held together" in order to be a moment (A99). I
interpret this act of the constitution of the present to
mean that the present only arises by deferring and differing
itself from what came previously. Each moment must

220 Heidegger points out that Kant explains time
spatially and space temporally, thus I can say that Kant
mixes his metaphors. Some thinkers believe that the mixing
of metaphors is an error that can be corrected, if we can
find the 'proper' terms for space and time. However, there
is another issue at work in this context, viz., that space
and time are inseparably connected. Thus there is no ·
unmixing of metaphors, but only the play of differance as
spacing and temporalizing.
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distinguish itself from what it is not while retaining the
past within it. Thus the present moment is a mark already
inscribed within a play of what I have described above as
differance. Thus the present only makes sense as a mark
inscribed within a text. The present arises only due to a
play of supplementation of what the present is not. 221
The idea of the supplementation of the present arises
more emphatically in the section entitled The Synthesis of
Reproduction in Imagination in the A Deduction. In this
section, Kant shows how the imagination makes experience
possible, which means that the imagination makes the present
possible. Kant shows how the imagination makes the present
possible, again contrary to his intentions, by explaining
the constitution of the present in terms of the play of
differing and deferring. 222 Kant says:
But if I were to drop out of thought the preceding
representations ... and did not reproduce them while
advancing to those that follow, a complete
representation would never be obtained: none of the
above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most
elementary representations (Grundvorstellungen) of space
and time could arise (A102).
221 The present is itself only possible due to

representation. A mode of Vergegenwartigung makes the
Gegenwartigung possible.
222 I find it interesting that Kant cannot describe any

mode of synthesis purely. He cannot describe the present
without reference to the past, he cannot the past without
making reference to the future, and he cannot describe the
future without reference to the past. This shows how the
modes of time do not make sense without being already
inscribed in a structure of signification that allows them
to refer to each other. Further, the structure of
signification shows a play of differance.
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Kant states in this passage what a sense of the present
would be outside and inside of experience. Outside of
experience, the present would be eternity without
representation, i.e., the act of always being present
without differentiation. For a hum.an entity, eternity would
be like a comatose state. However, eternity and experience
are incompatible, and experience is nothing like eternity.
Within experience, the present moment is possible only if
the present is separate from both what precedes it and what
is yet to come. The past does not become the present, as if
the present could encapsulate the past within it. The
present is not the past, and the present is not yet the
future. This spacing must remain if there is to be anything
like a present, and yet the trace of both the past and the
future make the present possible. Thus there must be a
spacing that differentiates the past, present.and future and
a temporalizing that defers closure. I can only have a
present if the present is inscribed already in the play of
signification. Since imagination is what allows the present
to emerge as present through a play of differing and
deferring, I can understand the imagination in terms of the
play of differance.
If the imagination generates the play of differance in
the CPR, then the imagination functions as a trace. However,
a trace is only a simulacrum. of presence but is not itself
present. In the CPR, the imagination appears in the text.

244

So, if the imagination is a trace, how can I account for the
appearance of the imagination in the CPR? As I have shown,
the imagination has an ambiguous character in the CPR. On
the one hand, Kant presents the imagination as a faculty of
the subject. As a faculty,

the imagination is inscribed in

the text of the metaphysics of subjectivity, since
imagination belongs to and is an essential part of the
subject. On the other hand, the imagination is what makes
the space of presence possible and thereby sets the Kantian
text in motion. In other words, the CPR becomes a
differential play of forces through the play of the
imagination. As such, I can no longer understand the
imagination as a faculty, since the imagination allows for
both the possibility of subjectivity and objectivity.
Understood as a trace, the imagination is marginal, i.e.,
does not appear in the text, or is not present in the text.
Heidegger refers to the ambiguous character of the
imagination in KPM when he suggests that the name
'imagination' is no longer adequate for the possibilities
that emerge in the analysis of the imagination in the CPR.
If I may be allowed to phrase this insight in a
deconstructive manner, the name 'imagination' is no longer
adequate because the imagination sets the field of naming,
or signification, into play. As such, the entry of the
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imagination into the text would displace the text. 223 Thus
the imagination disrupts presence, and the critical project
comes into question.
The disruption of presence within the metaphysics of
subjectivity results in a decentering of the subject. In
this decentering, a recentering is no longer possible, since
the possibility of the subject resides with the imaginative
play. Thus the subject is not self-constituting. Instead,
the subject finds itself inscribed within a text that owes
its possibility to the play of differance.
The question arises: does the disruption of the
subject in the deconstructive reading lead to an
understanding of the self as the why-questioner, i.e., as
Dasein? The answer to this question is no. By answering this
question negatively, I do not mean that questioning ceases.
Instead, I mean that questioning arises as a responsive
gesture. As being responsive, questioning cannot be the
primary designation of the self because questioning can only
be a response to something. Thus asking the question 'why?',
223 As a trace, I can say that the imagination appears
on the margin of the text. Further, if the imaginative trace
were incorporated into the text of the CPR, which is a text
of the metaphysics of presence, the CPR would displace
itself. Heidegger attempted to incorporate the imagination
into the text and developed a totally different text than
the CPR.
The notion of the imagination as a marginal trace
suggests another way to understand the Kantian recoil
besides Heidegger's way. I can say that Kant recoiled from
his insights into the imagination, because the imagination
not only disrupted Kant's project but also disrupted the
entire project of metaphysics.
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or 'why the why?', is only possible if a condition exists
that makes the response possible.
There are signs of the responsive character of the
question in Heidegger's early works, even though he does not
thematically develop it there. Specifically, Heidegger
expresses the responsive character of the question in his
phenomenological description of the formal structure of the
question in BT. Heidegger describes questioning as a
"seeking," and "every seeking gets guided before by what is
sought. 11224 In fact, Heidegger says that every seeking has
11

its preceding guide. 11225 Heidegger understands the guide as

the understanding of being that we possess already in our
tactical existence, only because he is seeking the meaning
of being as such rather than discussing the possibility of
questioning in itself. However, the sense that there is a
guide expresses the fact that there is a condition prior to
the questioning, and that the questioning only arises as a
response to this condition. How can I understand this prior
condition?
In a certain sense, Heidegger provides a clue to the
prior condition in his discussion of self as the whyquestioner. Within a Heideggerian framework, what makes it
possible for me to ask a question is my thrownness. I am

224
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See

sz,

BT, p.24.
The German text reads, "sein vorgangiges Geleit.
p. 5.

11
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free to ground, i.e.,

I am free to question, because I am

thrown into my world.

However, I can never get behind the

thrownness, and thus I

remain abyssal. As being thrown into

the world, I can say I am inscribed within the world.
Questioning arises as a response to this inscription. In
other words, if I were not thrown, then I would not
question.
If I understand questioning as a response to my thrown
inscription, tnen questioning has to affirm this condition
prior to questioning.

Thus the affirmation of the thrown

inscription stands prior to the act of questioning. In this
context, affirmation is neither an act of judgment nor an
intentional act. Instead, the affirmation is how I find
myself as being inscribed in a text. As being prior to the
act of questioning, the affirmation provides the space where
the questioning can occur. As arising out of the play of
inscription, I come to understand that I am not the
constituter of possibilities. Instead, if I may be allowed
to use a Nietzschean expression, I come to understand myself
as the yes-sayer, where the affirmation results from my
textual inscription and dissemination.
226

226

The problem of language arises in this context, but
the problem extends beyond the confines of the dissertation.
Thus I cannot develop the issue in the body of the text.
However, allow me to mention the issue. The issue begins at
the end of WG. It is possible to interpret founding, i.e.,
the third mode of grounding, in terms of a mode of Dasein's
disclosedness called discourse. Poggler interprets founding
in this manner (Path of Thinking, p.73). This interpretation
(continued ... )
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The reference to Nietzsche brings me back to the
history of an error. In a certain sense, I can say that my
dissertation has been an interpretation of this history. On
the one hand, I have offered an interpretation of the
error/era of the Kantian subject. Through this
interpretation I have shown how Kant's project is
ontological, how he understands the being of the object in
terms of subjectivity, how the imagination retains its
priority in both editions of the CPR, and how the
Heideggerian idea of the recoil is questionable. On the
other hand, I have offered an interpretation of the era of
Zarathustra. Through this interpretation I have shown
through two double readings how the imagination disrupts and
decenters the idea of subjectivity, and how this disruptive
decentering gives rise to other possible modes of selfunderstanding. Thus I come full circle in my dissertation
226

( ... continued)
is possible because founding requires proof on an antic
level and thus requires an articulation of an understanding.
However, the ontological sense of founding gives rise to the
basic question for Heidegger, or to the why. The basic
question does not simply emerge as an articulation of an
understanding. Instead, the question gives rise to the
possibility of articulation and possibly to the very
possibility of understanding, suggesting to me that a sense
of language other than discourse is beginning to emerge in
Heidegger's thought. This other sense of language would lead
to the sense of affirmation and the responsive character of
questioning, since questioning would find itself inscribed
in this other sense of language. In other words, the issue
of language has something to do with thrown inscription.
Derrida raises the issue of language and affirmation in both
"The Ends of Man" and Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question.
If I were to expand upon this issue, I would have to develop
the insights in these texts.
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and pull the beginning into the end. Only now I must
recognize that the end is only a place for a new beginning,
and that I too am inscribed in the text.

SUMMARY
This dissertation is an investigation into the mode of
self-understanding that arises once the conception of
subjectivity is displaced from its foundational position in
metaphysics. I examine the problem of the displacement of
the subject by focusing on the philosophy of Kant and
Heidegger. I choose Kant and Heidegger for two reasons:
first, Kant's Copernican Revolution places the subject at
the ground of metaphysics and defines the place of the
subject in philosophy up to the contemporary period; second,
Heidegger's investigation of Kant displaces the metaphysical
conception of the subject and gives rise to other possible
understandings of the self.
The dissertation consists of four chapters. First, I
develop the problem of displacement, place my dissertation
{

within the context of contemporary thought, and discuss
three modes of reading the history of philosophy. These
three readings are the polemical, the destructive and the
deconstructive. Of the three readings, I choose to conduct
both a destructive and a deconstructive reading of the
history of philosophy.

Second, I explain the Kantian
250
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conception of subjectivity in terms of the Copernican
Revolution. Here, I introduce the Kantian conception of the
imagination through an investigation of the imagination's
empirical employment. Third, I examine the relationship
between the imagination and subjectivity as it emerges in
the two transcendental deductions of the Critique of Pure
Reason. In this chapter, I show the ontological priority of
the imagination in Kant's thought. Contrary to the
'orthodox' body of Kantian interpretation, I argue that Kant
retrieves the findings of the A deduction within the B
deduction and that the imagination maintains its place of
importance in Kant's thought. Fourth, I examine Heidegger's
understanding of the imagination in Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics. I show how the temporal character of the
imagination displaces the conception of a self-grounding
subject and replaces the subject with an understanding of
ourselves as Dasein, or as the questioner. After discussing
this mode of the self, I show how the imagination
deconstructs subjectivity and the metaphysical project. The
deconstructive reading leads to a discussion of the self
within a Derridean and Nietzschean context.
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